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Summary
In the course of the European integration process, the nature of borders and border
regions has undergone major changes. Border regions on the former external border of
the European Union (EU-15) in particular have transformed from peripheral regions at
the edge of the European Union (EU) to more central ones within an enlarged EU. The
four essays in this dissertation focus on these border regions and assess various aspects of
the European Eastern integration process in these regions. Conceptually, the four essays
are based on two approaches to the study of borders and border regions in economic and
regional geography: the flow approach and the cross-border cooperation approach that
are introduced and discussed in the introduction of this dissertation (Chapter 1).
Following the flow approach, the first two essays (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) evaluate
the effects of two major institutional reforms, namely the EU Eastern enlargement in
May 2004 and the accession of Poland and the Czech Republic to the Schengen Zone in
December 2007, on the economic performance and public security in the Eastern border
regions of the EU-15. Both essays apply quasi-experimental research designs to establish
causal inference. Results in Chapter 2 show that on average, no statistically significant
enlargement effect can be observed. The average effect, however, veils the fact that border
regions are differently affected by the enlargement: the economic enlargement payoffs
seem to be driven mainly by the regional economic performance and industrial structure
prior to the enlargement as well as the regions’ endowment with physical infrastructure.
Regarding the effects of abolishing border controls at the German-Polish and German-
Czech border on public security in German border regions, that are assessed in Chapter 3,
results show that no significant effects can be observed for overall crime rates in German
border regions as well as for most types of criminal offenses. The rate of burglaries
in border regions, however, increased statistically significantly following the Schengen
Acquis.
Following the cross-border cooperation approach, the third and fourth essays (Chapter 4
and Chapter 5) take a closer look at spatial cooperation patterns of firms in one particu-
lar border region, namely the German border region of Lower Bavaria. Based on original
micro-data of regional firms, results show that Lower Bavarian firms cooperate primarily
with local or regional partners, whereas cross-border cooperation is comparatively scarce.
Results in Chapter 4 reveal that region-specific factors are relatively more influential on
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the spatial cooperation patterns of Lower Bavarian firms than firm-specific ones. Re-
garding the relation between spatial cooperation patterns of Lower Bavarian firms and
their innovation implications, results in Chapter 5 show that a spatially more diverse set
of cooperation linkages increases firms’ likelihood of innovating. Moreover, the spatial
dimension of cooperation linkages correlates with the type of innovation introduced by
Lower Bavarian firms.
The four essays’ findings can contribute to the academic and public debate on the conse-
quences of the European integration process in border regions in several ways: the first
two essays provide initial empirical evidence on the heterogeneous and multifaceted effects
of economic and political integration on the economic performance and public security in
border regions in the incumbent member states. In doing so, they address questions that
are of utmost relevance in the light of the current discussion of the future of the European
Union and the Schengen Zone. The third and fourth essays provide initial small-scale
empirical evidence on spatial cooperation patterns of firms as key economic actors within
one particular German rural, low-technology border region. They can provide empirical
evidence for policy-makers and regional stakeholders when designing regional cooperation
strategies.
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Zusammenfassung
Im Zuge der europa¨ischen Integration hat sich das Versta¨ndnis von Grenzen und Gren-
zregionen vera¨ndert. Das wird vor allem in den Grenzregionen an der fru¨heren o¨stlichen
EU-Außengrenze deutlich, die sich von peripheren Regionen am Rand der Europa¨ischen
Union (EU) zu binneneuropa¨ischen Grenzregionen gewandelt haben. Die vier Aufsa¨tze
in dieser Dissertation untersuchen verschiedene Aspekte der europa¨ischen Integration in
diesen Regionen. Konzeptionell basieren die Aufsa¨tze auf zwei Untersuchungsansa¨tzen
zur Studie von Grenzen und Grenzregionen in der Wirtschafts- und Regionalgeographie:
Dem Flow-Approach und dem Cross-Border Cooperation Approach. Beide Ansa¨tze wer-
den im einleitenden Kapitel der Dissertation (Kapitel 1) vorgesellt.
Die beiden ersten Aufsa¨tze der Dissertation (Kapitel 2 und 3) basieren auf dem soge-
nannten Flow Approach und untersuchen die Effekte zweier institutioneller Reformen –
der EU-Osterweiterung 2004 sowie des Beitritts Polens und der Tschechischen Repub-
lik zur Schengenzone 2007 – auf die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfa¨higkeit und Kriminalita¨t
in Grenzregionen der alten EU-15 Mitgliedsstaaten. In beide Aufsa¨tze werden quasi-
experimentelle Forschungsdesigns genutzt, um die kausalen Effekte der institutionellen
Reformen auf regionaler Ebene zu identifizieren. Die Ergebnisse in Kapitel 2 zeigen,
dass die EU-Osterweiterung im Durchschnitt keinen signifikanten Effekt auf das Brut-
toinlandsprodukt der deutschen, o¨sterreichischen und italienischen Grenzregionen hatte.
Allerdings lassen sich fu¨r einzelne Grenzregionen statistisch signifikante Effekte nach-
weisen. Vor allem wirtschaftlich erfolgreiche Regionen mit einem starken Industriesektor
und einer guten Verkehrsinfrastruktur konnten von der EU-Osterweiterung profitieren.
Die Ergebnisse in Kapitel 3 zeigen, dass der Beitritt Polens und der Tschechischen Re-
publik zur Schengenzone und die damit verbundene Grenzo¨ffnung keinen Effekt auf die
allgemeine Kriminalita¨tsrate sowie auf die Kriminalita¨tsraten der meisten Delikttypen
hatten. Fu¨r Wohnungseinbru¨che ist jedoch ein statistisch signifikanter positiver Effekt
festzustellen, d.h. die Rate der Wohnungseinru¨che in Grenzregionen stieg im Vergleich zur
Rate in den Kontrollregionen nach dem Beitritt Polens und der Tschechischen Republik
zur Schengenzone an.
Die beiden Aufsa¨tze in Kapitel 4 und 5 folgen dem sogenannten Cross-Border Coopera-
tion Approach und untersuchen ra¨umliche Kooperationsbeziehungen von Firmen in der
deutschen Grenzregion Niederbayern. Die Ergebnisse basieren auf Prima¨rdaten nieder-
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bayerischer Firmen, die im Zuge einer Unternehmensbefragung erhoben wurden. Die
Daten zeigen, dass niederbayerische Firmen vor allem mit lokalen und regionalen Partnern
kooperieren, wohingegen Kooperationen mit Partnern aus den Nachbarla¨ndern O¨sterreich
und der Tschechischen Republik vergleichsweise selten sind. Die Ergebnisse in Kapitel
4 verdeutlichen, dass die ra¨umliche Ausgestaltung von Forschungs- und Entwicklungsko-
operationen vor allem mit der Wissensbasis und dem Marktpotenzial mo¨glicher Kooper-
ationsregionen assoziiert werden kann. Bezu¨glich des Zusammenhangs zwischen Koop-
erationsmustern und Innovationen zeigen die Ergebnisse in Kapitel 5, dass ein positiver
Zusammenhang zwischen dem ra¨umlichen Umfang der Kooperationsbeziehungen und den
Innovationergebnissen eines Unternehmens besteht. Die ra¨umliche Ausgestaltung und die
Art der Kooperationsbeziehungen korreliert daru¨ber hinaus mit den Innovationsarten.
Die Ergebnisse der vier Aufsa¨tze tragen in unterschiedlicher Weise zur Literatur und zur
o¨ffentlichen Debatte bei. Die ersten zwei Aufsa¨tze liefern empirische Evidenz hinsichtlich
der Konsequenzen der EU-Osterweiterung und der Ausweitung des Schengenraums auf die
Wirtschaftskraft und Kriminalita¨t in Grenzregionen der alten EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Diese
Ergebnisse sind vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Debatte um die Zukunft
der Europa¨ischen Union und der Grenzfreiheit im Schengenraum relevant. Die letzten
beiden Aufsa¨tze liefern empirische Erkenntnisse u¨ber die Ausgestaltung ra¨umlicher Ko-
operationsbeziehungen von Firmen in einer la¨ndlichen Niedrigtechnologie-Grenzregion
in Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse identifizieren einerseits Faktoren, die die Ausgestal-
tung der ra¨umlichen Kooperationsmuster beeinflussen; andererseits zeigen sie Zusam-
menha¨nge zwischen Kooperationen und Innovationen von Unternehmen in der Region
auf. Damit ko¨nnen die Ergebnisse wichtige Hinweise hinsichtlich der Ausgestaltung von
Wirtschaftsfo¨rderprogrammen in Regionen mit einer la¨ndliche Struktur sowie einer Dom-
inanz von Niedrig- und Mitteltechnologie-Industrien liefern.
vi
Keywords
English:
• Border Regions
• European Integration
• Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns
Deutsch:
• Grenzregionen
• Europa¨ische Integration
• ra¨umliche Kooperationsmuster von Firmen
vii
viii
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Summary iii
Zusammenfassung v
Keywords vii
List of Tables xvii
List of Figures xx
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Conceptual Approaches to Border Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The Impact of Institutional Changes on Border Regions . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in the German Border Region of
Lower Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Contribution and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 The Economic Effect of the EU Eastern Enlargement on Border Regions
in the Old Member States 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Spatial Effect of Economic Integration - Theory and Empirical Evidence 17
ix
2.3 Border Regions in the EU-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 The Synthetic Control Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1.1 The Donor Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1.2 The Synthetic Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.1 Average Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.2 Regional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.3 Explanatory Factors for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects . . . . . 39
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Do Open Borders Tempt a Saint? Evidence from the Schengen Acquis
on Crime Rates in German Border Regions 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Theory and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Regional Crime Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2 Removal of Border Controls and Crime Rates in Border Regions . 49
3.2.3 Related Empirical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.1 Crime Rates in German Border and Non-Border Regions . . . . . 53
3.3.2 Matching Treatment and Control Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.3 Estimating the Schengen Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.1 All Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.2 Crimes Against Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
x
4 Firm-Specific and Region-Specific Factors and Spatial Cooperation Pat-
terns of Lower Bavarian Firms 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in Peripheral Regions . . . . . . . 78
4.2.1 Firm-Specific Factors and Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns . . 79
4.2.2 Region-Specific Factors and Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns . 80
4.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.2 Study Region and Firm Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.3 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.3.1 Dependent Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.3.2 Firm-Specific Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.3.3 Region-Specific Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Firm-Specific Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.2 Region-Specific Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5 Spatial Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes: Lessons from
Lower Bavarian Firms 101
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Cooperation and Innovation in LMT Regions - Theoretical Background . 104
5.2.1 Geographic Dimension of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.2 Knowledge Bases and Modes of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 The Regional Context of the Study Case: The Region of Lower Bavaria . 108
xi
5.4 Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.2 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.2.1 Explanatory Variable: Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.2.2 Dependent Variable: Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.2.3 Control Variables: Innovation-Supporting Variables . . . 116
5.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5.1 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in a LMT Region . . . . . 117
5.5.2 Impact of Spatial Cooperation Patterns on Innovation Outcomes . 119
5.5.2.1 Spatial Scope of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.5.2.2 Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes . . . . . 120
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
I Appendix Part One 139
I.1 Synthetic Controls for Individual Border Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
I.2 Logistic Regression for Propensity Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
I.3 Border Regions and Matched Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
I.4 Effect Size of the Schengen Acquis on the Rate of Burglaries . . . . . . . 156
II Appendix Part Two 157
II.1 Firm Survey Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
II.2 Representativity Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
II.3 Results for an Extended Choice Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
II.4 Results for Various Reference Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
II.5 Subsample Analyses for Manufacturing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Bibliography 179
xii
List of Tables
2.1 Typology of EU-15 Regions on the Border to the New Member States . . 22
2.2 GDP Predictor Variables for SCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Correlation between Regional GDP and Regional Covariates . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Magnitude of the Enlargement Effect in the Short and Medium Run . . . 33
2.5 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of EU Eastern Enlargement . . . . . . 34
2.6 Explanatory Factors of the Enlargement Payoff in Border Regions . . . . 41
3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Border Regions and Non-Border Regions . . . . 58
3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Border Regions and Matched Control Regions . . 60
3.3 Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: All Crimes . . . 64
3.4 Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: Poverty Crimes 66
3.5 Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: Various Types of
Crimes I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: Various Types of
Crimes II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1 Firms’ Main Cooperation Regions in R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 Overview over Firm-Specific and Region-Specific Variables . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions 91
4.4 Impact of Region-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions 94
xiii
5.1 Technology Intensity of the Regional Manufacturing Industry . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Distribution of Firms in the Sample According to Size and Sector . . . . 113
5.3 Innovation in Lower Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4 Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns by Functional Form of Cooperation 118
5.5 Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns by Cooperation Partner . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation: National Partners 123
5.7 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation: International Part-
ners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.8 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Innovation: National
Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.9 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Innovation: Interna-
tional Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.10 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation: National
Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.11 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation: Interna-
tional Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.12 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technological Innovation:
National Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.13 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technological Innovation:
International Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.14 Other European Second Tier LMT Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
I.1 Balance Test: Burgenland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
I.2 Synthetic Control: Burgenland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
I.3 Balance Test: Lower Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
I.4 Synthetic Control: Lower Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
I.5 Balance Test: Vienna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
xiv
I.6 Synthetic Control: Vienna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
I.7 Balance Test: Carinthia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
I.8 Synthetic Control: Carinthia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
I.9 Balance Test: Styria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
I.10 Synthetic Control: Styria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
I.11 Balance Test: Upper Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
I.12 Synthetic Control: Upper Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
I.13 Balance Test: Lower Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
I.14 Synthetic Control: Lower Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
I.15 Balance Test: Upper Palatinate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
I.16 Synthetic Control: Upper Palatinate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
I.17 Balance Test: Upper Franconia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
I.18 Synthetic Control: Upper Franconia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
I.19 Balance Test: Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
I.20 Synthetic Control: Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
I.21 Balance Test: Brandenburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
I.22 Synthetic Control: Brandenburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
I.23 Balance Test: Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
I.24 Synthetic Control: Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
I.25 Balance Test: Chemnitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
I.26 Synthetic Control: Chemnitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
I.27 Balance Test: Dresden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
I.28 Synthetic Control: Dresden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
I.29 Balance Test: Friuli-Venezia Giulia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
xv
I.30 Synthetic Control: Friuli-Venezia-Giulia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
I.31 Logistic Regression Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
I.32 Border Regions and Matched Control Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
I.33 Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: Effect Size Bur-
glaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
II.1 Representativity by Size: IHK Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
II.2 Representativity by County: IHK Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
II.3 Representativity by County: HWK Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
II.4 Item-Response Analysis: Cooperation and Innovation Variables . . . . . 169
II.5 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Extended Choice Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
II.6 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Reference Same County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
II.7 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Reference Lower Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
II.8 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Reference Bavaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
II.9 Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Reference Europe/World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
II.10 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation of Manufacturing
Firms: National Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
II.11 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation of Manufacturing
Firms: International Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
II.12 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Innovation of Manu-
facturing Firms: National Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
II.13 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Innovation of Manu-
facturing Firms: International Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
xvi
II.14 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation of Manu-
facturing Firms: National Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
II.15 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation of Manu-
facturing Firms: International Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
II.16 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technology Innovation of
Manufacturing Firms: National Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
II.17 Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technology Innovation of
Manufacturing Firms: International Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
xvii
xviii
List of Figures
2.1 NUTS-2 Regions on the Border to the New Member States . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Trends in Regional GDP per capita Including Berlin and Vienna . . . . . 31
2.3 Trends in Regional GDP per capita Excluding Berlin and Vienna . . . . 32
2.4 Economic Performance of Border Regions and their Synthetic Controls
1991-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 Police Expenditures 2004, 2006 and 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Clearance Rate in Border Regions by Federal State 2006 and 2008 . . . . 52
3.3 Map of German Border Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Crime Rates in German Border Regions 2006 and 2008 . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Crime Rates in German Border and Non-Border Regions 2004-2007 . . . 58
3.6 Crime Rates in German Border Regions and Matched Control Regions
2004-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Rate of Burglaries in Border Regions and Matched Non-Border Regions
2004-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Map of Lower Bavaria and Surrounding Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 Map of Lower Bavaria and Surrounding Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Scope of Cooperation and Firms’ Likelihood of Innovating . . . . . . . . 120
5.3 Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Innovation . . . . . . . . . . 122
xix
5.4 Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Product Innovation . . . . . 126
5.5 Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Process Innovation . . . . . 126
5.6 Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Non-Technological Innovation 127
xx
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the course of the European integration process, the nature of state borders and border
regions has undergone major changes (Newman, 2006; Wastl-Walter, 2011). While state
borders have traditionally been perceived as physical barriers to the movement of peo-
ple, capital, knowledge, goods and services, the economic and political integration of the
European Union (EU) has contributed to a revised understanding of borders as bridges
for cross-national economic activities in the economic and regional geography literature
(Paasi, 2011). Along with the revised understanding of borders, the role of border regions
has also changed. Border regions on the former EU external border in particular have
transformed from peripheral regions at the edge of the European Union to more central
ones within an enlarged EU. This entailed possible consequences for regional economic ac-
tors. Hence, the European Eastern integration process may have intensified cross-border
commuting of regional employees, cross-border business activities of regional firms and
the establishment of new cross-border cooperation linkages in these regions on either side
of the border. At the same time, the large wealth differential between old and new mem-
ber states may also have entailed an increase in price competition and illicit activities.
Since it is in these border regions that the consequences of the European integration pro-
cess may be most visible and tangible, these regions have become important interfaces
for the integration process and are commonly perceived as unique laboratories for both
challenges and possibilities of European integration in the economic and regional geog-
raphy literature (see, for example, Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999; O’Dowd, 2002; Paasi,
2011).
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The four essays in this dissertation focus on border regions on the former eastern exter-
nal border of the old member states (EU-15) and assess various aspects of the European
integration process in these regions. The first two essays, i.e. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
evaluate the effects of two major institutional reforms, namely the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment in May 2004 and the accession of Poland and the Czech Republic to the Schengen
Zone in December 2007, on the economic performance and public security in German as
well as in Austrian and Italian border regions. Both essays focus on the regional-level
effects of institutional reforms and apply quasi-experimental research designs to establish
causal inference. In contrast, the last two essays, i.e. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, take
on a micro-perspective. They examine spatial cooperation patterns of firms, as key eco-
nomic actors, in one particular border region, namely the German border region of Lower
Bavaria. Both essays are based on original firm-level survey data of Lower Bavarian
firms. While the third essay (Chapter 4) describes correlations between firm-specific and
region-specific factors as well as firms’ spatial cooperation patterns in Research and De-
velopment (R&D), the fourth essay (Chapter 5) assesses how spatial cooperation patterns
of Lower Bavarian firms translate into innovation success.
The juxtaposition of both macro-level (regional-level) and micro-level (firm-level) research
allows to assess the consequences of European Eastern integration process on border
regions on the former EU external border in multiple ways. From a conceptual point
of view, the essays respond to two conceptual approaches to border studies in economic
and regional geography introduced by Van Houtum (2000). While the first two essays
respond to the flow approach, assessing the measurable effect of the European Eastern
integration process on socioeconomic indicators in border regions, the last two essays
respond to the cross-border cooperation approach: both focus on the strategic behavior of
firms as key economic actors in one distinct border region a decade after the EU Eastern
enlargement. In applying both approaches, the essays in this dissertation account for
the fact that a thorough understanding of the consequences of the European integration
process in border regions in the old member states requires not only the quantitative
assessment of integration effects at the regional level, but also the assessment of the
strategic behavior of actors within these regions.
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The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows: the next section introduces com-
mon conceptual approaches to border studies in economic and regional geography and
classifies the four essays according to these approaches. Section 1.2 summarizes the main
research questions, empirical strategies and key results of the first two essays included
in this dissertation, while Section 1.3 summarizes the research questions and empirical
results of the third and fourth essays. Finally, Section 1.4 indicates how the findings
can contribute to the academic and public debate on the consequences of the European
integration process in border regions and provides an outlook for future research.
1.1 Conceptual Approaches to Border Studies
In the course of the European integration process, borders and their functions have gained
more attention in the academic and public debate. Border studies have become an in-
terdisciplinary subject developed in parallel work by economists, geographers, political
scientists, lawyers, sociologists and other social scientists (Kolossov, 2005). Because of
the interdisciplinary nature, no common conceptual framework for border studies exists.
In the field of economic and regional geography, Van Houtum (2000) defines three concep-
tual approaches along which he classifies studies on borders and border regions. These
are the flow approach, the cross-border cooperation approach and the people approach.
While his framework has been revised and extended in recent conceptual works (see, for
example, Sohn, 2014a and 2014b), the three approaches still constitute a comprehensive
conceptual basis on which to classify border studies. In this dissertation, they allow for
a categorization of the four essays according to their problem orientation, theoretical
framework and methodological characteristics.
The flow approach is based on the classic European location theorists such as Giersch
(1950) and Lo¨sch (1944) (see Van Houtum, 2000; Sohn, 2014a) and also follows New
Economic Geography (NEG) theories introduced by Krugman (1991). In this approach,
borders are perceived as artificial barriers to economic activities, which would otherwise
flow (Sohn, 2014a). Borders thus constitute obstacles to the free market, which prevent
the optimal allocation of resources and the balance of spatial disequilibria in economic
development (Van Houtum, 2000). Consequently, border regions are perceived as periph-
eral regions that are disadvantaged by their geographic location because of their limited
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market area (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002). The moment de-bordering occurs, border regions
are, however, assumed to profit from their geographic proximity and gateway location to
the adjacent regions (Sohn, 2014a). Studies that follow the flow approach focus primarily
on measuring the quantitative effect of borders by the use of gravity models based on
physical distance (see, for example, Bru¨lhart et al., 2004; Crozet and Koenig, 2004) or
on identifying the measurable effects of abolishing borders (see, for example, Head and
Mayer, 2000; Nitsch, 2000). In this approach, physical distance, transportation costs and
accessibility are important concepts (Van Houtum, 2000).
The cross-border cooperation approach, on the other hand, stresses the need to understand
the process of cooperation and networking of regional actors within border regions rather
than estimating the effects of the presence or absence of borders on cross-border factor
flows (Van Houtum, 2000). In contrast to the flow approach, border regions are no longer
perceived as passive spaces that may benefit or be harmed by integration processes, but
as active spaces, i.e. as distinct socio-territorial units endowed with strategic capacity of
regional actors (Perkmann, 2003; Sohn, 2014a). The cross-border cooperation approach
hence focuses on the strategic behavior of actors in border regions and their willingness to
engage in cross-border cooperation. According to Van Houtum (2000), this approach is
linked to a more general interest in integration and cooperation in economic and regional
geography. Terms and concepts such as clusters, districts, networks, embeddedness, co-
operation, transaction costs, trust and learning are consequently important buzzwords
within the approach (Van Houtum, 2000). Studies that apply the cross-border coopera-
tion approach focus not only on physical distance, but also on cultural or institutional
distance and on the challenges and possibilities of cross-border economic activities (see,
for example, Lundquist and Trippl, 2013 on cross-border innovation systems). The cross-
border cooperation approach has also been taken up in multiple policy programs in the
past two decades, aiming to stimulate the establishment and development of cross-border
cooperation networks such as Interreg programs by the European Commission (EC) or
regional attempts to create cross-border Euroregions (see, for example, Scott, 2000 for
the German context).
The people approach differs from the first two approaches in that the analysis of bor-
ders and border regions is replaced by analyzing the mind-sets of individuals taking part
in cross-border interaction (Van Houtum, 2000). In this approach, borders and border
4
Chapter 1: Introduction
regions are perceived as social constructs, following the social constructivist paradigm
introduced by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Borders are assumed to evolve by the im-
ages and perceptions of people and are defined through the meaning people attach to
them (Paasi, 1999 and 2001). The focus of the people approach is hence on the emotional
reactions, actions and origins of individuals confronted with cross-border integration pro-
cesses. Consequently, cognition, perceptions and identity are key words in studies that
follow this approach (Van Houtum, 2000).
The four essays of this dissertation follow primarily the conceptual framework of the flow
approach and the cross-border cooperation approach. The people approach, in contrast, is
not part of the focus of this dissertation. The first two essays, i.e. Chapter 2 and Chapter
3, both respond primarily to the flow approach. Hence, they measure the impact of the
European eastern integration process on the economic performance and public security
in border regions. They presume that physical distance matters and border regions are
especially affected by the European integration process due to their geographic location.
In contrast, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 primarily respond to the cross-border cooperation
approach, because both essays focus on the behavior of economic actors in one particular
border region and identify cooperation patterns of firms in this region. They account for
the fact that cross-border integration does not derive from the mere opening of borders,
but stems from the strategic behavior of actors and their willingness to cooperate.
1.2 The Impact of Institutional Changes on Border
Regions
As outlined above, the first two essays of this dissertation, i.e. Chapter 2 and 3, evaluate
the effects of two major institutional reforms in the course of the European Eastern
integration process on border regions in the old member states. In doing so, both essays
follow the initial assumption of the flow approach, namely that physical distance matters
and that border regions are particularly affected by the European Eastern integration
process. The European Eastern integration process started with the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the European Union incrementally
increased its relationships with its neighbors to the East (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014).
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The stepwise integration process culminated in the EU Eastern enlargement in May 2004,
enabling – with some transition regulations – free movement of goods, services, capital
and labor between the EU-15 and the new Eastern member states, namely Poland, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary (Epstein and
Jacoby, 2014). Compared to previous enlargement rounds, the EU Eastern enlargement
differed in terms of size and in terms of economic and social discrepancies between old
and new member states. Hence, the geographic expansion in 2004 was larger than in
any of the previous rounds and the wealth differential between old and new member
states was more distinct than was the case in any of the previous rounds (Baas and
Bru¨cker, 2010). Mainly because of the large wealth differential, the enlargement was
accompanied by public concerns in the old member states about a depression of wages,
increased unemployment and economic stagnation due to an increased competition from
the East. Concerns were especially visible in border regions, fueled by the perception that
their geographic location on the border to the new member states made these regions
particularly vulnerable to price competition from the East (see Forster, 2007; Trettin,
2010 for Germany). In contrast to public concerns, theoretical contributions in the field
of New Economic Geography (NEG) suggest that border regions in the old member states
should actually profit from the EU Eastern enlargement, given their privileged access to
the new markets (see, for example, Bru¨lhart et al., 2004; Bru¨lhart, 2011). Despite these
theoretical contributions, empirical research on the topic is comparatively scarce. Hence,
it is still unclear as to whether border regions have been particularly affected by the
integration process and whether potential effects are positive or negative. As Petrakos
and Topaloglou (2008) put it, it is actually unclear whether border regions indeed turn
from barriers to bridges in the integration process and inherently benefit from cross-
border interaction, or whether they remain peripheral regions that are not profoundly
affected by economic and political integration despite their geographic location.
Against this background, the first essay of the dissertation evaluates the effect of the
EU Eastern enlargement on the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of
border regions in the old member states. The empirical analysis includes German regions
on the border to Poland and the Czech Republic, Austrian regions bordering the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia, and an Italian region, which shares a border
with Slovakia. To establish causal inference, in the essay (Chapter 2), the Synthetic
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Control Method (SCM) is applied. This method has been introduced by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and has been refined by Abadie et al. (2010 and 2015). Basically, it
contrasts the economic performance of border regions after the EU Eastern enlargement
in 2004 with synthetic control groups that approximate the counterfactual situation, i.e.
the economic performance of border regions had the EU Eastern enlargement not taken
place. Results show that on average, no statistically significant enlargement effect can
be observed. However, for individual border regions, statistically significant enlargement
effects are visible. These heterogeneous effects suggest that the border location is not
sufficient to profit from changes in market access. When assessing potential factors that
drive the results, it becomes evident that the regional economic performance and indus-
trial structure prior to the enlargement as well as the regions’ endowment with physical
infrastructure are important indicators for integration success. These findings are in line
with other empirical works, suggesting that economically successful regions may be bet-
ter equipped to exploit the potentials of economic integration (Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007;
Petrakos and Topaloglou, 2008).
The EU Eastern enlargement is not the only institutional reform that may have affected
border regions in the old member states. The accession of Poland and the Czech Republic
as well as four other Eastern European countries to the Schengen Zone in December 2007
was another major institutional change that profoundly changed the role of borders be-
tween Germany and its Eastern neighbors. The implementation of the Schengen Acquis
in Poland and the Czech Republic entailed the abolishment of passport and any other
type of border controls at the German-Polish and German-Czech border and accelerated
the speed with which people and goods move across borders. The removal of physical
barriers was also accompanied by widespread concerns about public security (Killias,
1993; Schwell, 2009 and 2015). Media coverage suggested that concerns were again par-
ticularly strong in border regions, given their geographic proximity to Poland and the
Czech Republic (Rother, 2007; Sohn, 2014a; Weber, 2007). The second essay of this
dissertation assesses whether these fears were justified. Hence, it investigates whether
the abolishment of border controls at the German-Polish and German-Czech border af-
fected crime rates in German counties (Landkreise) bordering these two countries. In this
essay, difference-in-difference estimations on matched samples, i.e. conditional difference-
in-difference estimations (see Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005), are
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applied to evaluate the Schengen effect in a causal way. Results show that no significant
Schengen effect on crime rates in German border regions can be identified for most types
of criminal offenses as well as for overall crime rates in German border regions. However,
for the rate of burglaries, a statistically significant increase in border regions can be ob-
served. This suggests that for burglaries, public concerns proved to be true and public
authorities would do well to counteract criminal activities in border regions and signal
political awareness. In light of the current discussion on the future of the Schengen Zone
and borderless Europe, the findings could not be more relevant, as they suggest that at
least for border regions at the German-Polish and German-Czech border, there is only
little empirical support for the widespread concerns about public security.
1.3 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in the Ger-
man Border Region of Lower Bavaria
In contrast to the first two essays, the last two essays, i.e. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5,
zoom in on one particular border region, namely the German border region of Lower
Bavaria. Both essays investigate spatial cooperation patterns of regional firms as im-
portant economic actors. Since they focus on the strategic behavior of regional firms,
both essays follow the cross-border cooperation approach introduced above. The region
of Lower Bavaria constitutes an interesting case to study firms’ spatial cooperation pat-
terns, as the region’s geographic location on the border to Austria and the Czech Republic
provides regional firms with various spatial cooperation opportunities within the same
geographic radius. Consequently, it allows to draw conclusions about the relative im-
portance of cooperation on various spatial scales. The empirical analysis of both essays
is based on original firm data of 732 Lower Bavarian firms of various sizes and sectors
that were collected in the course of a research project at the Lower Saxony Institute of
Economic Research (Niedersa¨chische Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung, NIW) commis-
sioned by the Chamber of Commerce of Lower Bavaria (Industrie- und Handelskammer
Niederbayern, IHK Niederbayern) and the Chamber of Handicrafts of Lower Bavaria
and Upper Palatinate (Handwerkskammer Niederbayern-Oberpfalz) between February
and April 2013. Due to the collaboration with the local chambers, it was possible to
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draw firm addresses from their firm databases and conduct a firm survey based on a
specially designed questionnaire. This enabled a detailed inquiry about firms’ spatial
cooperation-linkages that exceed the information included in official firm surveys such as
the Community Innovation Survey (Mannheimer Innovationspanel) or the Firm Panel of
the Institute for Employment Research (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung,
IAB).
To be precise, the third essay (Chapter 4) describes spatial cooperation patterns of Lower
Bavarian firms in Research and Development (R&D) and examines the relative influence
of firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size and sector, and region-specific charac-
teristics, such as geographic and institutional proximity, on firms’ spatial cooperation
patterns. Results reveal that Lower Bavarian firms predominantly cooperate with lo-
cal or regional partners, whereas cross-border cooperation is comparatively scarce. This
finding is in line with the literature on the embeddedness of knowledge in a particular
regional context and the challenges associated with cross-border cooperation (see, for
example, Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Trippl, 2010). Regarding the factors that may ex-
plain spatial cooperation patterns of firms, results suggest that region-specific factors are
relatively more influential on firms’ spatial cooperation patterns than firm-specific ones.
The local knowledge base with which a region provides a firm, and the function that a
region fulfills within the value chain of a firm thereby seem to be equally influential than
common factors such as the geographic or institutional proximity of a region vis-a`-vis
Lower Bavaria.
The fourth essay (Chapter 5) expands the empirical analysis of the third essay by con-
sidering both the spatial and functional dimension of cooperation. It, hence, differen-
tiates between Research and Development (R&D) cooperation and application-oriented
cooperation, such as cooperation in the areas of production, procurement and/ or sales,
and investigates the interplay between these two dimensions of cooperation and firms’
innovation outcomes. On the output side, the essay differentiates between technology
and non-technology innovation to account for the fact that firms in peripheral and low-
technology regions in particular innovate via low-threshold innovation (Hirsch-Kreinsen,
2008; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al., 2005; Robertson and Patel, 2007). Empirical results show
that firms with a spatially more diverse scope of cooperation linkages are more likely to
innovate. This suggests that both intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation linkages
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are important, a finding that is in line with common concepts of spatial knowledge acquisi-
tion (see, for example, Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Bathelt et al., 2004). Moreover, results
reveal that regional cooperation linkages increase the likelihood of firms introducing non-
technological innovation, whereas cooperation with international partners increases firms’
likelihood of introducing product innovation.
1.4 Contribution and Outlook
The essays included in this dissertation contribute to the economic and regional geogra-
phy literature and to the public debate on the consequences of the European integration
process in several ways. The first two essays (Chapter 2 and 3) provide initial empirical
evidence on the heterogeneous and multifaceted effects of the European Eastern integra-
tion process on the economic performance and public security of border regions in the old
member states. They thus contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of
economic integration for border regions (see, for example, Bru¨lhart, 2011; Bru¨lhart et al.,
2012) and to the literature on the effect that the removal of physical barriers has on public
security (see, for example, Killias, 1993; Schwell, 2009 and 2015). Methodologically, both
essays apply quasi-experimental research designs to establish causal inference. While
these designs are commonly applied in regional economics (see, for example, Billmeier
and Nannicini, 2013; Braakmann and Vogel, 2010; Gathmann et al., 2014), they are only
scarcely used in regional geography. The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) in particular,
however, offers multiple possible applications in regional geographic research, where the
units of analysis are commonly aggregate entities such as countries, regions or cities. By
using the method in border studies, the first essay (Chapter 2) provides an application
example of how the method may be applied in regional geographic research. Yet the es-
says also reveal where quasi-experimental designs in regional research may be constrained
by the lack of available comprehensive long time series data at the regional level.
Along with their academic contribution, both essays also provide valuable input into the
public debate on the consequences of the European Eastern integration process. For res-
idents and businesses in border regions, questions about the economic consequences of
economic and political integration and about the consequences of the removal of border
controls on public security are relevant and quite emotional topics that are discussed
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controversially in the public debate. Providing empirical evidence on these questions
may help to show where concerns are justified, and public authority should do more to
counteract the unintended negative consequences of the European integration process,
and where concerns cannot be qualified by empirical evidence. This seems even more
important in light of the ongoing xenophobic tendencies in several East German border
regions revealed by high voting shares for populist or nationalist parties (Land Branden-
burg, 2014). Against this background and in light of the current discussion of the future
of the European Union and the Schengen Zone, the questions addressed in the first two
essays could not be more current.
While both essays provide empirical evidence on the multifaceted effects of the European
Eastern integration on border regions, several aspects remain unaddressed. In particular,
both essays say only little about the factors that drive the regional-level effects. In future
research, it may hence be worthwhile to identify factors that can explain the treatment
effects on the EU Eastern enlargement 2004 and the Schengen Acquis 2007 on border
regions in the old member states. It might thereby be crucial to expand the analyses to
border regions on the Eastern side of the border and to evaluate the extent to which factors
such as physical infrastructure, the industrial structure or wage differentials between
regions on either side of the border can explain heterogeneous treatment effects. It may
also be desirable to conduct sub-level analysis and identify effects at the sub-regional or
municipal level. This would also increase the number of observations and help to establish
asymptotic inference. Furthermore, it may be of interest to expand the empirical analysis
to non-border regions that are direct or indirect neighbors of border regions. This would
allow tracing the spatial dimension of the European integration effects at EU internal
borders. Particularly in the second essay (Chapter 3), that examines the effects of the
removal of border controls on crime rates in border regions, it may also be worthwhile to
expand the time period and examine not only the immediate, but also possible medium-
term effects.
The third and fourth essays (Chapter 4 and 5) provide initial empirical evidence on
spatial cooperation patterns of firms in the German, rural and low-technology border
region of Lower Bavaria. While firms’ spatial cooperation patterns have been assessed
manifoldly in the literature (see, for example, Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013 or Grillitsch
and Nilsson, 2015 for recent empirical evidence), small-scaled empirical evidence for the
11
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German context is still scarce. By disentangling the driving factors of firms’ spatial coop-
eration patterns as well as the innovation implications that various spatial and functional
cooperation configurations entail, the last two essays also contribute to the literature
on the relations between cooperation and innovation outcomes of firms in peripheral,
low-technology regions (Fitjar and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2011; Hansen and Winther, 2011 and
2014). Both essays show that comparatively few firms cooperate with partners from the
neighboring countries Austria and the Czech Republic, despite their geographic prox-
imity. This suggests that a decade after the EU Eastern enlargement, borders remain
persistent barriers to cooperation, and that the political attempts to stimulate cross-
border economic networks may not have led to lasting results. This result is in line the
critique of the cross-border cooperation approach, stating that the European integration
process may not be seen as a mythical high-speed train, vaporizing any political border
between the European Union member states (Van Houtum, 2000).
Despite their contributions to the literature, the last two essays both suffer from lim-
ited external validity. Hence, the detailed inquiry of Lower Bavarian firms comes at
the cost that only cross-sectional data of firms from one particular region are available.
This cross-sectional nature prohibits controlling for idiosyncratic region-specific or time-
specific effects and exploiting variations over time and space to establish causal inference.
The empirical results can therefore only depict statistically significant relations, but can-
not be interpreted in a causal way. In future research, it may hence be desirable to expand
the database and to compare the results of Lower Bavarian firms with the results of firms
in other border or non-border regions. This would allow for an investigation of whether
firms in other more or less successful border regions maintain more or fewer cooperation
linkages with internal and external partners and how firms’ cooperation linkages in those
regions translate into innovation outcomes. Increasing the number of observations would
also contribute to the establishment of asymptotic inference.
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The Economic Effect of the EU
Eastern Enlargement on Border
Regions in the Old Member States*
This essay evaluates the effect of the EU Eastern enlargement in May 2004 on the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) of border regions in the old member states. The effect is identified with
the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) that allows the evaluation of the enlargement effect in a
causal way. Results show that on average, no significant enlargement effect can be observed.
The average effect, however, hides the fact that border regions are differently affected by the
enlargement. The heterogeneous enlargement payoffs seem to be driven by the regional eco-
nomic performance prior to the enlargement, the regional industrial structure and the regional
endowment with physical infrastructure.
Keywords: Border Regions, Economic Integration, EU Enlargement, Synthetic Control
Method
JEL Classification: F15, R10, R11
*This Chapter has profited from valuable feedback from participants of the Annual Congress of the
European Regional Science Association 2015, the Annual Congress of the German Economic Association
2015 and a Workshop in Regional Economics organized by ifo Dresden in 2015.
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2.1 Introduction
About a decade ago, in May 2004, eight Eastern European countries joined the Euro-
pean Union in the largest expansion to date. The enlargement and the concomitant
implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in these countries led – with some transi-
tional agreements – to free movement of goods, services, capital and labor between the
EU-15 and its Eastern neighbors. The enlargement round in 2004 significantly increased
the market size of the common market; however, it differed from previous enlargement
rounds, as the wealth gap between old and new member states was more distinct. The
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita measured in purchasing power parties of the
new member states, for instance, amounted to merely 40% of that of the old member
states, i.e. the EU-15, in 2006 (Baas and Bru¨cker, 2010). Because of the large discrep-
ancy in wages and socioeconomic conditions, the enlargement came not only with hopes,
but also with fears about a depression of wages, increasing unemployment and, conse-
quently, economic stagnation in the old member states (Rippl et al., 2005). Particularly
in regions located on the border to the new member states, businesses and employees
feared increased price competition from the East, fueled by the presumption that the ge-
ographic position on the border to the new member states made these regions particularly
vulnerable to competitors from the new member states (see Forster, 2007 and Trettin,
2010 for Germany). In contrast to public concerns, regional economic and geographic
theories suggest that border regions ceteris paribus profit from the enlargement due to
their spatial proximity to the new member states and their privileged access to the new
markets (see, for example, Bru¨lhart, 2011; Bru¨lhart et al., 2004; Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002
for an overview).
Despite these theoretical contributions, empirical evidence on the question of the eco-
nomic consequences of the EU Eastern enlargement for border regions in the old member
states is scarce. The majority of empirical studies that assess the consequences of the en-
largement round focus on the EU-wide impact or on economic effects on the country level
in both old (see, for example, Baas and Bru¨cker, 2010 and Dauth et al., 2014) and new
(see, for example, Elsner, 2013a and 2013b) member states. Few address the peculiarities
of border regions, even though they were assumed to be focal points in the integration
process (European Commission, 2001; Resmini, 2003). The few studies that do empha-
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size on the enlargement effects in border regions in the old member states predominantly
focus on selected border regions and investigate the factors that facilitate or hinder cross-
border cooperation (see, for example, Knippschild, 2011; Kra¨tke, 2002; Kra¨tke and Borst,
2007; Leick, 2010; Xheneti et al., 2013). While these studies provide initial empirical evi-
dence on the behavioral strategies of regional economic actors, their external and internal
validity is comparatively low: firstly, they only investigate the consequences of the en-
largement in selected border regions, which prohibits general conclusions on all border
regions; and secondly, the studies do not consider the counterfactual situation, i.e. the
situation had the EU Eastern enlargement not taken place.
This essay aims to contribute to the literature by identifying the economic effect of the
EU Eastern enlargement on border regions in the old member states in a causal way. It
does so by applying the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) that was introduced by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and refined by Abadie et al. (2010 and 2015). Basically, the
SCM compares the economic development of each border region in the years after the EU
Eastern enlargement with the economic development of synthetically generated controls
that approximate the counterfactual situation, i.e. the hypothetical economic performance
of the border regions had the EU Eastern enlargement not taken place. The approach
allows the identification of the treatment effect of the EU Eastern enlargement for each
border region individually and the evaluation of the Average Treatment effect on the
Treated (ATT), i.e. the average enlargement effect over all border regions. By choosing
a relatively long time period of eight years after the enlargement, the empirical analysis
also accounts for the fact that cross-border cooperation needs some time to emerge and
that the enlargement effects may only unfold in the medium term.
Results indicate that on average, a negative enlargement effect can be observed. The
effect is, however, not statistically significant and is mainly driven by the two capital
regions of Berlin and Vienna. When excluding these two regions from the analysis, a
positive enlargement effect is visible in the medium term. This finding supports the
presumption that regions with inherently better access to new markets can profit from
economic integration (see, for example, Bru¨lhart et al., 2004; Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002).
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When looking at the enlargement effects in the individual border regions, it becomes
evident that border regions are differently affected by the enlargement and that hetero-
geneous enlargement payoffs can be observed. Descriptive evidence suggests that rural
border regions with a comparatively high regional GDP in the years prior to the en-
largement have predominantly profited from the enlargement, while rural border regions
with a comparatively weaker economic performance prior to the enlargement could not
capitalize on the enlargement to the same extent. For urban regions, however, the op-
posite seems to be the case. Here, economically successful urban regions reveal negative
treatment effects, whereas urban regions characterized by a lower economic performance
in the years prior to the enlargement experienced positive enlargement effects. As it
will be shown below, these effects may, however, be confounded by several intervening
factors. When quantitatively assessing the drivers of the heterogeneous treatment effect,
the regional employment rate, the strength of the industrial sector and the regional en-
dowment with physical infrastructure positively correlate with the regional enlargement
payoff. Translated into the political context, the findings suggest that one-size-fits-all
policy solutions are not appropriate. Instead, regional growth policies in regions border-
ing the new member states should pursue place-based solutions that consider regional
characteristics.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: Section 2.2 sketches the regional
economic and geographic theories on the spatial effects of economic integration and out-
lines the existing empirical evidence. Section 2.3 introduces the key characteristics of the
15 border regions and classifies these regions according to their settlement structure and
economic performance. Section 2.4 introduces the research design and the regional data,
while Section 2.5 outlines the results from the empirical analysis. The essay closes with
a critical discussion of the results in Section 2.6.
16
Chapter 2: The Economic Effects of the EU Enlargement 2004
2.2 Spatial Effect of Economic Integration - Theory
and Empirical Evidence
In the literature, the effects of economic integration on border regions have not yet
been conclusively assessed. Hence, it is still unclear whether regions located on the
border to newly integrated countries have been particularly affected by the integration
process, and whether the potential integration effect is positive or negative (Bru¨lhart,
2011; Petrakos and Topaloglou, 2008). In regional economic and geographic theory,
spatial effects of economic integration have traditionally been assessed in classic trade and
location theories (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002). Trade theories assume that spatial effects
of economic integration emerge as a result of intra-country factor reallocation. Regions
with inherently better access to new markets such as port cities and border regions are
assumed to profit from an increase in international trade flows (Rauch, 1991). Hence,
these regions can attract exporting firms due to their proximity to the new markets and
the presumably lower access costs. The increase in economic activities may then translate
into a positive regional economic performance (see Capello, 2007 and Niebuhr and Stiller,
2002). While trade theories primarily focus on the trading of goods, they also apply for
the trading of services that has also been implemented through the EU enlargement and
the ratification of the Acquis Communautaire in the Eastern European member states.
In contrast to trade theories that deal with the consequences of international trade flows
for the regional factor reallocation within a country, classic location theories explicitly
focus on the geographic location decisions of firms and view trade flows as a consequence
of these location decisions (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002). Based on the classic location
models of Lo¨sch (1944) and Giersch (1950), location theories presume that the location
decisions of firms are determined by the size of the market for goods and services that
they can serve. As borders constitute barriers to free flows of goods and services, they
constrain the accessible market area of firms located in these regions. Hence, they are
less attractive location sites for firms (see Capello, 2007; Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002 for an
overview). When free movement of goods and services is implemented, borders no longer
constitute barriers to factor flows. This increases the market potential of firms in border
regions. As a consequence, border regions may gain in attractiveness due to privileged
access to the new markets (Niebuhr, 2008).
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New Economic Geography (NEG) models integrate considerations of both trade and lo-
cation theories. NEG models were initially introduced by Krugman (1991) in his seminal
core-periphery model and have been modified and extended by Krugman and other au-
thors since then (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002). The models explain regional disparities in
economic activities by endogenous location decisions of both firms and employees (see
Capello, 2007 and Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002 for an overview). Since economic integration
facilitates cross-border factor movement and decreases cross-border transportation costs,
it is assumed to affect the regional distribution of economic activities in favor of border
regions. This assumption is tested in various theoretical applications of NEG models.
Bru¨lhart et al. (2004) and Crozet and Koenig (2004), for instance, trace explicitly what
happens to the spatial distribution of economic activities within a country when cross-
border transaction costs decrease. Their theoretical models predict that border regions
ceteris paribus realize the largest gains from economic integration. While Bru¨lhart et al.
(2004) attribute this to a concentration of human capital in border regions, Crozet and
Koenig (2004) predict that trade liberalization drives domestic firms to regions close to
the border, unless competition is too strong. Their results are mirrored in other models,
leading Bru¨lhart (2011) to conclude that the available NEG models predict that regions
with inherently less costly access to foreign markets, such as border or port regions, ceteris
paribus realize the largest gains from economic integration.
Despite these theoretical contributions, empirical evidence on the topic is comparatively
scarce. Niebuhr and Stiller (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of earlier empirical
works that assess the effect of economic integration on border regions for the European
as well as North American context. The majority of these studies apply gravity models
to estimate the magnitude of border effects on cross-border flows of economic activities
(see, for example, Head and Mayer, 2000 and Nitsch, 2000 for the European context),
or focus on the cross-border business linkages of firms in selected border regions (see,
for example, Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007 and Leick, 2010 for Germany). While these studies
provide initial empirical evidence on border effects as well as on the factors that facilitate
or hinder cross-border economic activities, they do not evaluate the effects of changes in
market access on border regions in a causal way.
In the past decade, however, several studies have been conducted that apply quasi-
experimental research designs in order to identify the causal effects of economic inte-
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gration. Redding and Sturm (2008), for instance, evaluate the effect of the German
separation on West German cities located close to the inner German border. They find
that these cities experienced a decline in population and economic performance once the
border was established. Focusing on Austrian border regions, Bru¨lhart et al. (2012)
identify a significant effect on regional employment rates and wages in border regions
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. With respect to the various EU enlargement rounds,
Brakman et al. (2012), reveal positive enlargement effects on population size in border
regions on either side of the inner European borders. In a quasi-experimental study that
focuses explicitly on the effects of the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 on border regions,
Braakmann and Vogel (2010) show that small service firms located in German Federal
States bordering Poland or the Czech Republic profited from the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment, while large firms did not profit, at least in the years immediately after the EU
Eastern enlargement.
While these studies differ in the estimation strategy, the regional context and the outcome
variable, they still predominantly support the hypothesis that border regions (or firms
located in these regions) are positively affected by economic integration. Yet it would also
be plausible to find no or negative integration effects in border regions. This assumption
is supported by the fact that border regions may systematically differ from core regions
in characteristics other than the geographic location. Hence, border regions often consti-
tute peripheral, low-opportunity areas, characterized by lower population densities and
the lack of any major regional agglomeration center (Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007; Petrakos
and Topaloglou, 2008). Consequently, they may lack the resources to exploit integration
benefits with which urban systems are endowed (Duranton and Puga, 2004). Moreover,
they may be less well integrated into international trade and knowledge flows that com-
monly take place between global hubs (Bathelt et al., 2004; Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007).
Less innovative border regions in particular, which compete predominantly via price,
may suffer from the increased international competition, reducing the attractiveness of
these regions as production sites (Niebuhr, 2008; Topaloglou et al., 2006). Moreover,
these less innovative regions are commonly insufficiently endowment with cognitive capi-
tal, which may hamper their capability to fully exploit new knowledge that is circulated
by increased factor mobility (Caragliu and Nijkamp, 2012; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
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Overall, these arguments suggest that there may be certain regional characteristics that
could prevent border regions from profiting from economic integration, despite their spa-
tial proximity to the new member states. At the same time, the arguments indicate that
the effects of the EU economic integration may vary across border regions, depending
on integral characteristics of these regions such as their economic performance, their set-
tlement structure, their stock of human capital or their innovativeness. As it will be
shown below, the Austrian, German and Italian regions located on the border to the new
member states inevitably differ in their regional characteristics, suggesting that they have
been differently affected by EU Eastern enlargement of 2004.
2.3 Border Regions in the EU-15
To learn more about the border regions at the frontier to the new member states, this
section clusters the Austrian, Italian and German border regions according their settle-
ment structure and economic performance in the years prior to the EU enlargement in
2004. Overall, the treatment group consists of all EU-15 regions at the second level of
the Nomenclature des Unite´s Territoriales Statistiques of 2006 ( NUTS-2 level of 2006)
that share a border with any of the new member states. Even though lower levels of
analysis such as the NUTS-3 or municipal level would facilitate the isolation of the im-
manent border effect (see Bru¨lhart et al., 2012 for a thorough discussion), in this essay,
the NUTS-2 level is used as the level of analysis. This level is chosen, because for sev-
eral regional covariates long time-series data is only available at this higher aggregated
level. Moreover, in Germany, several regional borders at the NUTS-3 level changed in
the course of local government reorganization, affecting in particular border regions in
Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. This would further aggravate the analysis
at the NUTS-3 level for German border regions.
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Figure 2.1 maps the 13 regions that are located on the border to the new member states.
Precisely, these are the five Austrian regions Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Burgenland,
Styria and Carinthia that share a border with either Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia or
the Czech Republic, the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, which borders Slovenia,
and the seven German border regions Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg,
Dresden, Chemnitz, Upper Franconia, Upper Palatinate and Lower Bavaria, which share
a border with either Poland or the Czech Republic.
Figure 2.1: NUTS-2 Regions on the Border to the New Member States
The map depicts German, Austrian and Italian border regions located at the border to
the new member states at the NUTS-2 level of 2006.
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Of the German regions, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Dresden and
Chemnitz are located in the East of Germany, the former German Democratic Republic
(GDR). The economic trajectory of these regions in the 1990s, therefore, differs from the
remaining EU-15 regions. Along with these 13 regions, the two capital regions of Berlin
and Vienna are also treated as border regions, given their proximity to the new member
states and their location within a NUTS-2 border region. The consideration of these
two capital regions also enables a comparison between the enlargement effect on rural,
peripheral border regions and metropolitan centers close to the border.
In the following, the 15 NUTS-2 regions that form the treatment group are clustered
according to the regional settlement structure and the regional economic performance
in the four years before the EU Eastern enlargement, i.e. from 2000 to 2004 (see Table
2.1). While the regional settlement structure may serve as a proxy for the presence of
regional agglomerations, the regional GDP per capita serves as an indicator of the overall
regional economic context. Both take up the assumption that border regions with a
higher population density and border regions with a stronger economic performance are
more capable of exploiting new market potentials, an argument that can also be found
in Kra¨tke and Borst (2007) and Petrakos and Topaloglou (2008).
Table 2.1: Typology of EU-15 Regions on the Border to the New Member
Statesa
High GDP Low GDP
Agglomration Center and Urban Regions
Berlin
Vienna
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Upper Franconia
Dresden
Chemnitz
Rural Regions
Upper Palatinate
Lower Bavaria
Styria
Upper Austria
Lower Austria
Carinthia
Brandenburg
M.-W. Pomerania
Burgenland
a Thresholds are as follows: 150 inhabitants per squared kilometer for the regional
settlement structure; GDP above 75% of the EU-15 average for the regional economic
performance. Data are obtained from the Eurostat Regional Database (Eurostat,
2016).
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Regarding the regional settlement structure, the two capital regions of Berlin and Vienna
stand out from the remaining border regions. Hence, both regions are characterized by
very high population densities of around 4,000 inhabitants per square kilometer in the
four years prior to the EU Eastern enlargement. Consequently, both regions classify as
agglomeration centers according to the official classification of the German Federal Insti-
tute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut
fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, BBSR, 2014). Along with the two capital regions,
the two East German regions of Chemnitz and Dresden are also among the more densely
populated border regions with a population density above 200 inhabitants per square
kilometer. Together with the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and the German re-
gion of Upper Franconia, which both reveal population densities above 150 inhabitants
per square kilometer, they classify as urban regions according to the BBSR classification
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, 2014). Among the rural regions,
i.e. regions with a population density below 150 inhabitants, the Austrian region of Upper
Austria and the German regions of Lower Bavaria and Upper Palatinate are the most
densely populated regions. These regions revealed population densities of between 110
and 115 inhabitants per square kilometers in the pre-enlargement period. The remaining
border regions are all characterized by population densities below 100 inhabitants per
square kilometer.
In terms of regional economic performance, the 5-year average of the regional GDP per
capita for the years prior to the enlargement, i.e. 2000 to 2004, is highest in the Aus-
trian capital region of Vienna, followed by the Austrian region of Upper Austria and
the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. In the same years, the four border regions
located in East Germany, namely Chemnitz, Dresden, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
and Brandenburg, realized the lowest GDP per capita. These four regions also qualified
as Objective 1 regions in the European structural funds programming period 2000 to 2006
(European Commission, 2015). Along with the four East German regions, the Austrian
border region Burgenland also qualified as an Objective 1 region, i.e. as a region with a
GDP below 75% of the EU-15 average (European Commission, 2015). All other border
regions reveal GDPs per capita above the 75% community average in the years prior to
the enlargement.
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When classifying the border regions according to their settlement structure and economic
performance, it becomes evident that rural regions prevail (see Table 2.1). The economi-
cally stronger rural border regions include the Austrian regions of Upper Austria, Lower
Austria, Styria and Carinthia as well as the German border regions of Upper Palatinate
and Lower Bavaria that are both located in the Federal State of Bavaria. The group
of economically weaker rural border regions includes the two East German border re-
gions of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the Austrian region of
Burgenland. Given their less favorable regional characteristics, it may be plausible to
assume that these regions may not profit from the EU Eastern enlargement to the same
extent that economically stronger regions do. Among the agglomeration centers and ur-
ban regions, three types can be identified: firstly the two capital regions of Vienna and
Berlin, secondly the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and the German region of
Upper Franconia, and thirdly the two East German regions of Dresden and Chemnitz
that have qualified as Objective 1 regions in the EU structural funds programming period
2000 to 2006.
2.4 Research Design
To evaluate the economic effect of the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 on border regions
in a causal way, the enlargement is thought of as an exogenous change to cross-border
factor mobility that affected border regions notably more than non-border regions given
their geographic proximity to the new member states. The EU Eastern enlargement in
2004 was the final step in a long integration process initiated in the early 1990s that
had led to gradual trade liberalization and may hence have been anticipated by regional
economic actors. However, the actual consequences of the enlargement only became
noticeable in May 2004, when the Acquis Communitaire was fully implemented in the
Eastern European member states, enabling free flows of goods, services, capital and labor
as well as the full adoption of the common legal framework1 (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014).
The adoption of the common legal framework reduced legal barriers as well as formal
non-tariff barriers to cross-border economic interaction such as rules of origin, import
licensing, or technical regulations. The EU 2004 enlargement hence exceeded earlier
1Except for some transition agreements on labor migration in Germany and Austria.
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trade agreements that merely dealt with the reduction of tariffs or trade quotas for goods.
Given these institutional changes, it is plausible to treat the EU Eastern enlargement as
an external change to market access that particularly affected regions located directly on
the border to the new member states. As these regions were exogenously selected into
the treatment group because of their geographic location and because their selection into
the treatment group is stable over time, the EU Eastern enlargement may be thought of
as a setting akin to a natural experiment.
2.4.1 The Synthetic Control Method
In the empirical analysis, the economic effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the
individual border regions in the old member states are identified and evaluated with the
Synthetic Control Method (SCM). The SCM was introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and modified and extended by Abadie et al. (2010 and 2015). It constitutes an
alternative method for evaluating the effect of an event or intervention that takes place
at an aggregate level and affects aggregate entities (Abadie et al., 2010). Basically, the
SCM compares the outcome of interest (in this case the regional GDP per capita) after an
event of interest (in this case the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004) in the entity affected
by the event (in this case a border region) with the outcome of a weighted combination of
unaffected entities (in this case a weighted combination of non-border regions) (Abadie et
al., 2010). This combination constitutes the so-called synthetic control. The weight for
the unaffected units are chosen so that the entities included in the synthetic control best
approximate the performance of the affected entity over an extended period of time prior
to the event of interest (Abadie et al., 2010). The idea of the SCM is that when both
affected entities and their synthetic controls behave similarly over an extended period of
time prior to the event of interest, then any discrepancy in the outcome variable after
the event of interest can be ascribed to the event itself; therefore, the discrepancy can be
interpreted as the causal effect of the event or intervention of interest (see Abadie et al.
2010 and 2015 for a detailed discussion of the SCM). The intuition behind the SCM is
comparable to the statistical matching approach and may be thought of as a treatment-
control design, as it compares the outcomes of treated units, i.e. border regions, and
otherwise similar but untreated units, i.e. combinations of non-border regions. The dis-
25
Chapter 2: The Economic Effects of the EU Enlargement 2004
crepancy in the outcome variable between treated units and their corresponding synthetic
controls can then be interpreted as the treatment effect on the treated. Given that Y Bjt
denotes the outcome, i.e. regional GDP per capita (in Euro in 2005 prices) observed for
border region j in the post-enlargement period t and Y SCjt denotes the outcome observed
for the synthetic control of border region j at time t for border regions j = 1 . . . J and
time period t = 1, . . . T , the treatment effect for each border region is the following:
∆ = Y Bjt − Y SCjt
Consequently, the weighted average of the discrepancy between all border regions and
their synthetic controls constitute the Average Treatment effect of the Treated (ATT),
whereby wj reflects the weight attached to each of the border regions, so that larger
border regions contribute to the ATT more than smaller ones:
∆ = E[wj(Y
B
jt − Y SCjt )]
2.4.1.1 The Donor Pool
As indicated above, in the context of the EU Eastern enlargement, the treatment group
includes the 13 border regions located on the border to the new member states and the
two capital regions Berlin and Vienna. The remaining 199 European NUTS-2 regions
in the EU-15 constitute potential control units. They form the so-called donor pool.
The identification of the donor pool, i.e. the selection of regions that may constitute
potential controls, is highly important: if the regions included in the donor pool are not
sufficiently similar to the border regions, then any differences in outcomes between border
regions and their synthetic controls may merely indicate disparities in their regional
characteristics (Abadie et al., 2015). Therefore, regions with geographic peculiarities are
a priori excluded from the donor pool. This applies to the French overseas departments,
the Spanish regions of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as to insular regions in France (Corsica),
Spain (Balearics and Canaries), Portugal (Azores and Madeira) and Finland (Aland).
Moreover, all Greek regions are also excluded because of a lack of data availability.
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Along with this baseline configuration, three alternative configurations of the donor pool
are tested for robustness. In the first alternative configuration, all regions that constitute
immediate neighbors to the 13 border regions are also excluded from the donor pool to
account for direct spatial spillover effects. In the second configuration, only NUTS-2
regions located in EU-6 countries, i.e. in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands are included in the donor pool. This accounts for possible integration
effects from previous enlargement rounds. In the third configuration, all regions located
on EU inner borders, for instance regions located on the French-German or Spanish-
Portuguese border, and all regions located on the coast are excluded from the donor pool
in order to isolate the border effect better. The overall results do not change when using
these alternative donor pool configurations. Yet the match between the border regions
and their synthetic controls deteriorates in these alternative configurations of the donor
pool. Given this caveat, the reported results are based on the more encompassing donor
pool of all EU-15 non-border regions, excluding the regions with regional peculiarities
outlined above.
2.4.1.2 The Synthetic Controls
Having identified the donor pool, in the second step, for each of the 13 border regions
and the two capital regions individual synthetic controls are generated. Technically, the
synthetic controls are generated as weighted averages of non-border regions included in
the donor pool, whereby the synthetic control can be represented by a (J × 1) vector
of weights W = (w1, . . . , wJ)
′, with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 1, . . . J non-border regions and
w1 + · · · + wJ = 1 (Abadie et al., 2010 and 2015). The weights for the regions included
in the donor pool are selected by an algorithm based on the similarity of the border
region with the regions included in the donor pool before the enlargement with respect
to past realizations of the regional GDP per capita and several GDP predictor variables.
In the analysis, the pre-enlargement period encompasses 13 years, i.e. the time period
from 1991 to 2003. This observation period is given by the availability of regional data.
The generation of the synthetic control is conducted using the synth package for Stata,
developed and made available by Abadie et al. (2015). As the construction of a suitable
comparison group, i.e. synthetic control, is based on a data-driven procedure, discretion
in the choice of the comparison control units is reduced and inference is possible (Abadie
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and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010).
For the GDP-predictor variables, a parsimonious set of standard economic performance
predictor variables is used. The set includes variables that are commonly identified in the
literature to affect a region’s economic performance (see, for example, Cuaresma-Crespo
et al., 2014).
Table 2.2: GDP Predictor Variables for SCMa
Variable Description
Dependent Variable:
Regional GDP GDP per capita in Euro in 2005 prices
GDP Predictor Variables:
Population Density Number of inhabitants per squared kilometer
Income Level Average regional hourly wage in Euro in 2005 prices
Primary Sector Share of agricultural sector (NACE Rev.2 A) on regional GVA
Secondary Sector Share of industrial sector (NACE Rev.2 B-F) on regional GVA
Teritiary Sector Share of service sector (NACE Rev.2 G-U) on regional GVA
Employment Rate Share of employees on the regional active population
Patent Intensity Number of patents reportet to EPO per 1,000 employees
GDP in 1991 GDP per capita in 1991 in Euro in 2005 prices
GDP in 1995 GDP per capita in 1995 in Euro in 2005 prices
GDP in 2000 GDP per capita in 2000 in Euro in 2005 prices
a Data are obtained from the Cambridge Econometric Regional Database (2015) and the
Eurostat Regional Database (2016). EPO= European Patent Office; GVA=Gross Value
Added; NACE=Nomenclature statistique des Activite´s e´conomiques dans la Communaute´
Europe´enne (European Industrial Activity Classification).
Basically, three groups of predictor variables are taken into account: firstly variables
that reflect the regional factor allocation such as the regional population density and
the regional income level. These variables indicate the regional economic potential and
should positively affect the regional GDP per capita. The second group of factors reflects
the regional sectoral structure, and includes the share of the primary, secondary and
tertiary sector of the economy on the regional Gross Value Added (GVA). Furthermore,
the regional endowment with human capital, measured through the regional employment
rate, and the regional innovativeness, approximated through regional patent intensity,
are included as further factors that affect the regional endogenous growth potential and,
consequently, the regional economic performance2. Furthermore, for three years (1991,
2The list is not conclusive and factors such as the share of employees with tertiary education and the
share of human resources in science and technology are also important. However, for several possible
covariates, time-series data for the years 1991 to 2000 are not available at the NUTS-2 level, which
restricts the set of possible regional covariates.
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1995 and 2000) the pre-enlargement regional GDP per capita are included as a fourth
group of variables to account for inertia and path-dependency in the regional economic
development. Data on the regional characteristics are obtained from the Cambridge
Econometrics Regional Database (2015) and the Eurostat Regional Database (2016).
Table 2.2 provides a comprehensive overview of the GDP predictor variables used to
generate the synthetic controls of the border regions.
One advantage of the SCM compared to standard panel regression is that the SCM
makes explicit the relative contribution of each control unit to the synthetic control
(Abadie et al., 2010 and 2015). The Tables in Appendix I, Part I.1 list the regions and
their corresponding weights that are included in the synthetic controls of the individual
border regions. As becomes evident, of all EU-15 regions included in the donor pool,
six to ten regions contribute to the synthetic controls of the individual border regions.
Only for the capital city of Berlin as well as for Chemnitz is the number of regions that
contribute to the synthetic control lower. This may result from the peculiar development
of both regions during the 1990s due to their GDR legacy. When comparing the GDP
predictor means in the pre-enlargement period of the border regions and their synthetic
controls, it becomes evident that the values of GDP predictors in the pre-enlargement
period of the synthetic controls match the values of the border regions quite well (see
Tables in Appendix I, Part I.1). Only for population density do the values between
the border regions and their synthetic controls differ in several border regions and their
corresponding synthetic controls. For the remaining variables, the values of the border
regions are close to the values of the synthetic controls in the pre-enlargement period,
suggesting that any discrepancy in the economic performance of border regions and their
synthetic controls in the post-enlargement period may indeed be attributed to the EU
Eastern enlargement.
For the SCM to work, two identification assumptions must hold: firstly, the choice of
pre-treatment characteristics should include variables that can approximate the path of
the treated region, and secondly, the regions used to create the synthetic control, i.e.
the donor pool, should not be affected by the treatment (Campos et al., 2014). The
first assumption can be tested by indicating the correlations between the GDP predictor
variables and the regional GDP. As Table 2.3 shows, all GDP predictor variables under
consideration sufficiently correlate with the regional GDP per capita. In contrast, the
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second assumption, also known as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
or non-macro effect assumption, is more difficult to justify in the context of the EU
Eastern enlargement of 2004. Hence, the EU enlargement also undeniably affects other
regions, and the SUTVA may be violated. Empirical results can thus only be interpreted
as lower bonds of the true effects3
Table 2.3: Correlation between Regional
GDP and Regional Covariatesa
Regional Covariates Correlation coefficient
Population Density .506
Employment Rate .464
Patent Intensity .397
Industrial Sector -.211
Service Sector .347
Agricultural Sector -.373
Income Level .816
a Correlation coefficients between GDP per capita and vari-
ous regional covariates based on a pooled sample of EU-15
regions (NUTS-2) for the years 1980 to 2012. For the East
German regions, only the years from 1991 onward are in-
cluded.
2.5 Empirical Results
The following section reports the average enlargement effect on the GDP per capita of
border regions in the old member states as well as the individual enlargement effects
in each of the 13 border regions and the two capital cities Berlin and Vienna. This
juxtaposition allows for an evaluation of the overall enlargement effect and an examination
of whether the effects are homogeneous across all types of border regions or whether
heterogeneous enlargement effects are at play.
3To account for potential spill over effects, regions that constitute immediate neighbors to the border
regions were excluded from the donor pool in an alternative configuration of this pool. When using this
alternative donor pool, results remain similar except for the East German regions for which immediate
neighbors constitute important control regions.
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2.5.1 Average Effect
Figure 2.2 depicts the weighted average of the regional GDP per capita of all 13 border
regions and the two capital cities for the years from 1991 to 2012 as well as the weighted
average of the corresponding synthetic controls. Both series are generated with weights
corresponding to the size of the regional labor force, measured by the number of employ-
ees. This allows to account for the size of the regions and their relative contribution to
the average of all border regions.
Figure 2.2: Trends in Regional GDP per capita Including Berlin and Vienna
Weighted average of border regions vs. weighted average of corresponding synthetic con-
trols
The two series show a similar trend until 2000; from 2000 onward, however, the average
of the synthetic controls shows a more favorable economic development than the average
of the border regions. This suggests that border regions could not capitalize from the EU
Eastern enlargement despite their geographic location on the border to the new markets.
In contrast, the graphs suggest that border regions actually suffered from the EU Eastern
enlargement, as their economic performance developed less favorably than that of their
synthetic counterparts. However, as will be shown below, this result is strongly driven
by the two capital regions of Berlin and Vienna that are both negatively affected by the
enlargement. Therefore, in the second step, the two capital regions are excluded from the
analysis. When excluding the two capital cities, the two series show a similar trend in the
years immediately after the EU Eastern enlargement (see Figure 2.3). However, from 2007
onwards, the weighted average of all border regions (excluding Berlin and Vienna) reveals
a better economic performance than the corresponding synthetic control, suggesting that
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in the medium term, border regions (excluding the capital cities Berlin and Vienna) have
experienced a more favorable development in the years after the EU Eastern enlargement
than they would have had the enlargement not taken place. This finding is in line
with regional economic theories, assuming that ceteris paribus regions with inherently
better access to new markets profit from economic integration (see Bru¨lhart, 2011 for
an overview). The time lag in the enlargement effect may result from the fact that the
institutionalization of cross-border cooperation does not happen overnight, but requires
some time to emerge4.
Figure 2.3: Trends in Regional GDP per capita Excluding Berlin and Vienna
Weighted average of border regions vs. weighted average of corresponding synthetic con-
trols
The difference in short-term and medium-term adjustment also becomes evident when
looking at the magnitude of the effect listed in Table 2.4. The table entries denote the
difference (in %) in GDP per capita between border regions and their corresponding
synthetic controls in the years after the EU Eastern enlargement. The first column
shows the magnitude of changes for the first four years after the EU enlargement, i.e. the
average change for the years 2004 to 2008, while the second column reports the magnitude
of changes for the first eight years after the enlargement, i.e. the average change for the
years 2004 to 2012. The values show that when including Berlin and Vienna, in the short
term, the enlargement effect is negative, amounting to -1.94%. In the medium term,
4Another interpretation would relate to the recent economic crisis, potentially affecting border regions
less severe than their synthetic controls. However, from a theoretical point of view, the economic crisis
should affect both border and non-border regions. Moreover, as Figure 2.3 shows, the difference in border
regions and their synthetic controls already emerges in 2007, i.e. a year before the crisis hit. Yet, in the
medium term, potential confounding effects from the crisis cannot be ruled out completely.
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however, the effect is slightly positive and amounts to 0.11%. When excluding the two
capital cities, the effect is positive and amounts to 0.26% in the short term and to 2.21%
in the medium term.
Table 2.4: Magnitude of the Enlargement Effect in the Short and Medium
Run
Difference in post-enlargement average GDP per capita (in %)
between Border Region and Synthetic Control
Average effect 4 years after Average effect 8 years after
Eastern Enlargement Eastern Enlargement
Average with Vienna and Berlin -1.94 0.11
Average without Vienna and Berlin 0.26 2.21
Burgenland 0.33 2.67
Lower Austria -0.42 2.13
Carinthia 1.64 3.45
Styria 3.18 3.36
Upper Austria 1.10 2.90
Vienna -3.94 -2.35
Berlin -9.30 -7.60
Lower Bavaria 0.02 5.43
Upper Palatinate -0.28 4.02
Upper Franconia -3.36 0.24
Brandenburg -0.88 -2.13
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania -1.99 0.87
Dresden 3.91 6.90
Chemnitz 6.53 5.84
Friuli-Venezia Giulia -1.49 -4.62
The relatively small magnitudes of the effects suggest that overall, the enlargement af-
fected the economic performance of border regions only slightly. In the second step, it is
now crucial to investigate the confidence attached to the estimated effects. There is, how-
ever, no accepted way to date of carrying out standard hypothesis tests when applying
the SCM (see Abadie et al., 2010; Campos et al., 2014). One strategy to attain confidence
about the level of statistical significance of the effects is to access the average differences in
the economic development of border regions and their synthetic controls before and after
the EU Eastern enlargement. This strategy has been proposed by Campos et al. (2014).
Precisely, a linear difference-in-difference model is estimated that reveals the statistical
significance of the differential between the average difference between the actual economic
performance of the border regions and their corresponding synthetic controls prior to the
enlargement, and their average difference in the post-enlargement period. Table 2.5 in-
dicates the level of statistical significance of the differences in the two series. It becomes
evident that for the weighted average of all border regions (including the two capital
regions Berlin and Vienna), the estimated DID coefficient is not statistically significant.
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This implies that on average, i.e. when taking all border regions together, border regions
do not reveal a significantly higher or lower GDP per capita after the EU enlargement
than they would have, had the EU enlargement not taken place. This finding suggests
that in contrast to public concerns, on average, border regions in the old member states
have not been the losers of the EU Eastern enlargement. When excluding the two capital
cities of Berlin and Vienna, the DID coefficient is not statistically significant, either.
Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of EU
Eastern Enlargementa
GDP per capita (in 2005 Euro)
DiD estimate R2
Std. error N
Average with Vienna and Berlin 178.31 .69
(805.05) 44
Average without Vienna and Berlin 618.32 .68
(882.46) 44
Burgenland 530.94 .55
(1051.64) 44
Lower Austria 522.45 .63
(962.30) 44
Carinthia 962.70 .65
(1046.06) 44
Styria 940.93 .62
(1254.17) 44
Upper Austria 1002.43 .67
(1242.49) 44
Vienna -778.09 .51
(1640.95) 44
Berlin -1800.00** .54
(670.18) 44
Lower Bavaria 1616.926 .61
(1216.76) 44
Upper Palatinate 1407.67 .61
(1374.96) 44
Upper Franconia 61.32 .71
(771.27) 44
Brandenburg -260.45 .69
(723.94) 44
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 404.90 .68
(605.11) 44
Dresden 922.79 .67
(758.79) 44
Chemnitz 1504.47* .72
(746.01) 44
Friuli-Venezia Giulia -1100.00 .28
(1027.16) 44
a Table entries denote the statistical significance of the difference be-
tween the average difference before the enlargement, i.e. 1991-2003
(between the border region and its synthetic control) and the average
difference after the enlargement, i.e. 2004-2012 (between the border
regions and its synthetic control). Results are presented for each re-
gion and for the two weighted averages. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Inference: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.5.2 Regional Effects
So far, the results have shown that on average, border regions did not reveal a significantly
higher or lower GDP in the years following the EU enlargement than they would have
had the enlargement not taken place. Yet the weighted average over all regions does not
say anything about the effects at the regional level. As outlined above, it is plausible
that economically successful regions are better equipped to profit from changes in market
access, whereas economically weaker regions may lack the resources to capitalize on the
enlargement. To draw conclusions about the enlargement effects in the individual border
regions, the enlargement effects are identified now for each border region individually.
The graphs in Figure 2.4 display the actual GDP per capita of the 13 border regions
and the two capital cities Berlin and Vienna between 1991 and 2012 and the trends
of the corresponding synthetic controls. The graphs reveal that several rural, economi-
cally successful border regions such as the Austrian regions of Upper Austria, Styria and
Carinthia and the German region of Lower Bavaria show a more positive development in
the post-enlargement period than their corresponding synthetic controls, indicating that
this group of regions could profit from the enlargement. For the German region of Upper
Palatinate and the Austrian region of Lower Austria, which also qualify as economically
more successful rural regions, the effect is negative, however. Yet, when looking at the
magnitude of the effects displayed in Table 2.4, it becomes evident that in each of these
region, the enlargement effect is positive in the medium run. As Table 2.5 denotes, ef-
fects are, however, not statistically significant for any of the rural, economically successful
regions.
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Figure 2.4: Economic Performance of Border Regions and their Synthetic Controls
1991-2012
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Turning to the group of rural, economically weaker border regions, including Burgen-
land in Austria and Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in Germany, the
graphs in Figure 2.4 show that the two German regions actually develop less favorably
than their corresponding synthetic controls, while the Austrian region of Burgenland re-
veals a more favorable development than its synthetic control. In the two East German
border regions of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the discrepancy in
the two series already emerges in the years prior to the enlargement. As the values in
Table 2.4 show, in both regions, the negative effects are actually larger in the short term.
In the medium term, both border regions seem to catch up with their synthetic con-
trols. Overall, these results only partly support the presumption that rural, economically
weaker border regions could not capitalize on the EU Eastern enlargement to the same
extent that economically stronger regions do (see, for example, Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007;
Petrakos and Topaloglou, 2008). As Table 2.5 shows, in none of these regions is the dif-
ference between the two series prior to and after the enlargement statistically significant,
however.
When looking at the enlargement effects in the two capital cities and in the urban regions,
results are surprisingly different. As the graphs in Figure 2.4 reveal, the capital cities
Berlin and Vienna both reveal large negative effects. Hence, in Berlin, the difference
between the actual GDP and the corresponding synthetic control amounts to -9.30% in
the short term and to -7.60% in the medium term. For Vienna, the difference in the short
term amounts to -3.94% and to -2.35% in the medium term (see Table 2.4). One possible
explanation for the large negative effects may be the peculiarity of these capital regions,
whose economic development may be primarily driven by the global economy and may
not be affected by changes in market access at the regional level to the same extent that
border regions with fewer ties to the global economy are. Moreover, the peculiarity of
these regions in terms of population density aggravates the selection of suitable regions
for the synthetic control. As Table I.20 in Appendix I shows, the synthetic control of
Berlin only consists of four non-border regions, namely of Brussels, Leipzig, the French
region Alps-French Riviera and the British region North Eastern Scotland. Hence, the
negative enlargement effect for Berlin may be driven by the distinct economic perfor-
mance of these four control regions in the 2000s. Effects are also negative in the Italian
region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and in the German region of Upper Franconia, suggesting
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that economically successful urban regions do not profit from changes in market access as
expected from the literature (Campos et al., 2014; Kra¨tke and Borst, 2007; Rodr´ıguez-
Pose, 2012). In the case of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the negative effect may be attributed
to country-specific effects. Hence, during the 2000s, the Italian economy developed less
favorable than other large EU-15 economies such as the French or Spanish economy (Eu-
rostat, 2016). When looking at the statistical significance of the effects, the discrepancy
between the two series prior to and after the EU enlargement of 2004 is statistically signif-
icant in Berlin, whereas for the remaining regions, effects are not statistically significant
(see Table 2.5).
In contrast, for the economically weaker urban border regions in the East of Germany,
namely Chemnitz and Dresden, a positive enlargement effect can be observed (see Figure
2.4 and Table 2.4). However, as both regions received large amounts of public funds
during the 2000s, the positive and statistically significant enlargement effects in these
regions cannot be isolated from potential funding effects. Hence, both regions qualified
as Objective 1 regions in the EU structural funding programming period 2000 to 2006
and in the programming period 2007 to 2013. Moreover, the German Federal State funds
East German regions under the GRW program (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe - Verbesserung
der Regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) (European Commission, 2015; Bundesministerium
fu¨r Wirtschaft und Energie, 2016a and 2016b). Furthermore, the synthetic controls of
both regions suffer from the relatively small number of non-border regions included. In
the case of Chemnitz, only five non-border regions match the region’s economic trajec-
tory, indicating a certain degree of uncertainty about the ability of the synthetic control
to reproduce the counterfactual situation, i.e. the economic development of the border
regions had the EU Eastern enlargement not taken place.
Despite these caveats, the results still reveal several interesting findings. In particular,
they show that border regions in the old member states have been differently affected
by the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004. While all regions have continued their positive
growth path after the EU Eastern enlargement, not in every region has the economic
performance exceeded the economic performance of the counterfactual, i.e. the situation
had the EU Eastern enlargement not taken place. On the aggregate level, results show
that in contrast to popular concerns, the enlargement did not comprehensively weaken
the economic performance of border regions. However, the enlargement did not lead to
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a comprehensive strengthening of border regions either, as may have been assumed from
economic theory (see Bru¨lhart, 2011 and Niebuhr ans Stiller, 2002 for an overview). At
least in the course of the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004, on average, the GDP of border
regions has not been affected by the enlargement in a statistically significant way.
2.5.3 Explanatory Factors for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The results outlined above suggest that regions respond differently to the changes in mar-
ket access. This section aims to shed more light on possible reasons behind the differential
payoff of the EU Eastern enlargement 2004 for border regions. It does so by quantita-
tively examining factors that are associated with positive or negative enlargement effects.
To identify regional factors that may drive the enlargement payoffs in border regions, a
simple linear panel regression model with region and year fixed effects is estimated for
the set of border regions in the post-enlargement period, i.e. from 2005 to 2012. Fol-
lowing the suggestions by Campos et al. (2014), the percentage difference between the
actual GDP per capita of the border regions and their estimated synthetic counterparts
serves as the dependent variable. This outcome variable inevitably suffers from being
an estimate itself. Yet it is the best proxy for the extent to which a region has actually
been affected by the EU Eastern enlargement. Formally, the regression model can be
presented as follows:
Yjt = β0 + βkXk,jt + γj−1Rj−1 + σt−1Tt−1 + µjt,
where Yjt is the percentage difference between the actual and synthetic time series for
region j at time t, β0 is the unknown intercept, Xk,jt is a matrix of k observed explanatory
variables, βk is the corresponding coefficient for the k−th variables, Rj−1 are j−1 dummy
variables for the border regions, γj−1 are the coefficients for the region dummies, Tt−1
are t − 1 dummy variables for the years in the post-enlargement period, σt−1 are the
coefficients for the time dummies, and µjt is the error term.
Overall, four sets of potential explanatory factors for the differential enlargement payoffs
across regions are examined. The first set includes again the regional factor allocation, ap-
proximated by the regional population density and the regional employment rate. Both
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factors take up the assumption that regions with a larger endowment with human re-
sources are better equipped to exploit the effects of economic integration. The second set
includes the share of the industrial sector in the regional Gross Value Added (GVA). This
factor responds to the assumptions of international trade theory based on Balassa (1965),
suggesting that the sectoral composition of a region is an important aspect for the extent
to which a region can benefit from economic integration. The third set reflects the re-
gional knowledge base, measured by the regional share of human resources in science and
technology and the regional patent intensity. It accounts for the fact that more innova-
tive regions can better absorb new ideas (see, for example, Caragliu and Nijkamp, 2012).
Furthermore, they may be more successful in fighting increased competition from foreign
firms. The fourth set of factors includes the regional endowment with infrastructure,
responding to the fact that infrastructure is important for cross-border economic activ-
ities (Thissen, 2005; Bro¨cker et al., 2010). Data on all explanatory variables are again
obtained from the Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (2015) and the Eurostat
Regional Database (2016).
Table 2.6 depicts the regression coefficients for four different estimated model specifica-
tions. As becomes evident from the reported estimates, the regional employment rate,
the relative strength of the regional industrial sector and the regional endowment with
physical infrastructure correlate statistically significantly with higher positive enlarge-
ment effects. In contrast, the regional population density and the regional innovativeness
do not correlate with the magnitude of the enlargement payoff in a statistically signif-
icant way. While the results only consider selected region-specific factors and are not
conclusive, they nevertheless provide initial insights on factors that possibly influence the
extent to which border regions have profited from changes in market access following the
EU Eastern enlargement of 2004.
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Table 2.6: Explanatory Factors of the Enlargement Payoff in Border Regionsa
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
Employment Rate 72.74*** 33.82** 33.96** 35.30**
(15.21) (13.23) (13.75) (13.48)
Population Density -.008 -.014 -.015 -.017
(.011) (.009) (.010) (.010)
Strength Industrial Sector .003*** .003*** .003***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Patent Intensity -.209 -.644
(4.12) (4.09)
Human Resources in Science and Technology -.076 -.143
(.123) (.124)
Roads .363**
(.162)
Constant -60.30*** -46.54*** -41.95*** -50.93***
(15.78) (12.74) (14.58) (14.83)
Region FE
√ √ √ √
Year FE
√ √ √ √
Observations 120 120 120 120
R2 .56 .72 .72 .74
a Table entries denote regression coefficients of with region and year fixed-effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent
variable: Percentage difference between the actual and the synthetic series of per capita GDP for each border region and each
year after the EU Eastern enlargement 2004. Inference: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This essay has examined the effect of the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 on the re-
gional GDP per capita of German, Austrian and Italian regions located on the border
to the new member states. It has done so by applying the Synthetic Control Method
(SCM) that compares the economic performance of these border regions after the en-
largement with a weighted combination of non-border regions that form the synthetically
generated controls. This method allows the identification and evaluation of the economic
enlargement effect in a causal way. Results show that on average, i.e. when considering
all border regions together, a negative enlargement effect can be observed. This effect is
mainly driven by the two capital cities of Berlin and Vienna. When excluding these two
regions, a positive enlargement effect is visible in the medium term, suggesting that in
line with regional economic theories, border regions are not the losers of the enlargement.
Instead, they can indeed capitalize on their geographic location and profit from economic
integration. This average enlargement effect is, however, not statistically significant.
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When looking at the enlargement effects in the individual border regions, however, it
becomes evident that border regions are differently affected by the changes in the mar-
ket access. Descriptive evidence suggests that Austrian rural border regions with a high
regional GDP per capita in the years prior to the enlargement have profited from the
enlargement, while German rural regions with a lower GDP per capita prior to the en-
largement could not capitalize on changes in market access to the same extent. For urban
border regions, the opposite seems to be the case. Here, urban regions characterized by
a lower GDP in the years prior to the enlargement have experienced positive enlarge-
ment effects, while urban regions with high GDPs per capita in the years prior to the
enlargement have witnessed negative enlargement effects. However, these results may be
driven by regional peculiarities of the two capital regions Berlin and Vienna, by possible
intervening effects of public funds, and by country effects.
When quantitatively examining possible factors that may explain the heterogeneous en-
largement payoffs across border regions, results show that the regional employment rate,
the relative strength of the regional industrial sector and the regional endowment with
physical infrastructure correlate statistically significantly with higher positive enlarge-
ment effects, while the regional innovativeness and population density do not correlate
with the magnitude of the enlargement effect in a statistically significant way. This sug-
gests that it is particular structural factors that matter. At the same time, the regions’
endowment with physical infrastructure, which is a common target of regional growth
programs (see Crescenzi and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2012 for an overview), seem to be equally
important.
Even though the results provide new insights into the effect of the EU Eastern enlargement
on the economic performance of regions located on the former EU external border, some
caveats have to be noted: firstly, the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
may not hold in the context of the EU Eastern enlargement. Hence, changes in market
access inevitably affected all European regions, not only border regions. The results can
thus only be interpreted as lower bonds for the true effects. Secondly, in several border
regions, the synthetic controls do not perfectly match the economic trajectory of the
border region in the years prior to the enlargement. This may violate the assumption that
border regions and their synthetic controls reveal similar growth paths in the years prior
to the EU Eastern enlargement. To attenuate these mismatches, it would be desirable
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to adjust the set of pre-enlargement GDP predictor variables to reflect better the growth
trajectories of border regions in the pre-enlargement period. Yet the adjustment of the
pre-enlargement GDP predictor variables is limited by the incompleteness of time-series
data for many economic growth factors throughout the 1990s. The limited availability of
data also prohibits the analysis at lower spatial levels such as the NUTS-3 or municipal
level. Conducting empirical analyses at these lower levels would be desirable, as several
empirical studies have shown that border effects rapidly decay with distance (Redding
and Sturm, 2008; Bru¨lhart et al., 2012). In future research, it would also be desirable to
repeat the analysis for alternative outcome variables such as the regional economic growth
rate, the regional employment rate, or the regional wage structure. This would provide
a more comprehensive picture on the economic effect of the EU Eastern enlargement in
2004 on border regions in the old member states. In order to confirm the robustness of
the results, it would also be desirable to perform in-time and in-space placebos tests (for
further discussion on the inference in the SCM, see Abadie et al., 2010 and 2015).
Despite these caveats, the essay still provides an initial attempt to identify and evaluate
the effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the GDP of border regions in a causal
way. Results show that in contrast to public concerns, on average, border regions in
the old member states have not been the losers of the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004.
Instead, many border regions have developed more favorably than they would have had
the enlargement not taken place. For some border regions, however, negative effects can
be observed. These heterogeneous effects suggest that the border location is not sufficient
for regions to profit from changes in market access. Instead, the regional context of border
regions matters. When translating the findings into the political contexts, they suggest
that one-size-fits-all regional integration policies are not appropriate. Instead, results
suggest that – in line with the Smart Specialization Strategy of European Commission
(see, for example, McCann and Ortega-Argile´s, 2015) – regional policies designed to
accompany economic integration in border regions should pursue place-based solutions
that consider regional characteristics.
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Chapter 3
Do Open Borders Tempt a Saint?
Evidence from the Schengen Acquis
on Crime Rates in German Border
Regions
The abolishment of passport and any other type of border controls at the German-Polish and
German-Czech border in December 2007 provoked public concerns that open borders would
increase cross-border crime. Despite these widespread concerns, empirical research on whether
public fears are justified is still scarce. Based on official data on reported crimes from the German
Police Crime Statistics, this essay evaluates whether the implementation of the Schengen Acquis
in Poland and in the Czech Republic in December 2007 increased crime rates in German counties
(Landkreise) that share a border with one of these two countries. Conditional difference-in-
difference estimation allows the evaluation of the Schengen effect in a causal way. Results show
that only for burglaries can a significant positive effect be observed. This suggests that for
this type of criminal offense, public concerns proved to be justified. In contrast, for overall
crime rates as well as for other common types of crime against poverty no significant effect can
be observed, indicating that there is only little empirical evidence for the widespread concerns
about public security.
Keywords: Crime Rates, Border Regions, Schengen Acquis, Open Borders
JEL Classification: R10, K40, F60, J60
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3.1 Introduction
In December 2007, Poland and the Czech Republic as well as six other Eastern European
countries joined the Schengen Zone, resulting in the abolishment of passport and any
other type of border controls at the German-Polish and German-Czech border. While
the enlargement of the Schengen Zone increased international cooperation and the speed
with which goods and people traveled between the member states, the prospect of elim-
inating border controls also provoked public concerns that open borders would increase
crime rates (see, for example, Killias, 1993; Schwell, 2009). In Germany, media coverage
suggests that public concerns were particularly strong in regions bordering Poland and
the Czech Republic, fueled by the perception that the geographic location directly on the
border to Poland and the Czech Republic made these border regions particularly vulner-
able to crime (see, for example, Rother, 2007; Weber, 2007). Border regions in the East
German Federal States of Brandenburg and Saxony in particular still witness compara-
tively high voting shares for Euroskeptic, populist parties such as the AfD (Alternative
for Germany) (Land Brandenburg, 2014) and the presence of vigilante groups in several
border communities (Bangel, 2014; Bederke, 2014). These phenomena may be nourished
by the image of the East as untrustworthy and threatening, which is rooted firmly in the
collective memory of the Western public (Schwell, 2009; Schwell, 2015).
Based on official data of reported crimes of the German Police Crime Statistics on the
county level (Landkreis), this essay examines whether the abolishment of border controls
between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic in December 2007
affected crime rates in German regions bordering one of these two countries. Effects are
identified by conditional difference-in-difference estimations that allow the evaluation of
the Schengen effects in a causal way. By applying a quasi-experimental research design
that compares the development of crime rates in border regions with the approximated
counterfactual situation, i.e. the development of crime rates in these regions had the
Schengen Acquis not taken place, the essay exceeds official reports of the German Ministry
of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2010a) or the European Commission
(European Commission, 2012), which are merely based on descriptive evidence.
The empirical results depict no significant increase in overall crime rates in border regions,
following the Schengen Acquis. For burglaries, however, the empirical analysis reveals a
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statistically significant increase. This suggests that for burglaries, public concerns proved
to be true and public authorities would do well to counteract criminal activities in border
regions. At the same time, the empirical findings show that for other, more common
types of criminal offenses, including thievery from motor vehicles, drug-related crimes,
or street crime, the abolishment of border controls revealed virtually no effect on crime
rates. In light of the current discussion on the future of the Schengen Zone and borderless
Europe, this is an important result, because it shows that at least for border regions on
the German-Polish and German-Czech border, there is only little empirical support for
the widespread concerns about public security.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: Section 3.2 identifies the mechanisms
through which the abolishment of border controls may affect crime rates in border regions
and discusses the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the empirical strategy, while
Section 3.4 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theory and Related Literature
3.2.1 Regional Crime Rates
The theoretical starting point in this essay is the standard rational choice model of crime
participation introduced by Becker (1968) and revised by Ehrlich (1973).1 According to
the model, an individual will engage in crime if the returns from committing a crime
outweigh the returns from non-criminal behavior. The returns from committing a crime
are calculated relative to the probability of getting caught and the expected sanction if
caught. Hence, an individual may commit a crime if:
(1− p)U(Crime)− pU(S) > U(Non-Crime),
whereby U(Non-Crime) denotes the utility from abstaining from crime, U(Crime) de-
notes the utility from a successful crime, i.e. a crime in which the perpetrator is not
1For a detailed discussion on the model at the regional level, see, for example, Soares (2004) or Entorf
and Spengler (2000).
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caught, p denotes the probability of being caught, and S the monetary-equivalent sanc-
tion if caught (Soares, 2004). Whether an individual will engage in criminal activities
then depends on the anticipated costs and benefits of criminal behavior compared to
legal behavior. Translated to the regional level, this means that the more prevalent the
conditions which make crime attractive in a region, the higher the crime rates within a
region are (Soares, 2004).
In the spirit of the Becker-Ehrlich model, the conditions that make crime more or less
attractive within a region are frequently attributed to the level of deterrence and to the
level of legal and illegal income opportunities within a region (see Entorf and Spengler,
2000 for the German context). The level of deterrence is commonly indicated by the
regional clearance rate and the level of sanctions. Legal and illegal income opportuni-
ties can be approximated by several regional characteristics such as the regional income
structure, the regional unemployment rate, or the regional GDP.
Deterrence variables such as the clearance rate within a region affect the probability of
getting caught, p, and, consequently, the expected utility that potential offenders can
yield from crime U(Crime). A higher propensity of getting caught thereby reduces the
expected utility from criminal activities. Similarly, higher levels of sanctions, S, such
as higher prisoner rates or longer average sentences, decrease the utility that a potential
offender can yield from committing a crime. Along with the regional level of deterrence,
legal and illegal income opportunities also determine the attractiveness of criminal be-
havior within a region. Both affect the utility that motivated offenders may gain both
from committing a crime U(Crime) and from non-illegal behavior U(Non-Crime). The
legal and illegal income opportunities within a region can be approximated by economic
variables such as the regional income level or the region’s economic performance. The
income level within a region can thereby serve as an indicator for both the presence of
more or less rewarding jobs and, in turn, higher or lower legal income opportunities within
a region. Similarly, it can serve as an indicator for higher or lower levels of transferable
assets within regions, making these regions more or less lucrative targets for potential
offenders (Entorf and Spengler, 2000). Further variables that are commonly identified
in the literature as affecting a regions’ susceptibility to crime include the regional unem-
ployment and youth unemployment rate, the regional demographic structure, the share of
foreigners and the regional level of educational attainment (see Entorf and Spengler, 2000
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for the German context). Regional crime rates may thus be driven by two sets of factors:
firstly factors that are associated with the level of deterrence, and secondly factors that
are associated with legal and illegal income opportunities within a region. Motivated
offenders should then choose committing a crime in region i rather than in region j when
the difference between the utility of committing a crime relative to non-criminal behavior
is larger in region i than it is in region j.
3.2.2 Removal of Border Controls and Crime Rates in Border
Regions
When border controls are abolished, any change in crime rates in border regions could
be attributed to either an increase in crimes committed by domestic offenders or to an
increase in crimes committed by offenders from abroad that choose to commit a crime
in border regions on the other side of the border rather than in their domestic region or
rather than abstaining from criminal activities.
Regarding the first possibility, the abolishment of border controls between Germany and
Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic should not affect the utility of domestic
offenders, since for them, the probability of getting caught (1− p) and the level of sanc-
tions S should not change when keeping all other factors constant. Furthermore, regional
characteristics that affect legal and illegal income opportunities, such as regional employ-
ment rates or income levels, should remain stable in the short-term. Hence, for domestic
offenders, the utility of committing a crime U(Crime) and the utility form non-criminal
behavior U(Non-Crime) should, ceteris paribus, not be affected by the abolishment of
border controls.
In contrast, for motivated offenders from the East, the abolishment of border controls
between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic may increase the
utility of committing a crime in German border regions relative to the utility of commit-
ting a crime in domestic regions or the utility from non-criminal behavior. Hence, the
removal of border controls may decrease the probability of getting caught p when com-
mitting a crime in German border regions. The relatively lower probability of getting
caught is reinforced by the fact that cross-border law enforcement is still not fully imple-
mented between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic (Schwell,
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2015). Motivated offenders from the East can thus expand their operation radius to Ger-
many without facing a higher probability of getting caught. The geographic location of
German border regions possibly makes these regions more attractive targets than other
German regions, given the potentially lower transaction costs for offenders from the East.
These may result from lower transportation costs and a higher familiarity of offenders
with these geographically close border regions compared to more distant German regions
(for a similar argument for the Swedish-Danish border, see Ceccato and Haining, 2004).
The susceptibility of German border regions to crime may also be reinforced by the fact
that – except for the northernmost part of the German-Polish border where the River
Oder separates Germany from Poland – the border between both Germany and Poland
and Germany and the Czech Republic is a land border. This type of border adjacency is
commonly assumed to facilitate the movement of motivated offenders (see Ceccato and
Haining, 2004).
When offenders from the East are no longer penalized by a higher probability of getting
caught when committing a crime in German border regions, these regions may constitute
more lucrative targets compared to Polish or Czech regions. This results from the large
wealth differential between Germany and its Eastern neighbors. Hence, the Gross Na-
tional Income (GNI) per capita, measured in purchasing power parties, of Poland and the
Czech Republic amounted to merely 40% of that of Germany in 2006, i.e. a year before
Poland and the Czech Republic implemented the Schengen Acquis (Baas and Bru¨cker,
2010). German regions might thus be better endowed with transferable assets. At the
same time, offenders from the East may face lower sanctions S when committing crimes
in Germany than in Poland or the Czech Republic, given that the punitivity is higher in
Poland and the Czech Republic than it is in Germany (Du¨nkel and Geng, 2013)2. This
may further increase the utility for committing crimes in German border regions relative
to committing a crime in domestic regions or relative to the utility for abstaining from
criminal activities.
However, descriptive evidence presented in governmental reports (for example Bundesmin-
isterium des Inneren, 2010a) shows that criminal offenses in border regions did not in-
2Hence, the rate of prisoners, which is commonly used as an indicator for the punitivity within a
country, is higher in Poland and the Czech Republic than it is in Germany. In 2012, for example, Poland
had 220 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants and the Czech Republic 219 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants,
whereas the rate of prisoners in Germany amounted to merely 83 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in
the same year (Du¨nkel and Geng, 2013).
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crease after Poland and the Czech Republic joined the Schengen Zone. One reason for
the non effect could be that in anticipation of an increase in motivated offenders, Federal
States along the border could have increased their police force to counteract criminal ac-
tivities. This would increase the level of deterrence and affect the probability of getting
caught (1− p) for both domestic and foreign offenders. Indeed, following the implemen-
tation of the Schengen Acquis in Poland and the Czech Republic, mobile identity checks
in border regions on both sides of the border were expanded to compensate for direct
border controls (Rother, 2007; Weber, 2007).
On the German side, the extra effort is depicted in an increase of expenditures to the
Federal Border Police as well as an increase in expenditures to the police in the Federal
States bordering Poland and the Czech Republic (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Police Expenditures 2004, 2006 and 2008
The left graphic depicts police expenditures in border states and non-border states as
well as expenditures of the Federal States. The right graphic depicts expenditures by
border state; BY=Bavaria; BB=Brandenburg; MV=Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania;
SN=Saxony. Data are obtained from the Statistical Yearbooks of the German Federal
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007, 2009 and 2011).
Expenditures increased relatively more in Federal States bordering Poland or the Czech
Republic (3.6% between 2004 and 2008) than in non-border Federal States (0.7% between
2004 and 2008). At the federal level, expenditures even increased by 8.4% during the
same period of time. Out of the Federal States on the border to Poland and the Czech
Republic, Saxony revealed the largest increase in expenditures to the police between 2004
and 2008. Hence, in Saxony, expenditures increased by 4.7% between 2004 and 2008. In
the same period, expenditures increased by 3.4% in Bavaria, by 3.0% in Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania and by 2.7% in Brandenburg. When looking at the clearance rates in
border regions, Figure 3.2 shows that clearance rates actually decreased in all four Federal
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Figure 3.2: Clearance Rate in Border Regions by Federal State 2006 and 2008
Clearance rate (in %); BB=Brandenburg; BY=Bavaria; SN=Saxony; MV=Mecklenburg
Western-Pommerania. Data are obtained from the German Police Statistics (Bun-
deskriminalamt, 2007 and 2009).
States that share a border with Poland or the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2008.
This suggests that despite the extra effort in police expenditures, the level of deterrence
decreased after the abolishment of border controls. This supports the argument that the
probability of getting caught, p, decreased following the abolishment of border controls
between Germany and its Eastern neighbors.
3.2.3 Related Empirical Studies
Even though the abolishment of border controls and its effect on public security is emo-
tionally and controversially discussed in the public debate, empirical evidence on the
effect of open borders on crime is scarce. One reason for the lack of empirical research is
that in the last decade following 9/11, border controls worldwide were expanded, rather
than relaxed (Schwell, 2015). Hence, the Schengen Zone constitutes an exceptional case
in which physical barriers were actually removed. Yet most studies that examine the
consequences of the Schengen enlargement focus on the economic effects of open borders.
Davis and Gift (2014), for instance, find that the Schengen membership yields positive
effects on trade, while Bartz and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2012) show that the abolishment of
border controls does not affect cross-border labor mobility in a statistically significant
way. In contrast, the effects of the Schengen Acquis on crime are only rarely assessed.
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The majority of studies, which focus on the effects of open border on crime, investigate
the effects of increased migration. The main conclusion of these studies is that higher
levels of immigrants in a given region significantly correlate with higher crime rates in
crimes against poverty, i.e. burglary or thievery, but not with higher crime rates in crimes
against the person, i.e. assaults or other forms of violent crimes (see, for example, Bell et
al., 2013 for Great Britain; Bianchi et al., 2012 for Italy; and Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012
for Spain). However, migration is only one possible phenomenon of open borders and
cannot be attributed to the abolishment of border control alone. Moreover, the Federal
States of Brandenburg, Saxony and Bavaria have not witnessed a significant increase in
migration following the Schengen Acquis (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2010b).
A further related stand of literature evaluates the effects of large infrastructure projects
that facilitate cross-border movements of people and goods. Here, the study by Ceccato
and Haining (2004) examines how the establishment of the Oresund Bridge affected crime
rates in Swedish and Danish border regions. Their findings show that the bridge between
Sweden and Denmark did not lead to higher crime rates in border regions in general.
Only for vehicle-related crimes did the authors find a significant increase. Their find-
ings correspond to a previous report released by the Swedish State Police that examined
changes in local crime patterns after the establishment of the Eurotunnel connecting Eng-
land and France (Ceccato and Haining, 2004). However, both studies focus on the effects
of decreased cross-border transaction costs, but not on the genuine effect of abolishment
of border control. This essay, in contrast, aims at identifying the impact of the removal
of border controls themselves. The following sections set up the empirical strategy for
identifying the Schengen effect, present the empirical results and discuss these results in
the light of the current discussion on the future of the Schengen Zone.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Crime Rates in German Border and Non-Border Regions
The empirical analysis aims at identifying the causal effect of the abolishment of border
controls between Germany and its Eastern neighbors on crime rates in the German border
regions. The removal of border controls came into force on 21 December 2007, when
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Poland and the Czech Republic as well as six other Eastern European states implemented
the Schengen Acquis. The empirical analysis is based on annual panel data of German
counties (Landkreise) for the years 2004 to 2008. The lower bond 2004 is given by the
accessibility of official crime data at the county level. The last year of the observation
period, 2008, is also determined by the availability of data. Because regional borders in
Saxony changed in the course of local governmental reorganization, it is not possible to
compare crime data for years before 2009 and after 2009 in Saxon regions. Figure 3.3
maps the 31 German counties (Landkreise) that share a border with Poland or the Czech
Republic. These regions constitute the treatment group in the subsequent analysis3.
Figure 3.3: Map of German Border Regions
German counties (Landkreise) located at the border to Poland and the Czech Republic
in grey coloring.
3The empirical analysis is based on the NUTS-3 classification for 2007, i.e. the year the Schengen
Acquis was implemented in Poland and the Czech Republic. In Saxony-Anhalt, regional borders also
changed during the observation period. However, in Saxony-Anhalt, crime rates for 2008 could be
recalculated in accordance with the distribution of inhabitants for the years prior to the reform.
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Data on regional crime rates, i.e. the annual number of reported crimes per 1,000 inhab-
itants, are compiled from the official German Police Crime Statistics (Polizeiliche Krimi-
nalita¨tsstatistik) for the Federal Republic of Germany provided by the Federal Criminal
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt). The Police Crime Statistics are so-called outgoing
statistics. This means that the statistics contain only those offenses which have come to
the attention of the police and have been passed to the public prosecutor’s office before
compilation began (see Bundeskriminalamt, 2016 for detailed information on the data).
The Police Crime Statistics thus do not contain undetected criminal offenses. Therefore,
the data do not reveal the real number of crimes within a region, but only the number of
recorded cases, which may differ across regions and across types of criminal offenses. Yet
a recent study conducted at the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW) shows
that in Germany regional crime patterns are – with some exceptions – comparable when
including dark figures, i.e. underreported crimes (Bug et al., 2015). Along with the over-
all regional crime rate, the regional crime rates for selected crimes against poverty are
also examined. This accounts for the fact that crimes against poverty such as burglary,
thievery, drug-related crimes, criminal mischief and street crime are mostly economically
driven and should thus be particularly affected by the abolishment of border controls4.
Figure 3.4 depicts crime rates of the counties (Landkreise) located on the border to
Poland and the Czech Republic for the years 2006 and 2008, i.e. one year prior to and
one year after the abolishment of border controls at the German-Polish and German-
Czech border. As the graphics reveal, the overall number of criminal offenses in these
regions amounted to 61 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2006, and dropped slightly to 58
crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2008. Approximately one third of all crimes were crimes
against poverty. When only considering these types of crimes, the rate increased from 22
crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2006 to 24 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2008 in border
regions. As Figure 3.4 reveals, this increase is mainly driven by a rise in street crimes
and criminal mischief, which are the most common types of crimes against poverty. The
rate of burglary also marginally increased between 2006 and 2008, while the rate of both
drug-related crimes and thievery from motor vehicles decreased in the border regions
between 2006 and 2008.
4The five types of criminal offenses against poverty assessed in this essay (i.e. burglary, thievery from
motor vehicles, criminal mischief, street crime and drug-related crimes) encompass all types of crimes
against poverty for which data on the NUTS-3 level is available in the German Criminal Police Statistics.
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Figure 3.4: Crime Rates in German Border Regions 2006 and 2008
Crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in border regions. Data are obtained from the German
Police Crime Statistics (Bundeskriminalamt, 2007 and 2009).
The descriptive evidence in Figures 3.4 shows that overall, there is no noticeable increase
in criminal offenses in border regions between 2006 and 2008, i.e. the years prior to and
following the Schengen Acquis in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yet the description
only reveals the naive effect, i.e. the difference between crimes in border regions before
and after the abolishment of border controls5. This effect, however, does not say anything
about how the rate of criminal offenses in border regions would have developed had Poland
and the Czech Republic not joined the Schengen Zone.
To identify the causal effect of the Schengen Acquis on border regions one would have to
compare the crime rates in border regions in the period after the abolishment of border
controls, i.e. E(yt|D = 1) with crime rates in border regions in the same period had
the Schengen enlargement not taken place, i.e. E(yt|D = 0). However, the situation
E(yt|D = 0), i.e. crime rates in border regions in the period after the abolishment of
border controls had Poland and the Czech Republic not joined the Schengen Zone, is
unobservable. This is what Holland (1986) calls the fundamental problem of causal
inference. One strategy to overcome the problem of causal inference is to approximate
the counterfactual situation by identifying a suitable control group of non-treated units,
i.e. non-border regions, that are sufficiently similar to the treated ones, i.e. border regions.
One possible control group for the German regions located on the border to Poland and
the Czech Republic are all German regions that are not located on the border to these
5The naive estimator is commonly given as δ = E(yt|D = 1) − E(yt−1|D = 0), whereby yt is the
outcome (crime rate) in border regions in the post-Schengen period t in the presence of the Schengen
Acquis, D=1, and yt−1 is the outcome (crime rate) in border regions in the pre-Schengen period t− 1 in
the absence of the Schengen Acquis, D=0 (see, for example, Shadish et al., 2002).
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two countries. Since the selection of border regions in the treatment group is exogenously
given by the geographic location of a region and is stable over time, this may be a
reasonable approach.
However, the simple comparison between crime rates of border and non-border regions
before and after the implementation of the Schengen Acquis in Poland and the Czech
Republic may not be suitable, as border regions may systematically differ from non-border
regions in a number of regional characteristics that may be related to regional crime rates.
The population density in these predominantly rural border regions, for instance, may be
below the German average. At the same time, border regions may witness comparatively
high unemployment rates, given that the majority of border regions are located in the East
German Federal States with unemployment rates above the German average (Eurostat,
2016). These discrepancies may violate the conditional independence assumption, stating
that – when controlling for certain region-specific covariates X – crime rates y in the
pre-Schengen period t − 1 and post-Schengen period t are independent from the border
location B, i.e. E(y) ⊥ B|X. This implies that E(yt−1|B = 1,X) = E(yt−1|B = 0,X)
and E(yt|B = 1,X) = E(yt|B = 0,X). The factors that may influence crime rates
should thus develop similarly in border and non-border regions. When the conditional
independence assumption is violated, these factors – and consequently crime rates – in
border and non-border regions would develop differently, even if Poland and the Czech
Republic had not implemented the Schengen Acquis. Hence, it may not be a good idea to
use the mean of all non-border regions as the control to approximate the counterfactual
situation.
Indeed, the values depicted in Table 3.1 show that German NUTS-3 regions located on
the border to Poland and the Czech Republic differ from the average German non-border
region in several factors that potentially influence regional crime rates such as the regional
demography, the regional economic performance, the regional education level and regional
clearance rates. Hence, the t-test for the mean comparisons suggests that border and
non-border regions substantially differ in almost all region-specific characteristics under
consideration. The statistically significant mean differences in the majority of regional
characteristics indicate that the conditional independence assumption may be violated
and that crime rates in border and non-border regions develop differently even in the
absence of the Schengen Acquis.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Border Regions and Non-Border
Regionsa
Border Regions Non-Border Regions t p > |t|
Share < 6 Years of Age 4.59 5.28 10.97 0.000***
Share 6 < 18 Years of Age 11.21 12.67 8.12 0.000***
Share 18 < 25 Years of Age 8.82 8.28 -5.44 0.000***
Share 25 < 30 Years of Age 5.35 5.61 3.00 0.000***
Share 30 < 50 Years of Age 29.46 30.42 7.24 0.000***
Share 50 < 65 Years of Age 19.70 18.50 -9.47 0.000***
Share 65 < 75 Years of Age 12.22 11.02 -10.1733 0.000***
Share > 75 Years of Age 8.65 8.22 -3.99 0.001**
Population Density 233.15 237.01 4.976 0.000***
Share of Foreigners 3.05 7.34 10.17 0.000***
Umemployment Rate 16.37 10.70 -12.36 0.000***
Youth Unemployment 12.50 12.80 1.50 0.134
Income per capita 14,932.57 17,264.21 11.32 0.000***
GDP per capita 20,083.95 25,658.90 5.9816 0.000***
Share Unskilled Labor 13.27 16.17 7.49 0.000***
Share University Degree 8.12 8.35 0.66 0.509
Clearance Rate 66.14 58.27 -11.03 0.000***
a Column (1) reports means for the years before the Schengen Acquis (2004-2006) in border
regions (N=124); column (2) reports means for the years before the Schengen Acquis (2004-
2006) in non-border regions (N=1,592). Column (3) reports the t-values of the test on the H0
that the mean value of each variable is the same in the treatment and control group. Column
(4) shows that the H0 can be rejected for almost all covariates. Stars denote significance as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Indeed, Figure 3.5 shows that while border and non-border regions share a common trend
in overall crime rates, the development of crime rates in crimes against poverty differs
between border and non-border regions in the years prior to the Schengen Acquis. Since
the common trend assumption is violated, a simple comparison between border and non-
border regions may not be suitable; instead it appears crucial to identify a more credible
control group.
Figure 3.5: Crime Rates in German Border and Non-Border Regions 2004-2007
The left graph depicts the development of crime rates in overall crimes in the pre-Schengen
period; the right graph depicts the development of crime rates in crimes against poverty
in the pre-Schengen period. Data are obtained from the German Police Statistics (Bun-
deskriminalamt, 2005 to 2008).
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3.3.2 Matching Treatment and Control Regions
To identify a control group that better approximates the counterfactual situation, i.e. the
development of crime rates in border regions in the absence of the abolishment of border
controls, statistical matching is used. Statistical matching aims at controlling preexisting
differences between the treatment and control group, so that units in the treatment group
are similar or only randomly different from the units in the matched control group on all
observed covariates X that may affect the outcome variable (Stuart and Rubin, 2008).
In doing so, it satisfies the conditional independence assumption that requires that the
border location B is not related to crime rates prior to the abolishment of border controls,
when controlling for region-specific factors X. Hence, any difference in X that is due to
the border location B is ruled out. Consequently, crime rates are then independent from
the border location given, i.e. E(y) ⊥ B|X (see Stuart and Rubin, 2008).
As the matching procedure, one-to-one nearest-neighbor propensity score matching with-
out replacement is applied. Hence, each border region is matched to the non-border
region (without replacement) that has a similar probability, i.e. propensity, of receiv-
ing the treatment, given the set of observed covariates X (see Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983 or Stuart and Rubin, 2008 for details). Propensity score matching is chosen as the
number of covariates that can impact regional crime rates is quite high and propensity
score matching decreases the dimensionality of the set of potential covariates X on which
border and non-border regions are matched (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). To satisfy
the common support assumption, requiring that 0 < Prob(B = 1|X = 1) < 1 over the
distribution of X, only border regions and their matched controls that are on common
support are included in the empirical analysis (Stuart and Rubin, 2008)6.
The set of covariates X, which are used to estimate the propensity scores of the regions,
contains several regional characteristics that are assumed to affect criminal activities
within a region (see Section 3.2). Precisely, the set includes the regional demographic
composition, the regional economic performance, the regional level of educational attain-
ment and the regional clearance rate. Data for the covariates are obtained from Eurostat
(2016), the Cambridge Econometric Regional Database (2015), the INKAR data of the
6Four border regions, namely Freyung-Grafenau and Wunsiedel in Bavaria and Go¨rlitz and Nieder-
schlesischer Oberlausitzkreis in Saxony are not on common support and are therefore excluded from the
analysis. This alters the average means of border regions between Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
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German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Devel-
opment (BBSR, 2016) and the German Police Crime Statistics released by the Federal
Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, 2005 to 2009). The propensity score is cal-
culated by a logistic regression model that regresses the binary border variable on a set
of regional control variables in 2006, i.e. the year prior to the implementation of the
Schengen Acquis in Poland and the Czech Republic. The estimated coefficients for the
likelihood of being a border region, i.e. treatment region, that is P (B|X), are displayed
in Table I.31 in Appendix Part I.
The final sample consists of 27 region pairs. Table I.32 in Appendix Part I lists the 27
border regions and their matched control regions. The list shows that most matched
control regions are regions within the same Federal State. Out of the matched control
regions, merely three regions (namely Demmin, Zwickauer Land and Hoyerswerda) are
direct neighbors of border regions. Direct spatial spillover effects, should hence not greatly
affect the results.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Border Regions and Matched Con-
trol Regionsa
Border Regions Matched Control Regions t p > |t|
Share < 6 Years of Age 4.58 4.54 -0.403 0.687
Share 6 < 18 Years of Age 11.15 10.86 -1.1270 0.261
Share 18 < 25 Years of Age 8.88 9.17 2.11 0.036**
Share 25 < 30 Years of Age 5.40 5.59 1.716 0.088*
Share 30 < 50 Years of Age 29.53 29.76 1.12 0.266
Share 50 < 65 Years of Age 19.74 19.72 -0.08 0.935
Share 65 < 75 Years of Age 12.18 12.04 -0.73 0.467
Share > 75 Years of Age 8.56 8.32 -1.451 0.148
Population Density 224.83 227.31 0.36 0.716
Share of Foreigners 3.01 2.99 -0.077 0.937
Umemployment Rate 16.34 16.41 0.097 0.923
Youth Unemployment 12.51 12.77 0.836 0.404
Income per capita 14,936.23 14,736.75 -1.087 0.278
GDP per capita 20,219.78 20,641.52 0.42 0.676
Share Unskilled Labor 12.70 12.21 -0.80 0.427
Share University Degree 8.26 9.62 2.37 0.019**
Clearance Rate 64.75 62.98 -2.14 0.033**
a Column (1) reports means for the years before the Schengen Acquis (2004-2006) in border regions
(N=108); column (2) reports means for the years before the Schengen Acquis (2004-2006) in
matched non-border regions (N=108). Column (3) reports the t-values of the test on H0 that the
mean value of each variable is the same in the treatment and control group. Column (4) shows
that the H0 cannot be rejected for almost all covariates. Stars denote significance as follows: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.2 shows that the matching procedure generates a balanced sample of treated re-
gions, i.e. border regions, and control regions, ı.e. non-border regions, in terms of observed
characteristics. Hence, the t-tests of the difference in variable means between treatment
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and control group show insignificant results in all cases, indicating that the matching
procedure indeed eliminates observable differences between treatment and control groups
in key regional characteristics. The balance between treatment and control groups on
the observed covariates suggests that the two groups will only randomly differ on all
observable and unobservable background covariates (see Stuart and Rubin, 2008).
Moreover, Figure 3.6 shows that crime rates in border regions and their matched controls
follow a common trend in the pre-treatment period, which satisfies the common trend
assumption. Since crime data at the county level are not publicly available before 2004,
a more thorough test of the common trend assumption is not possible. To be precise, it
is neither possible to conduct long pre-treatment trend comparisons nor to conduct any
pseudo-treatment test. However, as the graphs in Figure 3.6 depict, aggregated crime
rates in border regions for the period from 2004 to 2007 and their matched controls
are sufficiently similar. Controlling for several regional characteristics that potentially
affect regional crime rates should further alleviate concerns regarding the validity of the
common trend assumption (for similar empirical strategies, see, for example, Braakmann
and Vogel, 2010 or Gathmann et al., 2014).
Figure 3.6: Crime Rates in German Border Regions and Matched Control Regions
2004-2007
The left graph depicts crime rates in overall crimes in the pre-Schengen period; the right
graph depicts crime rates in crimes against poverty in the pre-Schengen period. Data are
obtained from the German Police Statistics (Bundeskriminalamt, 2005 to 2008).
3.3.3 Estimating the Schengen Effect
Having identified a suitable control group, the Schengen effect on crime rates in border
regions, i.e. the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), can be defined as the
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difference of the difference in crime rates prior to and after the Schengen Acquis between
border and non-border regions, i.e.
δ = [E(yt − y1t−1|B = 1)− E(yt − yt−1|B = 0)],
whereby E(yt − y1t−1|B = 1) is the difference in crime rates prior to and after the
Schengen Acquis in border regions and E(yt − y1t−1|B = 0) the difference in non-border
regions. This equation is also referred to as the conditional difference-in-difference (DiD)
estimator (see Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000 or Smith and Todd, 2005 for a detailed
discussion). The corresponding linear difference-in-difference regression model estimated
based on annual panel data for border regions and their matched control regions for the
years 2004 to 2008 can be formalized as:
yit = αi + β1Bi + β2Tit + β3(BiTit) + β4Xit + it,
where yit is the outcome of interest, i.e. the rate of criminal offenses of a certain type in
region i at time t, αi is the region-specific constant, Bi is a binary variable that takes the
value 1 for border regions and 0 for non-border, β1 captures the difference between border
and non-border regions in the absence of the Schengen effect, Tit contains a time dummy
for 2008, i.e. the year after the implementation of the Schengen Acquis in Poland and
the Czech Republic, β2 captures the corresponding coefficient, Xit is a matrix of control
variables including the regional level of deterrence, the regional income opportunities and
time dummies for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, β4 is a vector of the corresponding
regression coefficients, and it is a standard error term. Finally, BiTit is the interaction
term of Bi and Tit that takes the value 1 for border regions in 2008. The coefficient
β3 then measures the divergence in average outcomes between the border regions, i.e.
treatment group, and non-border regions, i.e. control group, in 2008, which indicates the
Average Treatment effect of the Treated (ATT). This is the effect of interest, i.e. the
Schengen effect.
The matching procedure outlined above contributes to the conditional independence as-
sumption holding. Hence, it ensures that the difference before and after the treatment
in the absence of the treatment are similar conditioned on the propensity of being a bor-
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der region, P(X), that is expressed by the propensity score. Along with the conditional
independence assumption, a second key initial assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment
Value Assumption (SUTVA), requiring that potential outcomes of units are unaffected
by the exposure to the treatment of other units (Rubin, 1980; Stuart and Rubin, 2008).
This assumption, often referred to as the non-macro effect assumption, is more difficult to
justify. Hence, the abolishment of border controls inevitably affected all German regions,
not only regions located on the border to the two new Schengen member states. The
identified effect can thus only be interpreted as the lower bond of the true effect.
To increase the efficiency of the estimates further, a set of regional covariates that may
affect crime rates within regions is included in the regression model. The set of covari-
ates includes the regional level of deterrence, indicated by the regional clearance rate
and the regional economic performance, measured by the regional GDP per capita and
the regional GDP growth rate. The regional population density is included as a further
region-specific variable. As indicated above, these variables are frequently identified in
the geography of crime literature as factors affecting the crime rate in a given region.
Data on all regional characteristics are again compiled from Eurostat (2016), the Cam-
bridge Regional Econometrics Database (2015), the INKAR data of the German Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (2016), and
the German Police Crime Statistics of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskrimi-
nalamt, 2005 to 2009).
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 All Crimes
Table 3.3 depicts the estimated regression coefficients and the corresponding robust stan-
dard errors of the linear difference-in-difference regression model on matched samples.
The first model specification depicts the results without the inclusion of any covariate,
while the subsequent model specifications include region-specific covariates that are com-
monly identified as affecting crime rates at the regional level. The second model specifica-
tion includes the regional clearance rate, while the third and fourth model specifications
also include the regional economic performance and the regional population density.
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Table 3.3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched
Samples: All Crimesa
All Crimes All Crimes All Crimes All Crimes
DID -1.396 -2.559 -.047 2.978
(2.945) (3.099) (3.619) (3.048)
Year=2008 -3.977 -4.681 -2.210 -2.337
(2.054) (2.382) (3.994) (4.339)
Border=1 -5.986 -5.425 -3.332 -5.082
(14.98) (14.54) (13.49) (11.77)
Clearance Rate -.577 -.853 .508
(.985) (.841) (.712)
GDP per capita .002 -.001
(.001) (.001)
GDP Growth Rate -306.5* -197.2*
(123.5) (85.82)
Pop. Density .126***
(.034)
Yearly Dummies
√ √ √ √
Constant 78.81*** 114.9 83.26 23.23
(8.991) (65.88) (67.71) (54.32)
Onservations 270 270 270 270
McFadden’s R2 -.018 -.018 .104 .312
a Table entries denote estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses)
and the level of significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The estimated coefficients in Table 3.3 show that the interaction term, (DID), which con-
stitutes the parameter of interest, is negative and not statistically significant in the first
specification. This indicates that the number of crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in German
regions on the border to Poland and the Czech Republic did not change in a statistically
significant way compared to their non-border counterparts after Poland and the Czech
Republic implemented the Schengen Acquis. The result stays the same when controlling
for the regional clearance rate and the regional economic performance. When further
controlling for the population density, the interaction term becomes positive, but stays
statistically insignificant. The binary variables for the year 2008 and the border location
are also not statistically significant in all four model specifications, which means that
crime rates in border and non-border regions did not differ during the entire observation
period, i.e. 2004 to 2008, and that crime rates in border regions and in their matched
control regions did not change significantly between the pre-Schengen, i.e. 2004 to 2007,
and the post-Schengen period, i.e. 2008.
Regarding the estimated coefficient of the various covariates, results show that the re-
gional economic growth rate and the regional population density both have a statistically
significant effect on crime rates. The positive regression coefficient for population density
suggests that more densely populated areas witness higher crime rates. This finding is
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in line with the geography of crime literature, suggesting that in more populated, i.e.
urban regions, crime rates are higher (Sampson et al., 1997; Entorf and Spengler, 2000).
When looking at the regional economic performance indicators, results show that the
GDP per capita has no significant effect, while the regional economic growth rate has a
statistically significant, negative effect. These findings suggest that in the case of Ger-
man regions bordering Poland and the Czech Republic and their matched non-border
control regions, economically more prosperous regions ceteris paribus witnessed lower
crime rates. This result fits with the theoretical consideration of Ehrlich (1973), who
proposes that economically prosperous regions provide better legal income opportunities.
It does, however, contradict the argument that more prosperous regions are endowed with
more transferable assets and may hence constitute more lucrative targets for offenders
from outside the region (see Entorf and Spengler, 2000 for a detailed discussion). In
contrast to the regional economic growth rate and regional population density, the re-
gional clearance-rate, which measures the regional level of deterrence, does not have a
statistically significant effect on crime rates in German border regions and their matched
controls.
3.4.2 Crimes Against Poverty
Table 3.4 depicts the estimated regression coefficients with the rate of crimes against
poverty as the outcome variable. Crimes against poverty include burglary, thievery from
motor vehicles, criminal mischief, drug-related crimes and street crimes, i.e. all types of
crimes against poverty for which regional-level data are available. The interaction term
is now positive, but still not statistically significant in all four model specifications. This
suggests that the Schengen Acquis and the subsequent abolishment of border controls at
the German-Polish and the German-Czech border has also not affected the rate of crimes
against poverty in German border regions in a statistically significant way. The binary
variables for the post-Schengen period and the border location are again not statistically
significant, either. This indicates that crime rates in border regions and their matched
control regions did not change before and after the Schengen Acquis in a statistically
significant way, and that crime rates in border regions and their matched control regions
did not differ during the entire observation period, i.e. from 2004 to 2008.
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples:
Poverty Crimesa
Povery Crime Povery Crime Povery Crime Povery Crime
DID .760 .669 1.781 1.951
(1.364) (1.801) (2.051) (1.547)
Year=2008 -.231 -2.977 -4.154 -.779
(1.606) (1.571) (2.142) (2.335)
Border=1 -3.389 -5.382 -4.731 -3.747
(5.733) (5.425) (5.238) (4.544)
Clearance-Rate -.767** -.714** -.303
(.224) (.214) (.167)
GDP per capita .001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
GDP Growth -102.9 -68.65
(51.81) (38.51)
Pop. Density .045**
(.014)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √
Constant 30.62*** 62.43*** 48.90** 37.65*
(3.763) (11.39) (16.32) (14.91)
Observations 270 270 270 270
McFadden’s R2 -.017 .099 .166 .323
a Table entries denote estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses) and the
level of significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Regarding the regional covariates, results show that for crimes against poverty, regional
clearance rates have a statistically significant negative effect. This indicates that for
these types of crimes, a higher level of deterrence within a region indeed reduces criminal
activities. However, when controlling for the population density, the coefficient for the
clearance rate is no longer statistically significant. While the level of economic perfor-
mance within a region has no statistically significant effect, the regression coefficient for
the regional population density is positive and statistically significant, indicating that
crime rates are again higher in urban regions compared to rural ones.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 depict the estimated regression coefficients for various types of criminal
offenses as the outcome variable. The findings show that the interaction term, indicating
the Schengen effect, is not statistically significant for thievery from motor vehicles (Table
3.5), drug-related crimes (Table 3.5), criminal mischief (Table 3.6) and street crimes
(Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples: Various Types of
Crimes IIa
Criminal Mischief Street Crime
DID .115 .061 .495 .580 .363 .116 .872 1.050
(.491) (.469) (.602) (.550) (.884) (1.152) (1.146) (.915)
Year=2008 1.384** 1.081 .950 1.979* -.093 -.203* -.872 .213
(.499) (.700) (.784) (.809) (1.011) (1.124) (1.506) (1.574)
Border=1 -.666 -1.082 -.507 -.139 -2.107 -3.053 -2.577 -2.108
(1.896) (1.822) (1.911) (1.464) (3.250) (3.153) (3.216) (2.795)
Clearance-Rate -.100 -.001 .092 -.528* -.404 -.133
(.124) (.104) (.097) (.211) (.219) (.188)
GDP per capita .001 -.001 .001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
GDP Growth -34.50* -20.24 -61.22 -41.80
(16.71) (11.41) (35.35) (27.12)
Pop. Density .019*** .026**
(.005) (0.008)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Constant 9.961*** 13.56** 6.467 5.104 16.40*** 30.64*** 21.86 17.10
(1.295) (4.821) (6.358) (6.787) (2.301) (6.920) (11.52) (11.00)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270
McFadden’s R2 -.014 -.009 .043 .326 -.015 .053 .106 .284
a Table entries denote estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses) and the level of significance: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
This indicates that for these types of criminal offenses, the abolishment of border controls
at the Polish-German and Czech-German border did not affect crime rates in German
border regions in a statistically significant way. The Schengen effect is, however, positive
and statistically significant for burglaries (Table 3.5), indicating that the Schengen Acquis
and the subsequent abolishment of border controls indeed affected the number of reported
burglaries per inhabitant in German regions on the border to Poland and the Czech Re-
public. In the baseline specification, i.e. the specification without any region-specific
covariate, the estimated coefficient has a value of .496, which is difficult to interpret in
terms of effect size. When taking the natural logarithm of crime rates as the dependent
variable, the estimated regression coefficient amounts to .527, which indicates that be-
cause of the removal of border controls, crime rates in border regions increased by 52.7%
compared to non-border regions, which is a comparatively large effect (see Table I.33 in
Appendix Part I). The positive effect remains similar when controlling for region-specific
covariates. This finding indicates that public concerns that the removal of physical bar-
riers at the German-Polish and German-Czech border would increase crimes in border
regions are not completely unjustified.
Yet results also reveal that the positive effect is mainly driven by a sharp decrease in
burglaries in the matched control regions in 2008. As Figure 3.7 illustrates, the rates of
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burglaries sharply decreased in the matched non-border regions in 2008, whereas in border
regions, the rate of burglaries stayed more or less the same between 2007 and 2008. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient for the border location dummy variable
also depicts that border regions actually witnessed fewer burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants
than their non-border matched controls in the entire observation period. The negative
effect for the 2008, i.e. post-Schengen, dummy reveals that the rate of burglaries decreased
after the Schengen Acquis in border regions and their matched controls.
Figure 3.7: Rate of Burglaries in Border Regions and
Matched Non-Border Regions 2004-2008
The rate of burglaries indicates the number of reported
burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants.
The estimated coefficients of the post-Schengen dummy variables are also negative and
statistically significant for drug-related crimes and thievery from motor vehicles, indicat-
ing that these types of crime also deceased in 2008 compared to the pre-Schengen period
in both border regions and their matched control regions (Table 3.5). For the remain-
ing types of criminal offenses, the estimated coefficients for the 2008 dummy variable
are, overall, not statistically significant. Regarding the border location, the estimated
coefficients are negative for all five types of criminal offenses under consideration. How-
ever, the effects are only statistically significant for burglaries, whereas in the other crime
types, the rates did not differ between border regions and their matched controls in a
statistically significant way between 2004 and 2008.
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Regarding the region-specific covariates, results show that the regional level of deterrence,
measured through the regional clearance rate in a particular type of crime, does not yield a
statistically significant effect for any of the five types of criminal offenses, except for drug-
related crimes. Here, the corresponding regression coefficient is negative and statistically
significant, indicating that the higher the regional clearance rate (in drug-related crimes)
is, the lower is the crime rate in drug-related crimes. The coefficient is also statistically
significant for street crime, but becomes insignificant when controlling for the regions’
economic performance and population density.
With respect to the economic indicators, results show that the regional GDP per capita
does not have a statistically significant effect on crime rates in border regions and their
matched controls. In contrast, the economic growth rate has a statistically negative ef-
fect on the crime rates in drug-related crimes, suggesting that drug-related crimes are less
frequent in economically prosperous regions. Effects are also negative and significant for
street crime and thievery from motor vehicles, as long as the regional population density
is not included in the model. The negative effects support the view that better legal
income opportunities reduce crime; yet they stand in contrast to the assumption that
economically prosperous regions should witness more crimes given their relative higher
endowment with transferable assets. Regarding the population density, the regression
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all five types of criminal offenses,
except for drug-related crimes. This indicates that more densely populated regions ceteris
paribus witness higher crime rates in these types of criminal offenses. For drug-related
crimes, the regression coefficient for population density is negative, suggesting that drug-
related offenses are also common in less populated, rural regions. This finding is in line
with recent media reports about an increase in drug abuse in rural Saxon and Bavar-
ian regions located near the border to the Czech Republic (Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r
Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit, 2016).
Overall, the empirical analysis shows that the abolishment of border controls on the
German-Polish and German-Czech border had no effect on overall crime rates as well as
on crime rates in the common types of poverty crimes in German border regions. One
potential explanation for the insignificant effect may be that the risk perception and
anticipated benefits of criminal activities in German border regions have not changed
for potential offenders from the East after border controls were abolished. Another ex-
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planation may be the reinforcement of police presence in the immediate border regions
once border controls were eliminated. In fact expenditures to the police increased in all
four Federal States bordering either Poland or the Czech Republic increased from 2006
to 2008. For the rate of burglaries, however, a positive and statistically significant effect
can be observed. This finding supports public concerns that the abolishment of border
controls would increase crime. Public concerns may be reinforced by the fact that bur-
glaries are one of the most feared types of criminal offenses in Germany (Hirtenlehner
and Hummelsheim, 2015). Indeed, in a survey conducted by the German Police Crime
Office in 2014, the fear of burglaries ranked even above the fear of robbery or rape among
the German public (Hirtenlehner and Hummelsheim, 2015). This may explain the public
concerns revealed, despite the fact that compared to other types of criminal offenses, the
number of burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants in border regions is quite low and increased
only slightly between the pre-Schengen and post-Schengen period in these regions.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This essay has assessed whether the abolishment of border controls at the German-Polish
and German-Czech border in December 2007 affected crime rates in German regions
located on the border to Poland and the Czech Republic based on annual panel data
of German counties (Landkreise) for the years 2004 to 2008. Effects were identified by
conditional difference-in-difference estimation on matched samples. This approach allows
the identification of the Schengen effect on crime rates in border regions in a causal way.
Results show that no significant Schengen effect can be observed for overall crime rates.
However, for the rate of burglaries, the data reveal a positive and statistically significant
effect, indicating that for burglaries, public concerns about an increase in crime following
the Schengen Acquis proved to be true. The identification strategy, however, also shows
that the effect is primarily driven by a sharp decline of burglaries in the matched control
regions instead of a sharp increase of burglaries in border regions. Moreover, results reveal
that for other, more common types of criminal offenses, including criminal mischief, street
crime, thievery out of motor vehicles or drug-related crimes, the abolishment of border
regions had virtually no effect on crime rates in border regions.
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Even though the results provide initial empirical evidence of the causal effect of the
abolishment of border controls on crime rates in border regions, some empirical caveats
have to be noted. Firstly, the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) may
not hold in the context of this essay. Hence, along with the border regions, the remaining
German regions were also affected by the elimination of border controls, and spatial
spillover effects cannot be ruled out. The findings can hence only be interpreted as lower
bonds of the true effects. Secondly, the number of border regions is very low, which
reduces the power of the estimation. Moreover, it is possible that results are driven by a
few outlier regions with regional peculiarities. To increase the number of observations, it
may be worthwhile in future research to conduct sub-regional-level analyses, for example
for German municipalities bordering Poland or the Czech Republic. However, crime data
on this sub-regional level may prove difficult to obtain. Thirdly, the empirical analysis
is constrained to the time period from 2004 to 2008 and includes only one year for the
post-Schengen period. The results, therefore, only indicate the short-term effect, but do
not allow any conclusions about medium-term or long-term effects. Finally, the essay
does not assess potential channels through which the removal of physical barriers affects
burglaries in border regions. In future research, it may hence be desirable to consider the
type of border adjacency, the physical infrastructure and trade routes between German
border regions and their Polish and Czech counterparts. This would allow conclusions
about the relevance of these factors that are frequently identified in the literature as
spurring border regions’ susceptibility to crime (see, for example, Ceccato and Haining,
2004, Johnson; 2014 or Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, it may be of interest to expand the
empirical analysis to non-border regions that are direct or indirect neighbors of border
regions. This would allow the tracing of the spatial dimension of the Schengen effect on
regional crime rates.
Despite these caveats, the essay still offers an initial attempt to empirically identify and
evaluate the causal effect that the abolishment of border controls at the German-Polish
and German-Czech border had on crime rates in German border regions. Results show
that for overall crime rates, no significant increase in crime rates can be observed. Hence,
in contrast to public concerns, border regions have not per se experienced an increase
in crime rates as a result of the implementation of the Schengen Acquis in Poland and
the Czech Republic. However, for burglaries, a statistically significant positive effect
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is visible, indicating that public concerns are not completely unjustified. Against this
background, public authorities would do well to counteract criminal activities in border
regions more intensively. This would also signal political awareness, which may decrease
public concerns and the drift of voters in border regions to populist or even nationalist
parties that exploit public fears. At the same time, the empirical results show that for
other types of criminal offenses such as street crime, thievery of motor vehicles, criminal
mischief or drug-related crimes, the Schengen Acquis had virtually no effect on crime rates
in German border regions. In light of the prevailing xenophobic tendencies especially in
East German border regions and the current discussion on the future of the Schengenzone
and borderless Europe, this is quite a relevant result, because it shows that that at least
for border regions at the German-Polish and German-Czech border, there is only little
empirical support for the widespread concerns about public security.
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Chapter 4
Firm-Specific and Region-Specific
Factors and Spatial Cooperation
Patterns of Lower Bavarian Firms*
This essay examines spatial cooperation patterns of firms in Research and Development (R&D)
and assesses the relative influence of firm-specific and region-specific factors on these patterns.
Results, which are based on genuine micro data of 221 firms located in the German region
of Lower Bavaria, suggest that characteristics of the cooperation regions are relatively more
influential for firms’ spatial cooperation patterns than firm-specific ones. Thereby, the regional
knowledge base and the function that a region fulfills within the value chain of a firm seem to be
equally influential than common factors such as the geographical and institutional proximity of
a region. Translated into the political context, these findings suggest that regional stakeholders
and policy makers should consider region-specific patterns along with firm-specific ones when
designing regional cooperation strategies.
Keywords: R&D Cooperation, Spatial Cooperation Patterns, Low-Technology Region,
German Firms
JEL Classification: R11, R12, R14, L20
*The Chapter has profited from constructive comments from participants of the Doctoral Day of the
Regional Innovation Policy Conference 2015.
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4.1 Introduction
Cooperation with other organizations, such as other firms, universities or research insti-
tutes, is one channel through which firms can absorb external knowledge that is beneficial
for their innovativeness and economic prosperity. Hence, strengthening firms’ connectiv-
ity, i.e. their cooperation linkages with external partners, has become a key element of
regional growth and development policies in Europe (see Camagni et al., 2014; Cam-
agni and Capello, 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argile`s, 2015). The Europe 2020 strategy
of the European Commission, for example, highlights the relevance of cooperation with
external partners and recommends integrating inter-regional cooperation strategies in
regional development policies (European Commission, 2010). Particularly for firms lo-
cated in peripheral, low-technology regions, i.e. regions with a low population density,
no major city and a dominance of low- and medium-technology industries, cooperation
with inter-regional partners can constitute an important instrument with which to over-
come the limited regional knowledge bases (Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Grillitsch and
Trippl, 2013). At the same time, models of spatial knowledge acquisition suggest that
geographic proximity is highly important, as it facilitates face-to-face contact and mu-
tual trust, which are preconditions for successful cooperation (Asheim and Gertler, 2005;
Malmberg and Maskell, 2006).
This essay examines firms’ spatial cooperation patterns in Research and Development
(R&D) based on a sample of 221 firms located in the German low-technology border
region of Lower Bavaria. R&D cooperation is defined here as cooperation between two
or more parties that aim to develop new products or processes and that exceed pure
market relations. Along with a detailed description of spatial cooperation patterns in
R&D of Lower Bavarian firms, this essay addresses in particular the question of the
relative influence of firm-specific factors, such as the size or sector of a firm, and region-
specific factors, like geographical or institutional proximity, on firms’ spatial cooperation
patterns. Knowing the relative influence of these factors can provide valuable insights for
regional stakeholders and policymakers when designing regional policy strategies. Hence,
it allows recommendations as to whether programs, aiming to foster cooperation between
firms and other actors, should focus on firm-specific factors, for instance specific support
for SMEs, or on region-specific patterns.
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The essay applies multinomial logit and conditional logit models to assess the relation
between firms-specific as well as region-specific factors and firms’ spatial cooperation
patterns in R&D. While a multinomial logit model is applied to analyze the influence of
various firm-specific factors, a conditional logit models is applied to simultaneously assess
the relative influence of both firm-specific and region-specific factors. Results indicate
that when firm-specific and region-specific factors are assessed simultaneously, the latter
are relatively more influential on firms’ spatial cooperation patterns. The function that a
specific region fulfills within the value chain of an individual firm as well as the presence
of a relevant university or research institute within a region are equally important than
common factors such as the geographical and institutional proximity of a region vis-a`-vis
Lower Bavaria. These findings indicate that universities and research institutes are rele-
vant partners in R&D for firms in rural, low-technology regions. Moreover, results show
that firms’ spatial operation radii are constrained, as firms tend to engage in R&D coop-
eration mainly with partners in regions that are also of functional, i.e. market importance
to them.
Translated into the political context, the results suggest that regional stakeholders and
policy makers should consider region-specific patterns along with firm-specific characteris-
tics when designing regional cooperation strategies. In particular, they should strengthen
the regional knowledge base and foster local and regional university-industry linkages. At
the same time, they should promote interregional cooperation initiatives and incentivize
firms to search for cooperation partners outside their usual spatial operation radii.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
literature on spatial cooperation patterns of firms and the relation between firm-specific
and region-specific characteristics and these spatial patterns. Section 4.3 introduces the
estimation strategy and the survey data of Lower Bavarian firms. The empirical results
are presented and discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in Periph-
eral Regions
In the literature, there is a broad consensus that Research and Development (R&D)
cooperation is beneficial for the innovativeness of firms. Hence, R&D cooperation with
other firms, universities or research institutes enables firms to exploit external knowledge
and absorb new ideas (see, for example, Becker and Dietz, 2004 for the German context).
Regarding the spatial dimension of R&D cooperation, firms can choose from a variety of
spatial cooperation options. They can cooperate predominantly with partners from the
same region or with partners from outside the region. Equally, they can predominantly
cooperate with domestic partners or with international partners.
Recent empirical evidence shows that firms in peripheral regions profit especially from
cooperation with partners from outside the region, as these cooperation-linkages can en-
able firms to exploit specific knowledge that is not present within the region (see, for
example, Fitjar and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2011; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Grillitsch and
Trippl, 2013). At the same time, theories on the spatial acquisition of knowledge suggest
that knowledge transfer is facilitated by geographical as well as cultural and institutional
proximity, given the tacit nature of knowledge and the embeddedness of knowledge in
the local or regional socioeconomic, cultural and institutional context (see Gertler, 2003;
Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). While cultural proximity refers to a common language,
culture and history, institutional proximity refers to a common political-institutional sys-
tem and a common legal framework (Boschma, 2005). For R&D cooperation in particular,
which mainly deals with the transmission of knowledge instead of the exploitation of pure
price effects, these soft factors may play an important role in enhancing cooperation.
Based on existing conceptional approaches to spatial knowledge acquisition and recent
empirical studies, the following sections assesse two sets of factors that potentially in-
fluence the spatial cooperation patterns of firms in low-technology regions. The first
set includes firm-specific characteristics such as the size or sector of the firm, while the
second set includes region-specific characteristics such as the regional geographical or
institutional proximity of a region to Lower Bavaria.
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4.2.1 Firm-Specific Factors and Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Pat-
terns
In the literature, the vast majority of studies, which examine the determinants of firms’
R&D cooperation strategies, focus on the impact of firm-specific factors such as the size
or sector of a firm. Regarding the initial cooperation decision of firms, i.e. the decision
to engage in R&D cooperation, the size and sector of a firm, and its R&D intensity are
frequently identified as decisive factors for explaining cooperation decisions of firms (see
Barge-gil, 2010 for an overview). The idea is that larger firms have greater capacity
and resources to search for cooperation partners and manage cooperation. Consequently,
they may be more likely to cooperate (see, for example, Veugelers, 1998). Similarly, firms
in high-technology industries and firms with a high R&D intensity are more likely to
cooperate, as their research and development process is usually more complex, requiring
the acquisition of external knowledge (see, for example, To¨dtling et al., 2006). At the
same time, innovative firms frequently command a higher absorptive capacity, enabling
them to profit from R&D cooperation (see, for example, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Studies which explicitly emphasize the choice between various cooperation options are
less frequent. Also, they predominately focus on the choice between horizontal cooper-
ation, i.e. cooperation with competitors, and vertical cooperation, i.e. cooperation with
suppliers and customers. Kaiser (2002), for instance, finds that firm size and firm loca-
tion can explain the choice between vertical, horizontal and mixed cooperation of firms
in the German service sector. Similarly, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) show for French
manufacturing firms that the technological intensity of the firm best explains the choice
between horizontal and vertical cooperation. For a sample of Dutch firms, Belderbos et
al. (2004) identify firm size and R&D intensity as the main explanatory factors driving
the choice between competitors, suppliers, customers and research institutes as coopera-
tion partners, while Franco and Gussoni (2010) find for Italian manufacturing firms that
the size and sector of the firm as well as the level of firms’ R&D expenditure determine
the choice between market and research cooperation. Considering the spatial dimension
of cooperation, i.e. the choice between partners from various regions, Arranz and Fer-
nandez de Arroyabe (2008) show that the technological intensity as well as the firm size
can explain the choice between domestic, EU and US partners of Spanish manufacturing
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firms, whereas Miotti and Sachwald (2003) identify the same variables as factors that
explain the likelihood of French firms cooperating with partners from the US and Japan.
These studies show that firm-specific factors, particularly the size and sector of a firm
and a firm’s R&D intensity, can contribute a great deal towards explaining firms’ R&D
cooperation patterns. Yet these firm-specific factors may not be the only ones that matter.
In the spatial context in particular, characteristics of the alternative cooperation regions
may be equally important.
4.2.2 Region-Specific Factors and Firms’ Spatial Cooperation
Patterns
In the past decades, several models of knowledge acquisition have been introduced that
emphasize the spatial dimension of cooperation of firms. The Regional Innovation System
(RIS), for instance, stresses the relevance of geographical proximity for knowledge creation
and knowledge diffusion between actors (Asheim, 1996; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Cooke,
2001). This idea is similar to the one outlined in the regional geography’s cluster literature
(Porter, 2000), suggesting that an agglomeration of cooperating firms within a region can
increase the regions’ innovativeness. However, it may not only be geographical proximity
that supports intra-regional cooperation. As Boschma (2005) points out, cultural and
institutional proximity may be equally important. The idea is that cooperation with
partners, who speak the same language, share a common culture and operate within
the same political-institutional system, may be less expensive in terms of transaction
costs than cooperation with culturally or institutionally more distant partners (Lundquist
and Trippl, 2013; Trippl, 2010). Consequently, firms may gain the highest utility from
engaging in R&D cooperating with partners in geographically, culturally or institutionally
close regions.
For R&D cooperation, however, transaction costs may be less important than for pro-
curement or production cooperation, with the acquisition of complementary knowledge
possibly being the main motivation for firms’ cooperation (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003;
Tether, 2002). From this resource-based perspective, firms located in regions with a lim-
ited knowledge base, such as peripheral, low-technology regions, may profit in particular
80
Chapter 4: Spatial Cooperation Patterns in R&D
from cooperating with external partners. Hence, cooperation with partners from out-
side the region can enable firms to overcome the limited regional knowledge base and to
exploit external knowledge (Bathelt et al., 2004). This perspective has been supported
by recent empirical works indicating that firms in peripheral regions are more likely to
innovate when they cooperate with partners from outside the region (see, for example,
Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013). Hence, the knowledge base that
a region provides for a firm may be a further relevant factor for firms’ spatial cooperation
patterns.
A third region-specific factor that may influence firms’ spatial cooperation patterns is
the functional, i.e. market, importance that a region has for an individual firm. The idea
is that particularly Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) lack the financial and
personal resources to engage in cooperation with partners in multiple regions. Instead,
firms may be constrained in their spatial operation radius and engage in R&D cooperation
with partners from regions that are also of market importance to them. Consequently
firms that operate mainly on local markets may, ceteris paribus, tend to engage in R&D
cooperation primarily with local partners, whereas firms operating on interregional or
international markets may, ceteris paribus, be more likely to cooperate primarily with
partners from outside the region. This argument suggests that the function that a region
fulfills within the value chain of a firm may be a further factor that influences firms’
spatial cooperation patterns.
To summarize, the literature suggest that both firm-specific and region-specific factors
may influence firms’ spatial cooperation patterns in R&D. Following an explorative re-
search approach, the remainder of this essay assesses the relative influence of both sets of
factors on firms’ spatial cooperation patterns on a sample of 221 Lower Bavarian firms.
With respect to the characteristics of the individual firm, the empirical assessment dis-
tinguishes between the size and sector of the firm as well as firms’ R&D expenditure.
Regarding the characteristics of the alternative cooperation regions, the focus is on the
relative influence of the geographical and institutional proximity of a region vis-a`-vis
Lower Bavaria as well as on the regional knowledge base and on the market function that
a region fulfills within the value chain of a firm.
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4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
To examine the relative influence of firm-specific and region-specific factors on firms’
spatial cooperation patterns, several specifications of multinomial choice models are es-
timated. From a conceptual point of view, multinomial choice models are based on the
standard random utility maximization framework, assuming that firms are utility max-
imizers and choose the alternative with the highest utility (see McFadden, 1974; Train,
2009 for and overview). Translated in the context of firms’ spatial cooperation patterns,
this means that firms predominantly cooperate with partners in that region with the
highest utility for them.
Following the literature on the standard random utility maximization framework (see
Long and Freese, 2006; McFadden, 1974; Train, 2009), the utility U a firm i attaches to
each of the alternative cooperation regions j, i.e. Uij, is expressed as a function V of firm-
specific factors xi of firm i and region-specific factors zj of an alternative cooperation
regions j. As firms are assumed to be utility-maximizers, they choose to cooperate
with partners from region m from a set of alternative regional options J , when Uim >
Uij,∀ m, j ∈ J and m 6= j. The probability of a firm i choosing region m is then given
as:
P (yi = m) = P (Uim > Uij),∀ m 6= j
When the function V only contains firm-specific factors, instead of firm-specific and
region-specific ones, a multinomial logit model can be estimated. The probability of
choosing region m out of a set of J possible alternative regions j is then given as a
function V of the observable firm-specific characteristics x of firm i, and the parameter-
vector β, and the error term ij. Hence, the model can be formalized as:
Pr(m) = V (xi; β; ij),∀ m, j ∈ Ji and m 6= j
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Under the assumption that the error terms follow an extreme value distribution of type
I, the probability of choosing alternative m is then given by:
P (yi = m) =
exp(Vim)
1 +
J∑
j=2
exp(Vij)
The denominator indicates that in order to estimate the regression coefficients, one al-
ternative has to be fixed. This alternative serves as the reference group in the estimation
(for a detailed discussion of the model see, for example, Long and Freese, 2006 or Train,
2009).
However, this essay aims at assessing not only the influence of firm-specific factors on
firms’ spatial cooperation patterns; instead it pursues to also examine the relative influ-
ence of both firm-specific and region-specific factors on these patterns. Therefore, it is
crucial to include both sets of factors in one and the same model. When both firm-specific
and region-specific factors are simultaneously assessed, the multinomial logit model is no
longer appropriate. Instead, a conditional logit model is more suitable, as this model al-
lows the simultaneous inclusion of both sets of factors in one and the same model. In the
conditional logit model, the probability of choosing region m out of a set of J alternative
regions is then modeled as a function V that includes not only observable firm-specific
characteristics x of firm i, but also observable characteristics of region m, i.e. zm as well as
observable characteristics of all other regions j, i.e. zj. The model can then be formalized
as follows:
Pr(m) = V (zm; zj;xi; β; ij),∀ m, j ∈ Ji and m 6= j
Again under the assumption that the error terms follow an extreme value distribution
type I, this probability is given by:
P (yi = m) =
exp(Vim)
J∑
j=1
exp(Vij)
(see Long and Freese, 2006 or Train, 2009). The multinomial logit and conditional logit
model are the standard econometric models of firms’ spatial location decisions (see, for
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example, Alama´-Sabater et al., 2011; Autant-Bernard, 2006; Carlton, 1983). Hence, it
seems appropriate to apply these models in the context of spatial cooperation decisions
as well. Yet both models make quite strong assumptions. In particular, they assume
that the choices are Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) (McFadden, 1974). In
the context of spatial cooperation patterns, this would mean that firms would choose
their main cooperation region in R&D with the same probability, even if they face fewer
or more alternatives. This assumption may not hold and more complex models such as
mixed logit or multinomial probit models that relax the IIA assumption may be more
appropriate. However, several studies have pointed out that especially in the case of small
sample size and few alternatives, these more complex models frequently fail to converge at
a global optimum or produce imprecise parameters (see, for example, Dow and Endersby,
2004; Geweke et al., 1994; Horowitz, 1980; Quinn et al., 1999). Furthermore, empirical
applications have shown that in many cases, the IIA assumption is not very restrictive or
relevant (Dow and Endersby, 2004). Given these caveats of more complex models in small
samples, it seems appropriate to use the simpler multinomial logit and conditional logit
model in the context of firms’ spatial cooperation decisions. However, it is important to
note that as the IIA assumption may not hold in the context of firms’ spatial cooperation
choices, the results only reveal statistically significant correlations between firm-specific
and region-specific factors as well as spatial cooperation patterns of firms, and cannot be
interpreted in a causal way.
4.3.2 Study Region and Firm Data
As outlined above, the empirical analysis is based on original micro-data obtained from a
survey of firms located in the German NUTS-2 region of Lower Bavaria. This region offers
an interesting case to study, as it is located in the southeastern most corner of Germany,
directly on the border to Austria and the Czech Republic. This location provides regional
firms with different cooperation options within the same geographic radius (see Figure
4.1). Hence, regional firms can cooperate predominantly with local partners or with
partners from the remainder of Germany. Similarly, they can cooperate predominantly
with German partners or with partners from abroad.
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Figure 4.1: Map of Lower Bavaria and Surrounding Regions
Map of Lower Bavaria and the surrounding German, Austrian and Czech regions, whereby
Lower Bavaria is depicted in dark coloring and Bavaria in grey coloring.
In terms of the regional socio-demographical structure, Lower Bavaria can be described
as a peripheral region. Its population density is below 120 inhabitants per squared km,
and the three largest cities Landshut (ca. 67,500 inhabitants), Passau (ca. 50,000 inhabi-
tants) and Straubing (ca. 46,000 inhabitants) do not represent major agglomeration cen-
ters (Industrie- und Handelskammer Niederbayern und Handwerkskammer Niederbayern-
Oberpfalz, 2012). In terms of industrial structure, the region is characterized by a domi-
nance of Low and Medium-Technology (LMT) industries such as the vehicle manufactur-
ing and engine building industry, and the wood, metal and glass industry. The largest
enterprise located in the region is BMW, operating a major production plant in Dingolf-
ing. Except for this major plant and a few more firms with more than 100 employees,
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) dominate within the region (Industrie- und
Handelskammer Niederbayern und Handwerkskammer Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, 2012). In
terms of economic performance, the region is quite successful. In 2013, the year when
the firm survey was conducted, the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
amounted to 32,000 Euro, which was only slightly below the German average (32,600
Euro). In the same year, the regional unemployment rate of 3.5% was well below the
German average (6.7%). However, despite its economic success, Lower Bavaria realizes
comparatively low values on the traditional innovation-supporting indicators such R&D
expenditure and human resources in science and technology (Eurostat, 2016).
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The firm data used in the empirical analysis are derived from a survey of Lower Bavarian
firms that was conducted between February and April 2013 in a joint research project
of the Lower Saxony Institute of Economic Research (Niedersa¨chsisches Institut fu¨r
Wirtschaftsforschung, NIW), the Lower Bavarian Chamber of Commerce (Industrie- und
Handleskammer Niederbayern, IHK Niederbayern) and the Chamber of Handicrafts of
Lower Bavaria and Upper Palatinate (Handwerkskammer Niederbayern Oberpfalz). The
cooperation with the regional chambers granted access to the chambers’ firm databases
and enabled the drawing of firms’ contact information from these databases. Due to the
compulsory membership of German firms in one of the chambers, these datasets include
the entire population of regional firms. However, firms with an annual turnover below
17,500 Euro were excluded from the survey, as these firms constitute micro-firms without
relevant R&D cooperation-linkages. Overall, 732 Lower Bavarian firms participated in
the survey, reflecting a return rate of 13.7%. Several representativity tests have shown
that the realized sample is representative for the entire population of regional firms in
terms of firm size and geographical location (see Tables II.1 to II.3 in Appendix Part II).
However, due to item-non response, not all firms are included in the empirical analysis.
The advantage of the original data compared to standard innovation survey data, such as
data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) (Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschafts-
forschung, 2011 and 2014), is that they provide detailed, small-scale information on the
main cooperation region of firms. This detailed inquiry, however, comes at the cost that
data are not publicly accessible and are only available for firms in one specific region and
for one year. This naturally constrains the external validity of the results. It is thus not
possible to analyze variation over time and space or to model dynamic processes. De-
spite these limitations, the data still offer an initial, cross-sectional glance at statistically
significant correlations between firm-specific and region-specific factors and the spatial
cooperation decisions of firms located in a peripheral, low-technology border region in
Germany.
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4.3.3 Variables
4.3.3.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the main cooperation region of a firm. The main cooperation
region is one alternative from a choice set that includes the following five unordered alter-
natives: (1) same county (Landkreis), (2) Lower Bavaria, (3) Bavaria, (4) Germany, (5)
Europe/World1. Using the main cooperation region as the dependent variable accounts
for the fact that multinomial choice models require the choice alternatives to be mutually
exclusive, unordered and complete. Hence, even through firms may cooperate with part-
ners from various regions, they can only have one main, i.e. preferred, cooperation region.
As firms could only choose from these regions as their main cooperation region, the choice
set can also be regarded as complete. Values for the dependent variable are generated on
the basis of firms’ information on their main cooperation region in the fields of R&D2. To
be precise, firms were asked to indicate their main cooperation region in R&D from a list
of 26 different regions (see the questionnaire in Appendix Part II.1). Their choices have
then been condensed to the five alternatives outlined above. As the summary statistic in
Table 4.1 reveals, the vast majority of firms cooperate primarily with partners from the
same county (Landkreis) or same region (i.e. Lower Bavaria). In contrast, only few firms
indicate that they mainly cooperate with foreign partners. Out of these firms, only a
handful cooperates mainly with partners from the neighboring countries Austria and the
Czech Republic. These descriptive findings already suggest that geographic and institu-
tional proximity may be important factors for spatial cooperation patterns of regional
firms.
4.3.3.2 Firm-Specific Variables
The set of firm-specific factors includes the size and sector of a firm, as well as firms’
R&D expenditures. Firm size is measured via the number of employees. Regarding the
sector, three binary sectoral variables are created. They indicate (1) the manufacturing
1In an alternative choice set, seven choices were generated to further differentiate between (5) Austria,
(6) Czech Republic and (7) Europe/World. Results are similar when using this alternative choice set
(see Table II.5 in Appendix Part II).
2For innovating firms that do not specify their main cooperation region in R&D, the main cooperation
region of cooperation with universities and research institute is used.
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Table 4.1: Firms’ Main Cooperation Regions in R&D
Region Frequency Percentage Cumulated Percentage
Same County 86 38.91 38.91
Lower Bavaria 45 20.36 59.27
Bavaria 42 19.00 78.27
Germany 30 13.57 91.84
Europe/Worlda 18 08.16 100.00
a Out of the 18 firms that mainly cooperate with international partners in R&D, two
firms mainly cooperate with partners from Austria and three firms with partners from
the Czech Republic.
sector, (2) the construction sector, which also includes the large regional crafts sector,
and (3) the service sector. This broad sectoral classification corresponds to the division
in other empirical works (for example Franco and Gussoni, 2010). With respect to firms’
R&D expenditures, a binary variable is generated that indicates whether a firm devotes
extra financial means to R&D.
4.3.3.3 Region-Specific Variables
The set of region-specific factors includes the geographical and institutional proximity of
a region vis-a`-vis Lower Bavaria. Both variables are binary coded, whereby the variable
geographical proximity takes on the value one when the cooperation region is located
within Lower Bavaria, and zero for the remaining alternatives. In contrast, the variable
institutional proximity takes on the value one for all alternatives within Germany and
zero for the alternative outside Germany. The variable can, hence, be also understood
as an indicator for cooperation with national partners. Regarding the knowledge base
that a region provides for a firm, a binary variable is generated that indicates whether
a region hosts a relevant university or research institute, i.e. a university or research
institute with which the firm cooperates. This relation may appear tautological at first
glance, yet the extent to which the presence of a university or research institute within
a region is a relevant factor for firms’ spatial cooperation patterns can vary across firms.
With respect to the functional, i.e. market importance a region has for an individual
firm, two further binary variables are generated. Both indicate the function that a region
fulfills within the value chain of a firm. The first variable indicates whether a region
serves as a procurement market of a firm and the second one indicates whether a region
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serves as a sales market of a firm. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the firm-specific and
region-specific variables included in the empirical analysis.
Table 4.2: Overview over Firm-Specific and Region-Specific Variables
Firm-Specific Variables
Size Number of employees
Sector 1 for firms from the construction sector
2 for firms from the manufacturing sector
3 for firms from the service sector
R&D Expenditures 1 for firms that devote extra financial means to R&D
0 otherwise
Region-Specific Variables
Geographical Proximity 1 for (1) same county (2) Lower Bavaria
0 for the remaining alternatives
Institutional Proximity 1 for (1) same county, (2) Lower Bavaria, (3) Bavaria, (4) Germany
0 for the remaining alternative
Knowledge Base 1 if the region hosts a university with which a firm cooperates
0 otherwise
Procurement Market 1 if the region serves as a procurement market for a firm
0 otherwise
Sales Market 1 if the region serves as a sales market for a firm
0 otherwise
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Firm-Specific Factors
In the first step, spatial cooperation patterns of firms in R&D are regarded as a function of
firm-specific characteristics alone. The estimated results of a multinomial logit model are
depicted in Table 4.3. The table entries denote relative risk ratios that are obtained from
exponentiating the corresponding regression coefficients. Relative risk ratios are reported
as they are more intuitive to interpret than regression coefficients in a multinomial logit
model. To be precise, relative risk ratios indicate the factor change in the outcome
variable relative to the reference group for one unit change in the predictor variable
when all other variables in the model are kept constant (Long and Freese, 2006). In
the analysis, the remainder of Germany (4), i.e. Germany except Bavaria, serves as the
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reference group, which implies that the relative risk ratios of the alternative regions have
to be interpreted in relation to the remainder of Germany. The remainder of Germany (4)
is chosen as the reference group because it constitutes the middle category when sorting
the spatial alternatives according to their geographical or institutional closeness. Hence,
the three alternatives (1) same county (Landkreis), (2) Lower Bavaria and (3) Bavaria
are all geographically closer to a Lower Bavarian firm than cooperation partners in the
remainder of Germany. In contrast, the remaining alternative (5) Europe/World is at
least institutionally further away. Relative risk ratios greater than one then indicate that
firms prefer partners from a given region over partners from the remainder of Germany
as their main cooperation partners in R&D. In contrast, relative risk ratios lower than
one indicate that firms prefer partners from the remainder of Germany over partners
from that region as their main cooperation partners in R&D. The choice of the reference
category is, hence, crucial and the relative risk ratios displayed in Table 4.3 can only
be interpreted in relation to the reference category. In contrast, the results do not say
anything about the relation between choosing partners from the same county over partners
from the remainder of Lower Bavaria, or choosing partners from Bavaria over partners
from abroad. Investigating these questions requires changing the reference category. The
results of the various model specifications with alternative reference groups are depicted
in Tables II.6 to II.9 in the Appendix Part II. The results reveal that the findings, i.e.
the relative influence of firms’ size, sector and R&D expenditures, do not change when
altering the reference group.
The first model specification displays regional cooperation patterns in R&D, when keep-
ing all firm-specific factors constant. Here, results indicate that, ceteris paribus, Lower
Bavarian firms prefer to cooperate with partners from the same county (Landkreis) and
the same region (i.e. Lower Bavaria) over partners from the remainder of Germany. To
be precise, firm are almost three times more likely to choose a partner from the same
county (Landkreis) as their main partner in R&D over a partner from the remainder of
Germany, and they are 1.5 times more likely to choose a partner from the same region, i.e.
from Lower Bavaria, over a partner from the remainder of Germany. In contrast, firms
are significantly less likely to choose partners from abroad (Europe/World) as their main
cooperation partners in R&D over partners from the remainder of Germany. These find-
ings reflect the descriptive evidence from Table 4.1 and underline that, ceteris paribus,
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Table 4.3: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial
Cooperation Decisionsa
County/ Lower Bavaria/ Bavaria Abroad
Germany/ Germany/ Germany/ Germany/
Specification I
Constant 2.87*** 1.50* 1.40 .600*
(.609) (.354) (.335) (.179)
Observations 1105
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size .998*** .999*** .999*** 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .263*** .359** .260*** 1.26e+07
(.089) (.127) (.091) (8.13e+09)
Service Sector .128*** .097*** .188*** .420
(.049) (.044) (.076) (484.11)
Constant 11.92*** 4.58*** 5.48*** 7.31e-08
(3.72) (1.52) (1.79) (.001)
Observations 955
McFadden’s R2 .061
Specification III
Firm Size .999 .999 .999 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .547 .631 .572 7.73e+07***
(.423) (.517) (.514) (2.53e+08)
Service Sector .486 .175 .620 3.95
(.439) (.199) (.658) (13.54)
R&D Activites .183*** .330 .460 .541
(.116) (.227) (.343) (.462)
Constant 14.92*** 5.65** 3.77* 1.58e-08***
(9.77) (3.97) (2.77) (5.52e-08)
Observations 825
McFadden’s R2 .083
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Dependent
variable: Main cooperation region in R&D. Reference category: Germany. Refer-
ence category sector variable: construction sector. Firm clustered standard errors
in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
geographical and institutional proximity may indeed be relevant factors for firms’ spatial
cooperation patterns. The results are in line with the literature on the embeddedness
of knowledge in a specific regional context, suggesting that geographic and institutional
proximity are important aspects of knowledge transmission (see, for example, Asheim and
Gertler, 2005; Boschma, 2005). Moreover, the results suggest that cross-border cooper-
ation may face higher hurdles, potentially resulting from differences in the legal system
and a different language and culture (Lundquist and Trippl, 2013; Trippl, 2010)3.
3As Table II.5 in Appendix Part II indicates, this is true even for the geographically closer neighboring
countries Austria and the Czech Republic.
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When the size and the sector of a firm are included, the corresponding relative risk
ratios indicate that smaller firms prefer partners from their own county (Landkreis),
their own region (Lower Bavaria) or their own Federal State (Bavaria) over partners from
the remainder of Germany as their main cooperation partners in R&D. This result is in
line with other empirical studies suggesting that small firms may be unable or unwilling to
engage in cooperation with more distant partners, as these cooperation linkages may be
more costly and may require a higher absorptive capacity (see Barge-gil, 2010; Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Veugelers, 1998). In contrast, larger firms prefer international partners
over partners from the remainder of Germany. However, the corresponding relative risk
ratios reveal that the positive correlation is not statistically significant.
Regarding the sector of the firm, results reveal that firms from the construction sector,
which also includes the large crafts sector and which serves as the baseline category for
the sectoral variables, are more likely to prefer local or regional cooperation partners,
i.e. partners from their own county (Landkreis), their own region (Lower Bavaria), or
their own Federal State (Bavaria) over partners from the remainder of Germany than
firms from the manufacturing or service sector are. This finding suggests that for firms
in this traditionally less R&D-intensive sector, the region itself is an important source
of knowledge. In contrast, firms from the manufacturing sector have profoundly larger
relative risk ratios in choosing international partners over partners from the remainder
of Germany than firms from the construction sector do. However, the latter correlation
is again not statistically significant, whereby the non-significance may be driven by the
extremely large standard errors resulting from the fact that only a few Lower Bavarian
firms indicate that they primarily engage in R&D-cooperate with partners from foreign
regions (see Table 4.1).
In the third model specification, firms’ R&D expenditures are included as a further firm-
specific variable that may influence spatial cooperation patterns of firms. Results show
that firms that devote extra financial means to R&D prefer cooperating with partners
from the remainder of Germany over cooperating with partners from their own county
(Landkreis) when controlling for firms’ size and sector. This result also supports the
findings of other empirical works, suggesting that R&D-prone firms require particularly
analytical knowledge that may not be available in low-technology regions and that R&D-
intensive firms have higher capacity to absorb analytical knowledge from interregional
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partners (Asheim and Gertler, 2005). For the remaining comparisons, i.e. for the choice
between Lower Bavaria or Bavarian partners and partners from the remainder of Germany
as well as the choice between international partners and partners from the remainder of
Germany, R&D expenditures are not statistically significant when controlling for firm
size and sector. At the same time, results reveal that firm size is no longer statistically
significant when controlling for R&D expenditures.
The results of the multinomial logit model provide an initial glance at the correlations
between various firm-specific characteristics and firms’ spatial cooperation patterns. How-
ever, in all three model specifications, the McFadden R2, representing a measurement for
the model fit in Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) models, is comparatively low.
Furthermore, the standard errors for the alternative outside Germany are quite high,
resulting from the low number of firms choosing these regions as their main cooperation
region. This suggests that the validity of the estimations is low. In the second step, the
analysis is now extended and region-specific factors are assessed along with firm-specific
ones. This also allows conclusions about the relative influence of both sets of factors.
4.4.2 Region-Specific Factors
To examine the relative influence of region-specific factors along with firm-specific ones, a
conditional logit model is estimated. In contrast to the multinomial logit model, the con-
ditional logit model enables the simultaneous inclusion of both firm-specific and region-
specific characteristics. Table 4.4 depicts the odds ratios of the various model specifica-
tions. Similarly to the relative risk ratios in the multinomial logit model, the odds ratios
of the conditional logit model are obtained by exponentiating the regression coefficients
of the corresponding regression model. The odds ratios of the region-specific variables
indicate the multiplicative effect of a unit change in that region-specific variable on the
odds of any given spatial cooperation alternative (see Long and Freese, 2006). In the
first three model specifications in Table 4.4, only region-specific characteristics are in-
cluded, while the last model specification includes both region-specific and firm-specific
characteristics simultaneously.
In the first model specification of the conditional logit model (Spec. 1), only the geo-
graphical and institutional proximity of an alternative cooperation region vis-a`-vis Lower
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Table 4.4: Impact of Region-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Co-
operation Decisionsa
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Geographical Proximity 1.5* 1.46* 3.88*** 3.39**
(.354) (.345) (1.07) (1.89)
Institutional Proximity 2.31** 2.10** 1.69 1.59
(.768) (.692) (.563) (1.38)
University 3.22*** 3.29*** 3.63***
(.962) (.701) (1.32)
Procurement Market 2.10*** 1.99**
(.404) (.426)
Sales Market 3.28*** 3.07***
(.701) (.729)
Regional Dummies
√ √ √ √
Firm-Specific Factors
√
McFadden’s R2 .206 0.226 .303 .339
Number of Observations 1547 1547 1547 1288
a Table entries denote odds ratios of a conditional logit regression model. Dependent variable:
Main cooperation region in R&D. Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses. Stars
denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Bavaria are included. Results show that both variables are statistically significant at the
0.1-significance level. The odds ratios indicate that geographic proximity increases the
odds of mainly cooperating with partners from a geographically close region by a factor of
1.5. Institutional proximity even increases the odds of mainly cooperating with partners
from institutionally close (i.e. domestic) regions by a factor of 2.3. These results underline
that geographical and institutional proximity are indeed important aspects of firms’ spa-
tial cooperation patterns. Hence, in the region of Lower Bavaria, firms prefer cooperating
with geographically close regional partners, i.e. partners from the same county (NUTS-3
region) or the same region (NUTS-2 region) in R&D. Similarly, they prefer cooperating
with German partners than with foreign partners, a finding that is also obtained from
the descriptive statistic in Table 4.1.
The second model specification (Spec. 2) further includes the knowledge base that a region
constitutes for a firm. Whether a region constitutes an important knowledge base for a
firm depends on the individual firm. In other words, a region can provide an important
knowledge base for one firm, but not for another firm. As outlined above, the presence of
a university or research institute with which a firm cooperates serves as an indicator for
the regional knowledge base. The odds ratios from the corresponding conditional logit
model show that the presence of a relevant university or research institute within a region
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increases the odds of a firm mainly cooperating with partners from that region by a factor
of 3.2. This result suggests that in R&D cooperation, the presence of a relevant university
or research institute within the region is more influential than the region’s geographical
or institutional closeness of a region. These findings support the idea that university-
industry linkages in R&D are important and that universities or research institutes are
relevant cooperation partners for firms located in peripheral, low-technology regions, a
finding that is in line with the literature (see, for example, Morgan, 1997; Benneworth
and Charles, 2005; D’Este et al., 2013).
In the third model specification (Spec. 3), the function that a region fulfills within the
value chain of an individual firm is included as additional region-specific factor. While
the first variable indicates whether a region serves as a procurement market for a firm,
the second variable indicates whether a region serves as a sales market for a firm. Results
reveal that both variables are statistically significant. The odds ratios show that serving
as a procurement market of a firm increases the odds of firms mainly engaging in R&D
cooperation with partners from that region by a factor of 2.1. Serving as a sales market
even increases the odds of firms mainly engaging in cooperation with partners from that
region in R&D by a factor of 3.3. These findings suggest that firms primarily engage
in R&D cooperate with partners in regions that are also of functional – i.e. market –
importance to them. This result may also indicate that the spatial operation radii of
firms in peripheral, low-technology regions is constrained in a way that firms search for
R&D cooperation partners primarily in regions that are also of functional importance to
them.
In the last model specification (Spec. 4), firm-specific characteristics, precisely firms’ size,
sector and R&D expenditures, are included alongside the region-specific ones. None of
the firm-specific factors are significant when simultaneously considering region-specific
variables. In contrast, characteristics of the alternative cooperation regions remain sta-
tistically significant. These findings suggest that firm-specific characteristics can only
partly explain spatial cooperation patterns of firms. Instead, region-specific factors seem
to be relatively more influential.
Even though the empirical findings offer an initial glance at the correlations between
firm-specific and regional-specific factors and firms’ spatial cooperation patterns, some
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limitations have to be noted. Firstly, the number of observations is comparably low and
only few firms cooperate mainly with partners from abroad. Hence, the power of the
estimations is comparatively low and the results may be driven by a few outliers, result-
ing in imprecise estimations. Secondly, the alternative cooperation regions vary in size
and several regions (Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Europe/World) are broad. This
aggravates the interpretation of the results. Thirdly, the relations only reveal associa-
tions between firm-specific and region-specific characteristics and firms main cooperation
region, but say nothing about the second or third most important cooperation regions of
firms. Finally, the correlations cannot be interpreted in a causal way as the IIA assump-
tion may not hold in the present analyses. Instead, the results can only reveal statistically
significant correlations.
These correlations, however, may be of interest for regional stakeholders and policy-
makers in several ways. Firstly, they suggest that regional stakeholders and policy-
makers should consider region-specific factors alongside firm-specific ones when designing
regional cooperation strategies. Secondly, the empirical results show that universities and
research institutes are important partners for firms in peripheral, low-technology regions
in the field of R&D and that strengthening university-industry linkages may indeed be
an important element of regional growth and development policies. Finally, the results
suggest that in order to promote inter-regional cooperation, firms should be incentivized
to search for R&D partners outside their usual spatial operation radius.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This essay examined spatial cooperation patterns in R&D of firms located in the German
region of Lower Bavaria and evaluated the relative influence of firm-specific and region-
specific factors on these spatial cooperation patterns. Empirical results, based on original
micro-data of 221 regional firms, reveal that firms primarily cooperate with local or
regional partners, while partners in regions outside Lower Bavaria are less frequently
chosen as the main R&D cooperation partners. These findings fit well in the literature
on spatial cooperation and knowledge acquisition patterns of firms, as they stress the
importance of geographic and institutional proximity for knowledge spillover and the
embeddedness of knowledge in a certain cultural and socioeconomic context. However,
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the results also show that not all firms choose local or regional partners over partners from
outside the region, indicating that firms pursue different spatial cooperation patterns.
Regarding the relative influence of firm-specific factors on firms’ spatial cooperation pat-
terns, the empirical results are in line with the literature (see Barge-gil, 2010 for an
overview). Hence, they show that smaller firms are more likely to choose local or re-
gional partners over partners from the remainder of Germany, while larger firms are more
likely to cooperate with foreign partners. With respect to the sector of a firm, results
show that construction firms prefer cooperating with local or regional partners than with
partners from the remainder of Germany. This can be attributed to the fact that firms
in this traditionally low-technology sector may lack the resources and the capacity to
absorb specific, analytical knowledge from outside the region. When controlling for R&D
expenditure, results show that firms which devote extra financial means to R&D prefer
cooperation with interregional partners over cooperation with local or regional ones in
the field of R&D. This result partially reflects the findings of other empirical works on
firms’ cooperation strategies in research and development, suggesting that R&D-prone
firms firstly require analytical knowledge from outside the region and, secondly, have a
higher absorptive capacity to benefit from inter-regional cooperation (see Asheim and
Gertler, 2005 and Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Regarding the influence of region-specific factors, i.e. characteristics of the alternative
cooperation regions, results show that along with common factors such as the region’s
geographic and institutional proximity, the knowledge base that a region provides for
a firm and the function that a region fulfills in the value chain of a firm are equally
relevant. Hence, regions that host universities or research institutes with which a firm
cooperates have higher odds of being the main cooperation region of Lower Bavarian firms
in R&D compared to regions that do not host such a university or research institute. This
finding suggests that, in line with the literature, the presence of a university or research
institute is indeed an important regional asset for a region (see, for example, D’Este
et al., 2013). Moreover, the results indicate that Lower Bavarian firms engage in R&D
cooperation primarily with partners that are also of market importance to them. This
finding suggests that the spatial operation radius of firms is limited in such a way that
firms search for cooperation partners in R&D primarily in regions that serve as their
procurement or sales markets. This behavior is reasonable, given the presumed bounded
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rationality of firms (Simon, 1979). Yet it may hinder firms in their search for cooperation
partners beyond their usual operation radius and may deter firms from cooperating with
the most suitable partner. The associations between regions-specific factors and firms’
spatial cooperation patterns remain statistically significant when controlling for firm-
specific factors. In contrast, none of the firm-specific factors is any longer statistically
significant when controlling for characteristics of the alternative cooperation regions. This
finding suggests that region-specific factors are relatively more influential on firms’ spatial
cooperation patterns than firm-specific factors are.
Even though the analysis adds new aspects to the academic debate on firms’ spatial co-
operation patterns, there are some limitations to be noted. Firstly, the data are spatially
and chronologically constrained, as they only include information from firms in one par-
ticular region and for one year. This cross-sectional nature inevitably limits the external
validity of the results. Hence, it is not possible to control for any idiosyncratic Lower
Bavarian factor or to model dynamic, path-dependent processes. Moreover, the data
limitations prohibit the modeling of regional spillover effects that are commonly assessed
in the literature (see, for example, Autant-Berand, 2006; Alama´-Sabater et al., 2011).
The small number of observations within the final sample also prohibits the estimation of
more complex models such as nested logit or multinomial probit models that would relax
the IIA assumption. This assumption requires that choices are independent from each
other, which may not hold as some alternatives such as Lower Bavaria and Bavaria are
potentially more similar to each other than others. Therefore, it is not possible to claim
a causal interpretation of the associations. Instead, results can only reveal statistically
significant correlations and have to be interpreted as such. A further caveat results from
the fact that the alternative cooperation regions vary in size. In particular the alterna-
tives outside Lower Bavaria are quite broad, which aggravates the interpretation of the
results.
Despite these limitations, the correlations identified in this essay provide initial empirical
insights into the relations between firm-specific and region-specific factors and firms’ spa-
tial cooperation patterns. In doing so, the results are a starting point for a more detailed
analysis of the underlying mechanisms that can explain the rationales behind firms’ spa-
tial cooperation strategies. Knowing these rationales can provide valuable insights for
regional stakeholders and policy-makers, when designing regional cooperation strategies.
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Hence, the findings of this essay suggest that a sole focus on firm-specific factors may not
be appropriate. Instead, region-specific patterns should also be considered. In particular,
regional stakeholders and policy-makers should strengthen the regional knowledge base,
which has been identified as one important region-specific factor. Furthermore, they
should thoroughly analyze the market relations of regional firms, as firms tend to engage
in R&D cooperation with partners in regions that are also of market importance for them.
Simultaneously, they should promote interregional cooperation initiatives by incentiviz-
ing firms to search for cooperation partners outside their region. This may help firms in
peripheral, low-technology regions to overcome their constrained spatial operation radius
and help them to exploit knowledge from outside this radius.
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This essay examines cooperation patterns of firms in the German low-technology border region
of Lower Bavaria. Particular emphasis is placed on the interplay between the spatial scale of
cooperation, the form of cooperation and the type of innovation. Generic results show that
overall, firms with a spatially more diverse set of cooperation linkages have a higher likelihood
of innovating. However, the innovation outcomes differ depending on the spatial scale of co-
operation. While cooperation with regional partners positively correlates with low-threshold
innovations, cooperation with spatially distant partners positively correlates with product in-
novations. Surprisingly it is application-oriented cooperation that channels the relation in both
cases. The findings support the view that innovation of firms in low-technology regions is driven
by development rather than research. It also suggests that innovation-driven growth may even
be possible in regions with limited values on the traditional innovation-supporting factors.
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5.1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that innovation is an interactive process, requiring the com-
bination of various competencies, skills and technologies, and that firms have to acquire
external knowledge in order to innovate. One main channel through which firms acquire
knowledge is through cooperation with other firms, universities or research institutions.
Geographic proximity is traditionally regarded as facilitating cooperation and knowledge
spillovers, because of the embeddedness of knowledge in a particular sociocultural and
institutional context (Breschi and Lissoni, 2009; Gertler, 2004; Malmberg and Maskell,
1999 and 2006; see Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015 for an overview). This implies that
firms located in regions with a low technological knowledge base, i.e. regions with low
Research and Development (R&D) inputs and low shares of human resources in science
and technology, do not profit from local cooperation in the same way as firms located
in agglomeration regions with a predominance of high-technology industries (Copus and
Skuras, 2006; Fragerberg, 2002). This has led some scholars to conclude that innovation-
driven, economically successful development is difficult in regions that are dominated by
Low and Medium-Technology (LMT) industries (see, for example, Heidenreich, 2009).
Case-specific empirical evidence, however, indicates that in some Low and Medium-
Technology (LMT) regions, the majority of local firms self-report an innovative behaviour
despite the limited regional knowledge base. One of these regions is the German border
region of Lower-Bavaria located in the south-east corner of Germany at the German-
Austrian-Czech border. In this region, two-thirds of regional firms report that they have
introduced some kind of innovation between 2010 and 2013 despite the fact that the
region shows comparatively low values on the traditional innovation indicators such as
patents and shares of human resources in science and technology.
The literature offers two explanations for this apparent contradiction: firms in these
regions may either focus on low-threshold, i.e. process or non-technological, innovation
that does not require science-based, analytical knowledge (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2008; Hirsch-
Kreinsen et al., 2005; Robertson and Patel, 2007), or firms may acquire innovation-
relevant knowledge by cooperating with partners from outside the region (Fitjar and
Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2011; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Varis and Littunen, 2012). While
both are plausible explanations that have been empirically assessed for various peripheral
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or low-technology regions, systematic empirical evidence on the interplay between the two
is still comparatively scarce for the German context.
This essay examines the cooperation behaviour of firms located in the German rural, Low-
and Medium-Technology (LMT) region of Lower Bavaria. It does so by building on the
existing literature on the spatial dimension of cooperation (see, for example, Asheim and
Gertler, 2005; Cooke, 2001) and differentiated knowledge bases (see, for example, Asheim
et al. 2011; Jensen et al., 2007; see Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013 for an overview). Lower
Bavaria serves as a good case study region, because its geographical location directly
at the border to Austria and the Czech Republic provides regional firms with different
cooperation options within the same geographical radius. To obtain insights into the
interplay between the geographic scale of cooperation, the form of cooperation and the
corresponding innovation outcomes, the essay sketches the spatial cooperation patterns of
firms located in Lower Bavaria with partners in the surrounding regions in Germany, Aus-
tria and the Czech Republic and differentiates between R&D-oriented cooperation (i.e.
R&D cooperation with universities and research institutions) and application-oriented co-
operation (i.e. procurement, sales, and production cooperation with suppliers, customers
and competitors). Furthermore, it assesses the innovation outcomes that the distinct
cooperation patterns entail. Here, the essay incorporates a broad innovation concept
and differentiates between product innovation, process innovation and non-technological
innovation (i.e. organisational innovation and marketing innovation) to account for the
fact that firms in LMT regions are frequently assumed to be restrained from product
innovation, but focus on lower-threshold innovation such as process or non-technological
innovation (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2008; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al., 2005; Robertson and Patel,
2007). Overall, the essay addresses the following two research questions:
1. What are the spatial cooperation patterns of firms located in a LMT region?
2. How do the spatial cooperation patterns of regional firms translate into innovation
success?
These questions are addressed using original micro-data from a survey of 732 Lower
Bavarian firms. By examining the relation between cooperation and innovation of firms
located in a successful LMT region, the findings shed light on the interplay between the
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spatial scale of cooperation, the form of cooperation and the corresponding innovation
outcomes. In doing so, the essay provides valuable recommendations for policymakers
and regional stakeholders aiming to design public support programmes to strengthen
cooperation linkages and innovativeness of firms in LMT regions.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: the next section provides a brief
overview of the theoretical concepts and corresponding empirical evidence from the liter-
ature and states the research hypotheses. Section 5.3 sketches the main regional features
of the study region. The data and the estimation strategy are described in Section 5.4.
The results from the empirical analysis are reported and discussed in Section 5.5. The
essay closes with a critical discussion of the main results and their implications.
5.2 Cooperation and Innovation in LMT Regions -
Theoretical Background
5.2.1 Geographic Dimension of Cooperation
In recent decades, various territorial models of knowledge acquisition have been intro-
duced, emphasising the spatial scale of cooperation. These models frequently assign the
region a relevant role in the knowledge-sourcing activities of firms (Gertler, 2004; Malm-
berg and Maskell, 1999 and 2006). Here, the Regional Innovation System (RIS) has led
the way in stressing the importance of the region for knowledge creation and knowledge
diffusion between regional actors (Asheim, 1996; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Asheim and
Isaksen, 1997; Cooke, 2001; Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013). Boschma (2005) attributes
the importance of local knowledge not only to geographic but also to institutional and
cultural proximity that is necessary for knowledge exchange, as face-to-face contact and
mutual trust support regional knowledge exchange (Boschma, 2005; Maskell and Malm-
berg, 2007). Other arguments underlying the importance of local knowledge spillovers
refer to the tacit nature of knowledge or regional labor mobility (Breschi and Lissoni,
2009; see Grillitsch and Nillson, 2015 for an overview).
However, several empirical studies show that intra-regional cooperation is not sufficient
for firms to innovate (Fitjar and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2011; Grillitsch and Nillson, 2015; Varis
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and Littunen, 2012). Particularly in LMT regions with a limited regional knowledge base,
inter-regional cooperation is crucial in order to acquire knowledge, skills and competencies
from outside the region (Iammarino, 2005; Morrison et al., 2013; To¨dtling et al., 2011).
The interrelatedness of local and global knowledge sourcing activities is also highlighted
by the notion of local buzz and global pipelines introduced by Bathelt et al. (2004). This
approach underlines the importance of the region itself, the so-called local buzz, that
provides free and automatic circulation of knowledge within the region, but also stresses
the importance of firms’ integration into global pipelines that provide access to specific
knowledge which cannot be acquired from the limited knowledge base of the region itself
(Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013). Actors located in global hubs, i.e. high-technology regions
that are strongly integrated into the global knowledge flows, are particularly important
cooperation partners (Bathelt et al., 2004).
The empirical studies that examine the cooperation behaviour of firms located in periph-
eral or low-technology regions support the idea that firms located in such regions have
to acquire knowledge from outside the region in order to innovate. Varis and Littunen
(2012), for instance, find that innovating firms perceive the importance of inter-regional
cooperation with actors outside the region to be greater than non-innovating firms. In
the same line, Fitjar and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2011) indicate that firms with cooperation
linkages reaching outside the region are particularly successful in developing new prod-
ucts. The benefits of inter-regional networks for firms in LMT regions are also high-
lighted by Huggins and Johnston (2009), whose results indicate that more innovative
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) possess denser networks with actors both
within and outside the region. Further empirical evidence is provided by Lagendijk and
Lorentzen (2007), who find that firms in remote regions depend heavily on non-local
forms of cooperation. In the same line, Virkkala (2007) shows for a Finnish region that
the leading regional firms acquire knowledge from external knowledge sources, while Vale
and Caldeira (2007) illustrate for the low-technology region of Northern Portugal that
the most innovative regional firms develop distant cooperation-linkages. Recent evidence
from Grillitsch and Nilsson (2015) reveals that in Swedish peripheral regions, cooperation
with distant partners compensates for the lack of regional knowledge spillovers.
In accordance with the literature, is is assumed is that in Lower Bavaria as one example
of a rural region with a limited local knowledge base, firms have to acquire knowledge
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from outside the region in order to innovate. Hence, the first hypothesis is that firms with
a spatially more diverse set of cooperation linkages have a higher likelihood of innovating.
• Hypothesis 1: The more diverse the geographic scale of cooperation is, the higher
the likelihood is of firms introducing any innovation.
Despite the empirical evidence suggesting that cooperation with spatially distant part-
ners can be beneficial, transaction costs accompanying long distance cooperation may
exceed the benefits. In the literature, this phenomenon is known as the distant decay
effect, suggesting that distant cooperation is only beneficial up to a certain tipping point
but that beyond this point cooperation is no longer beneficial (Crescenzi and Rodr´ıguez-
Pose, 2008; Van Beers and Zand, 2013). Cooperation with distant partners may not
only be hampered by geographical distance but also by institutional and cultural dis-
tance (see Boschma, 2005). Firms entering cross-national cooperation in particular may
face additional barriers originating from different customs, habits, languages and legal
institutions (Lundquist and Trippl, 2013; Trippl, 2010). Given the higher transaction
costs accompanying cooperation with geographically or culturally distant partners, firms
may only engage in this cooperation when the required knowledge is not available from
geographically closer sources. The availability of innovation-supporting knowledge on
various geographical scales depends heavily on the type of knowledge that firms require
and on the mode through which firms innovate. Hence, both constitute important ele-
ments for explaining the relation between the spatial scale of cooperation and innovation
outcomes of firms.
5.2.2 Knowledge Bases and Modes of Innovation
Concepts that explicitly focus on the type of knowledge and the mode of innovation
include the knowledge base approach (Asheim et al., 2011; Asheim and Gertler, 2005)
as well as the notion of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) and the Doing, Us-
ing and Interaction (DUI) modes of innovation (Jensen et al., 2007). Both approaches
provide valuable starting points for an assessment of cooperation patterns and innova-
tion behaviour of firms in low-technology regions (see Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013 for an
overview).
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The knowledge base approach explains firms’ cooperation and innovation behaviour through
different types of knowledge that firms require in order to innovate. Firms aiming to en-
gage in product innovation are assumed to require predominantly analytical, i.e. science-
based, knowledge (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Martin and Moodysson, 2013). This form
of knowledge may be best acquired from R&D-oriented cooperation with high-technology
firms, universities, or research institutions (Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013). As these part-
ners cannot be found in most rural, low-technology regions, firms have to cooperate with
partners outside the region in order to introduce product innovations. In contrast, for
firms aiming to introduce low-threshold innovation, i.e. process or non-technological in-
novation, synthetic, i.e. engineering, knowledge is more important (Grillitsch and Trippl,
2013). As synthetic knowledge is usually more tacit and less codified than analytical
knowledge, geographical proximity is assumed to be more relevant for the transmission
of synthetic knowledge (Grillitsch and Nillson, 2015).
Along with the type of knowledge, the mode of innovation is likewise relevant. The
difference between two distinct modes of innovation, namely the Science, Technology
and Innovation (STI) mode and the Doing, Using and Interaction (DUI) mode was first
proposed by Jensen et al. (2007). Depending on the mode through which firms innovate,
the cooperation behaviour of firms may vary. While firms that innovate based on a
STI mode of innovation require explicit science-based, codified knowledge, firms that
incorporate the DUI mode of innovation are engaged in an informal process of learning
that requires experience-based knowledge exchange (Jensen et al., 2007). Consequently, it
is plausible that firms that incorporate the STI mode of innovation rely on R&D-oriented
cooperation, whereas firms incorporating the DUI mode of innovation profit from local
and regional application-oriented cooperation (Grillitsch and Trippl, 2013; Jensen et al.,
2007).
In summary, the literature on knowledge bases and different modes of innovation suggests
that the type of knowledge and the mode of innovation are crucial elements for explaining
the interplay between the spatial scale of cooperation and the corresponding innovation
outcomes of firms located in a LMT region. Given the tacit nature of synthetic knowledge,
cooperation with local and regional cooperation partners may be a good strategy for firms
engaging in low-threshold innovations, i.e. process and non-technological innovations. In
contrast, for firms engaged in product innovation that require analytical, science-based
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knowledge, actors located in high-technology core regions may be suitable cooperation
partners. The reason for this is that particularly in regions with a low-technology knowl-
edge base, analytical knowledge is not available and firms are forced to engage in more
costly cooperation with distant partners in order to innovate. This reasoning supports the
hypothesis that cooperation on different geographical scales entails different innovation
outcomes. Hence, the second hypothesis is stated as follows:
• Hypothesis 2: Cooperation on different geographical scales entails different innova-
tion outcomes.
• Hypothesis 2.1: Cooperation with local or regional partners has a positive impact
on firms’ likelihood of introducing low-threshold, i.e. process and non-technological,
innovation.
• Hypothesis 2.2: Cooperation with partners in distant regions or in high-technology
regions has a positive impact on firms’ likelihood of introducing product innovation.
To assess the hypotheses stated above, original micro-level data from firms located in the
German rural LMT region of Lower Bavaria are used. Before introducing the empirical
data, the next section sketches the main regional characteristics of Lower Bavaria in order
to provide a comprehensive picture of the study region that helps to better integrate and
interpret the empirical findings within the regional context.
5.3 The Regional Context of the Study Case: The
Region of Lower Bavaria
As outlined above, the German region of Lower Bavaria constitutes the empirical case
study area. This region represents an interesting case for economic geographers, as it
has a comparatively high share of innovating firms, despite low values on the traditional
innovation supporting indicators such as regional R&D expenditures, or shares of human
resources in science and technology. Furthermore, its geographic location at the border to
Austria and the Czech Republic provides regional firms with several spatial cooperation
options within the same geographic radius (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Map of Lower Bavaria and Surrounding Regions
Map of Lower Bavaria and the surrounding German, Austrian and Czech regions, whereby
Lower Bavaria is depicted in dark coloring and Bavaria in grey coloring.
The region of Lower Bavaria qualifies as a rural region according to the official classifica-
tion of the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial
Development (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumforschung, 2014), given the lack
of any major city with more than 100,000 inhabitants and the comparably low regional
population density.
Politically, Lower Bavaria belongs to the Federal State of Bavaria. In terms of economic
growth, Bavaria has undergone a very successful development in the past 60 years (Schif-
fers, 2013). While the Federal State was one of the poorest regions in West Germany
after World War II, characterised by a rural and backward economic structure, Bavaria
has risen since 1960 to become one of the most successful German Federal States. How-
ever, it has mainly been the metropolitan area of Munich and the surrounding region of
Upper Bavaria that have profited intensely from the successful development, with mul-
tiple high-technology firms clustering around the universities and research facilities in
Munich (Kujath, 2002). In contrast, Lower Bavaria, which can be perceived as a second
tier region vis-a`-vis Munich, has attracted far fewer high-technology firms. During the
time of the Cold War, the location directly alongside the Iron Curtain was particularly
disadvantageous for the region.
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The regional economic structure is still characterised today by a dominance of LMT
industries. When taking the sector-based classification of technology intensity proposed
by the OECD (2011) as a basis, LMT industries represent over three-quarters of the
regional manufacturing sector, whereas high-technology industries are absent entirely
(see Table 5.1)1.
Table 5.1: Technology Intensity of the Regional Manufacturing
Industrya
Technology Intensity Share of Regional
Manufacturing Industries
Low-Technology Industries 35.5%
Medium-Low-Technology Industries 40.7%
Medium-High-Technology Industries 23.8%
High-Technology Industries 00.0%
a Share of regional manufacturing firms (by the number of establishments) by technologi-
cal intensity based on the classification of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology
and Industry (2011). Own calculation based on data obtained from Industrie- und Han-
delskammer Niederbayern and Handwerkskammer Niederbayern-Oberpfalz (2012).
Regarding the economic structure by industry, the location of a major production sub-
sidiary of the BMW automobile group in the region in 1969 contributed to the establish-
ment of various suppliers, especially in the vehicle manufacturing industry. This industry
still constitutes the most important regional industry and is particularly responsible for
the regional growth. Between 2000 and 2012, for instance, the turnover of the German
automobile industry and the regional gross domestic product (GDP) strongly correlated.
However, the regional automobile industry is mainly production-driven, while research
only plays a subordinate role in the region and mainly takes place at the BMW head-
quarters in Munich. Hence, innovation may, if at all, be driven by incremental process
improvements facilitated by cooperation with suppliers. Along with the automobile in-
dustry, the engine building and plant construction industries are also quite strong in
the region. Both industries classify as medium-technology industries according to the
official OECD classification outlined above. Given their medium technology intensity,
both industries are assumed to innovate based on a DUI mode of innovation, requiring
particularly engineering-based, synthetic knowledge. Hence, in these industries, devel-
opment seems to be more important than research and firms may introduce particularly
low-threshold innovations, i.e. process and non-technological innovations. With respect
1This sector-based distinction is not indisputable (see, for example, Kirner et al., 2009).
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to firm size, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) dominate, a pattern that can be
observed in many rural, low-technology regions.
In summary, the region of Lower Bavaria is certainly disadvantaged by its low-technology
industrial structure and the limited regional knowledge base. However, two-thirds of
regional firms have introduced some form of innovation between 2010 and 2013 and the
economic performance indicators such as regional per capita GDP and employment are
well above the German average. Given these apparently contradicting regional features,
Lower Bavaria serves as a good example of a specific type of European region that is quite
successful despite a limited regional knowledge base and low levels of regional R&D.
5.4 Data and Variables
5.4.1 Data
To assess the spatial cooperation patterns of regional firms and their impact on innova-
tion outputs, original micro-level data from a survey of Lower Bavarian firms conducted
between February and April 2013 are used2. The advantage of the data compared to
standard innovation surveys (for example the Community Innovation Survey) is that
they provide detailed information on the spatial scale of cooperation and the form of co-
operation. On the output side, the data allow a distinction between product innovation,
process innovation and non-technological innovation, i.e. organisational and marketing
innovations. This enables a nuanced assessment of the interplay between these three di-
mensions. The broad innovation concept is especially crucial, because firms operating in
LMT industries are frequently assumed to innovate through low-threshold innovations.
The drawback, however, is that these precise data are only available for Lower Bavarian
firms. Hence, it is not possible in this essay to compare the results of Lower Bavarian firms
with the cooperation patterns and innovation outcomes of firms located in other regions.
Nevertheless, the analysis provides a valuable descriptive starting point for exploring the
interplay between cooperation and innovation of firms located in a LMT region.
2As outlined above, the data have been compiled in the course of a joint research project of the Lower
Saxony Institute of Economic Research, the Lower-Bavarian Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber
of Handicrafts of Lower Bavaria and Upper Palatinate. The German version of the questionaire used in
the firm survey is included in Appendix Part II (II.1).
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The sample of firms is drawn from the firm database of the regional Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (Industrie- und Handelskammer Niederbayern) and the regional Chamber of
Handicrafts (Handwerkskammer Niederbayern-Oberpfalz). Due to the compulsory mem-
bership of German firms in one of the two chambers, the joint database can be considered
as comprehensive. Overall, 5,347 firms were asked to participate in the survey, reflecting
all regional firms with an annual turnover of more than 17,500 Euro. This boundary was
implemented to exclude the large number of micro-firms, which would potentially bias
the results due to non-cooperation. In the survey, firms were contacted either by email
or post. Overall, 732 Lower Bavarian firms participated in the survey, reflecting a return
rate of 13.7%. Even though this return rate is quite low, its scale is similar to response
rates in comparable firm surveys. Hence, even in the more institutionalised Community
Innovation Survey, the response rate for German firms does not exceed 20% (Zentrum
fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung, 2011). However, due to item-non response, only
399 firms (i.e. 7.46%) are included in the subsequent analysis. However, the results of
an item-response analysis confirm that the 399 firms included in the final sample do not
significantly differ from firms, for which only limited information is available (see Table
II.4 in Appendix Part II).
As Table 5.2 depicts, the sample of firms includes not only manufacturing firms, but also
firms from the construction sector and the service sector. This may appear unusual, be-
cause the innovation behaviour of these firms differs greatly from that of manufacturing
firms (see, for example, Hipp and Grupp, 2005). The empirical analysis, nevertheless,
includes all firms in the sample, because the goal of the essay is to obtain a thoughtful
picture of the cooperation patterns and their innovation implications for all firms in the
region. Thereby, it is assumed that even though innovation differs between the manu-
facturing sector, the service sector and the construction sector, innovative firms behave
differently in all three sectors than non-innovative firms when it comes to cooperation.
Since innovation behaviour is self-reported, it is interesting to compare the cooperation
behaviour of firms that regard themselves as innovative and firms that do not. Still, the
empirical analysis accounts for the fact that the innovation behaviour of firms from the
service or construction sector may systematically differ from that of manufacturing firms.
It does so by including sector dummies in the estimation model and by conducting a
separate analysis for the sub-sample of manufacturing firms. Results stay the same when
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only considering a sample of manufacturing firms (see Tables II.10 to II.17 in Appendix
Part II).
With respect to the distribution of firms by size and sector, it becomes evident that
small firms with fewer than 50 employees dominate, a pattern that reflects the actual
distribution of Lower Bavarian firms. The results of several representativity tests confirm
that firms included in the final sample are representative for the entire population of
regional firms with respect to its size and its location within the regional districts of
Lower Bavaria (see Tables II.1 to II.3 in Appendix Part II).
Table 5.2: Distribution of Firms in the Sample According to Size and
Sectora
Firm Size (Number of Employees)
Sector <10 <50 <100 <250 <1000 ≥ 1000
Construction Sector 56 43 10 2 1 1 113
Manufacturing Sector 81 75 21 22 14 4 217
Service Sector 31 33 4 0 1 0 69
168 151 35 24 16 5 399
a Distribution of Lower Bavarian firms according to size and sector. Own calculation.
5.4.2 Variables
5.4.2.1 Explanatory Variable: Cooperation
With respect to firms’ cooperation patterns, the essay examines the spatial scale of firms’
cooperation according to the form of cooperation. It does so by asking firms to indi-
cate their cooperation linkages in a two-dimensional matrix. The first dimension, i.e. the
spatial dimension, includes the geographic distribution of cooperation linkages. In this di-
mension, firms could choose from a list of 26 different regions in which their cooperation
linkages are geographically located. The second dimension includes the form of coop-
eration, i.e. procurement cooperation, production cooperation, sales cooperation, R&D
cooperation and employee training cooperation, and the cooperation partner, i.e. suppli-
ers, customers, competitors, universities and research institutes (see the questionnaire in
Appendix Part II.1).
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For the subsequent analysis, the information obtained from this cooperation matrix is ag-
gregated to various binary cooperation variables indicating the spatial scale and the form
of cooperation. This allows a fine-grained assessment of the spatial cooperation patterns
of regional firms and the relation between the various cooperation patterns and their in-
novation implications. Regarding the spatial scale, binary variables for cooperation with
partners in Lower Bavaria, Bavaria (excluding Lower Bavaria) and Germany (excluding
Bavaria) are generated. This enables examining the relation between cooperation and
innovation on different spatial scales. Further binary variables include a variable for co-
operation with partners in Munich, the nearby high-technology region, and variables for
cross-border cooperation with partners in Austria and in the Czech Republic, as well as
for cooperating with partners in distant regions, i.e. with partners from regions outside
Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. This differentiation allows assessing whether
cooperation with distant partners or with partners in high-technology regions correlates
with the introduction of product innovations that presumably require analytical knowl-
edge that may not be present within the region. Moreover a variable that indicates the
geographical scope of cooperation, i.e. the number of different regions with which a firm
cooperates, is created. This allows examining whether a spatially more diverse scope of
cooperation is positively correlated with a higher likelihood of a firm innovating. The
variable takes on values between 0 and 7, depending on the number of different regions
with which a firm cooperates.
Along with the spatial scale of cooperation, the form of cooperation is also important,
as it may serve as an intermediate, channeling the relation between the spatial scale of
cooperation and innovation outcomes of firms. Drawing from the literature on knowl-
edge bases and different modes of innovation (see, for example, Asheim et al., 2011;
Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Jensen et al., 2007), it is expected that application-oriented
cooperation is beneficial for low-threshold innovations, i.e. process innovation and non-
technological innovations, while R&D-oriented cooperation should stimulate product in-
novation in particular. To account for the fact that the form of cooperation may drive
the relation between the spatial scale of cooperation and the type of innovation output
of firms, a variable for R&D-oriented cooperation and a variable for application-oriented
cooperation are generated for every spatial dimension identified above. While the for-
mer includes explicit R&D cooperation and cooperation with universities and research
114
Chapter 5: Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes
institutions, application-oriented cooperation includes procurement cooperation, sales co-
operation and production cooperation, as well as cooperation with suppliers, customers
and competitors3. Hence, for every geographical scale, three cooperation variables are
observed: one for R&D-oriented cooperation, one for application-oriented cooperation,
and one for an aggregate of the two. Overall, 21 (7x3) binary cooperation variables are
generated.
5.4.2.2 Dependent Variable: Innovation
With respect to innovation, the essay applies a broad innovation concept to account for
the fact that innovation of firms in low-technology regions is frequently assumed to be
based on low-threshold innovation, i.e. process or non-technological innovation (Hirsch-
Kreinsen, 2008; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al., 2005; Robertson and Patel, 2007). This defini-
tion of innovation follows the guidelines for interpreting innovation data outlined by the
OECD and Eurostat in the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 2005). In the survey,
therefore, firms were asked to differentiate between product innovation, process innova-
tion, organisational innovation and marketing innovation. A detailed description of the
wording used in the corresponding questionnaire (in German) is given in Appendix II.1.
In line with the suggestions of the OSLO Manual and other empirical works (see, for
example, Pippel, 2014), marketing innovation and organisational innovation are aggre-
gated to non-technological innovation. The differentiation between product, process and
non-technological innovations allows examining how the various cooperation patterns of
firms in low-technology regions translate into different types of innovations.
The descriptive statistics of firms’ innovation outputs are depicted in Table 5.3. The
statistics reveal that 60.4% of Lower Bavarian firms have introduced some form of in-
novation, i.e. product, process, or non-technological innovation, between 2010 and 2013.
This is lower than the German average, which amounted to 87% in 2008, but higher
than the average in all other EU countries except Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg
(Rammer and Pesau, 2011). With respect to technological innovation, i.e. product and
3Admittedly, cooperation with competitors seems strange at first, but empirical evidence has shown
that firms frequently cooperate with competitors to form strategic alliances and gain access to knowl-
edge resources and capabilities (see, for example, Haeussler et al., 2012). Moreover, firms may choose
competitors as cooperation partners, because by cooperating with local or regional competitors, they can
establish and exploit cluster effects, i.e. a combination of cooperation and competition (Porter, 2000).
115
Chapter 5: Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes
process innovation, and non-technological innovations, results indicate that the share of
firms that have introduced technological innovations is slightly higher than the share
of firms that have introduced non-technological innovations, i.e. marketing innovations
or organisational innovations between 2010 and 2013. This is despite the fact that the
region’s characteristics would suggest that low-threshold innovations, i.e. process and non-
technological innovations, prevail. Hence, regional firms may indeed be able to introduce
product innovation, because they acquire the necessary knowledge through cooperation.
Moreover, in line with other firm surveys, innovation behaviour is self-reported. As mul-
tiple answers were possible, the categories, i.e. product innovations, process innovations
and non-technological innovations are not mutually exclusive.
Table 5.3: Innovation in Lower Bavariaa
Yes No n
1. Technological Innovation 178 (44.61%) 221 (55.39%) 399
1.1 Product Innovation 148 (37.09%) 251 (62.91%) 399
1.2 Process Innovation 76 (19.05%) 323 (80.95%) 399
2. Non-Technological Innovation 164 (41.10%) 235 (58.90%) 399
3. Any Innovation 241 (60.40%) 158 (39.60%) 399
a Number and share (in parantheses) of Lower Bavarian firms that have or have not introduced
product, process, non-technological or any innovation between 2010 and 2013.
5.4.2.3 Control Variables: Innovation-Supporting Variables
To control for certain firm-specific characteristics when assessing the impact of the differ-
ent cooperation patterns on innovation, a parsimonious set of control variables is included
in the analysis. The control variables are chosen in accordance with the factors that have
been identified in the literature as potentially influencing the relationship between coop-
eration and innovation in LMT regions (Barge-gil, 2010). The set comprises the size and
the sector of a firm as well as a firm’s R&D expenditure, which have been shown to affect
firms’ likelihood of innovating in regions with a low-technology industrial structure4. The
size of a firm is measured by the number of employees. The variable is categorical, with
4The literature suggests that the size of a firm and firms’ R&D expenditure both have a positive
effect; regarding the sector, export-oriented industries and high-technology industries in particular pos-
itively affect firms’ likelihood of innovating (Barge-gil, 2010). A further variable frequently mentioned
is the presence of a distinct R&D department. However, as this variable highly correlates with R&D
expenditure, it is not included in the analysis.
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categories approximating the common EU classification (European Commission, 2006)5.
Results do not change significantly when using the annual turnover to determine the size
of a firm. With respect to the sector, three binary sectoral variables are created. They
indicate (1) the manufacturing sector, (2) the construction sector, which also includes
the large regional crafts sector, and (3) the service sector6. Regarding firms’ initial R&D
inputs, a binary variable indicating whether or not a firm devotes financial means to R&D
is generated, constituting a proxy for a firm’s in-house capacity. By and large, about a
quarter of Lower Bavarian firms use financial means for R&D.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Spatial Cooperation Patterns of Firms in a LMT Region
The empirical assessment begins with a descriptive analysis of the spatial cooperation
patterns of Lower Bavarian firms, differentiating between R&D-oriented and application-
oriented cooperation. The cooperation patterns displayed in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that
local cooperation, i.e. cooperation with Lower Bavarian partners, and regional coopera-
tion, i.e. cooperation with Bavarian partners, prevail across both forms of cooperation.
This finding is in line with the literature on the nature of knowledge exchange, suggesting
that geographic proximity is indeed a relevant aspect (Breschi and Lissoni, 2009; Gertler,
2004; Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). Firms located in low-technology regions seem to
generate and exploit regional agglomeration effects. Munich, the nearest core region, is
also an important partner when it comes to application-oriented cooperation. In contrast
to what is expected from the literature, however, it is not R&D-oriented cooperation that
prevails when cooperating with partners in Munich.
Comparing the descriptive results to the German average as depicted in the Community
Innovation Survey (Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung, 2014), the findings
reveal that Lower Bavarian firms are more often engaged in application-oriented coop-
eration, i.e. cooperation with customers, suppliers and competitors, than the German
5In the analysis, the following thresholds are applied: (0) 0 employees, (1) 1-9 employees, (2) 10-
49 employees, (3) 50-99 employees, (4) 100-249 employees, (5) 250-999 employees, (6) more than 1000
employees.
6Here, the sector is based on self-indication of firms and may deviate from the classification reported
in the official statistics.
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Table 5.4: Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns by Functional Form of Cooperationa
R&D Procurement Sales Production Training
Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation
R&D cooperation Application-oriented cooperation
Lower Bavaria 9.27% 28.07% 24.81% 24.31% 18.55%
Munich 2.01% 6.02% 6.52% 3.01% 1.50%
Bavaria 6.02% 13.78% 14.04% 9.52% 5.26%
Germany 7.02% 10.53% 8.77% 4.26% 2.51%
Austria 1.75% 5.01% 5.26% 4.26% 0.25%
Czech Republic 0.00% 2.01% 2.76% 2.76% 0.25%
Distant Regions 2.26% 5.75% 6.52% 4.26% 1.25%
a Percentage of cooperation linkages by spatial scope and functional form (N=399).
Table 5.5: Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Patterns by Cooperation
Partnera
Universities Suppliers Customers Competitors
R&D cooperation Application-oriented cooperation
Lower Bavaria 12.03% 31.83% 35.59% 15.04%
Munich 3.01% 5.01% 9.02% 2.26%
Bavaria 5.76% 15.79% 19.05% 19.30%
Germany 4.26% 11.53% 11.28% 3.76%
Austria 0.75% 6.02% 5.51% 1.50%
Czech Republic 0.00% 2.26% 2.51% 0.50%
Distant Regions 0.75% 5.01% 6.27% 3.51%
a Percentage of cooperation linkages by spatial scope and partner (N=399).
average. At the same time, they are less frequently engaged in R&D-oriented cooper-
ation, i.e. in cooperation with universities or research institutes. These findings are in
line with the presumption that firms located in LMT regions require primarily synthetic,
engineering-based knowledge and innovate primarily via the DUI mode of innovation
(Jensen et al., 2007).
With regard to cross-border cooperation, results show that Lower Bavarian firms cooper-
ate more with partners from Austria than with partners from the Czech Republic, despite
the fact that both countries are located within the same geographic radius. This sug-
gests that cultural and institutional proximity may indeed be important when engaging
in cross-border cooperation (see Lundquist and Trippl, 2013; Trippl, 2010). Moreover,
firms may profit particularly from technologically more advanced Austrian partners.
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5.5.2 Impact of Spatial Cooperation Patterns on Innovation
Outcomes
The description of the cooperation patterns outlined above provides an initial overview
of the cooperation behaviour of firms in a LMT region. However, the results do not yet
tell anything about the extent to which cooperation translates into innovation success.
Therefore, the empirical analysis now turns to the impact of cooperation on innovation.
To empirically investigate the impact of cooperation on innovation – while controlling
for different firm-specific confounding factors – a binary regression model with various
specifications is estimated. The likelihood of a firm innovating is thereby regressed on
the various cooperation variables, on the size and the sector of the firm and on the firm’s
R&D inputs. The baseline model can be described as follows:
P (innovi = 1) = αi + β1(Ci) + β2(Si) + β3(Bi) + β4(RDi) + i,
where innovi refers either to product innovation, process innovation or non-technological
innovation, i.e. marketing or organisational innovations, i denotes the specific firm and αi
the intercept for each firm i. The parameters β1 to β4 denote the estimated parameters
for the independent variables included in the model. Here, Ci depicts the various binary
cooperation variables, or, alternatively, the geographic scope of cooperation of firm i. Si
depicts the firm size, measured by the number of employees. Bi denotes the firm’s branch,
i.e. sector, included as various sectoral binary variables with the service sector serving as
the reference category, and RDi denotes firms’ financial R&D inputs. Finally, i denotes
the error term.
5.5.2.1 Spatial Scope of Cooperation
The analysis begins with regressing the likelihood of firms innovating on their geographic
scope of cooperation. This allows testing the first presumption, namely that firms with
a spatially more diverse set of cooperation partners have a higher likelihood of innovat-
ing. Figure 5.2 displays the predicted probabilities of firms introducing any innovation
dependent on the geographic scope of cooperation, i.e. the number of different regions
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with which a firm cooperates. Results show that the probability of firms innovating
significantly increases with the number of different regions with which a firm cooper-
ates. Results are similar when distinguishing between R&D-oriented cooperation and
application-oriented cooperation.
Figure 5.2: Scope of Cooperation and Firms’ Likelihood of Innovating
Overall, the result supports the first hypothesis, namely that firms cooperating with a
spatially more diverse set of partners have a higher likelihood of innovating, even when
controlling for the size and sector of the firm as well as for firms’ R&D expenditures.
This suggests that regional cooperation alone is not sufficient for stimulating innovation.
Instead, the interplay between both regional and inter-regional cooperation is important.
This is in line with the literature on Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) and the notion
of local buzz and global pipelines, which both highlight the importance of the interplay
between local and global knowledge-sourcing activities (see, for example, Asheim, 1996;
Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Bathelt et al., 2004).
5.5.2.2 Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes
While the previous finding shows that firms with a spatially more diverse set of co-
operation partners have a higher likelihood of innovating, the result does not provide
any conclusion on the impact of cooperation on different geographical scales. To shed
more light on the relation between cooperation and innovation at various spatial scales,
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the essay now assesses the relation between cooperation and innovation separately for
each geographical scale. It further differentiates between R&D-oriented and application-
oriented cooperation to examine the extent to which the form of cooperation influences
the relation between the spatial scale of cooperation and innovation.
Figure 5.3 reports the average marginal effects of the different cooperation variables on
the likelihood of firms introducing any innovation, including product, process, or non-
technological innovation. The marginal effects are calculated based on the estimated
results of the logistic regression model spelled out above. To be precise, they are calcu-
lated by computing the marginal effect of a distinct independent variable for each firm
individually, and then calculating the average over all firms. Marginal effects instead of
the regression coefficients are presented, because the latter are difficult to interpret when
applying logistic regression. Moreover, marginal effects provide a good approximation
for the amount of change in the dependent variable that is produced by a unit change of
the independent variable (William, 2012). As the cooperation variables are binary vari-
ables, the marginal effects do, however, not reflect the effect of an instantaneous change
of the independent variable, but rather the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1. The
results show that cooperation positively relates to innovation on all spatial scales, except
for cooperation with partners in the Czech Republic and R&D-cooperation with distant
partners. The negative effect for cooperation with Czech partners might indicate that
cooperation with partners in the Czech Republic is not innovation-driven. However, it
is highly plausible that firms cooperating with partners in the Czech Republic instead
primarily exploit price advantages. The positive relation is statistically significant only
for cooperation with partners in Bavaria and Austria when controlling for the size and
sector of the firm as well as for the firm’s R&D expenditures. For cooperation with
partners in Bavaria, the average marginal effect amounts to .118 for all cooperation,
i.e. R&D or application-oriented cooperation. This means that on average, firms that
maintain cooperation-linkages with partners from Bavaria have a 11.8 percentage points
higher probability of innovating than otherwise similar firms that do not cooperate with
partners in Bavaria. The marginal effect of cooperating with partners from Austria is
even larger, amounting to 17.2 percentage points. As evident from the values in Figure
5.3 application-oriented cooperation drives the statistically significant relation in both
regions. This suggests that in line with the literature, in this region, it is synthetic,
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application-oriented knowledge that is transmitted through these cooperation linkages.
Figure 5.3: Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Innovation
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Regarding the control variables, R&D expenditure and the number of employees reveal a
statistically significant positive average marginal effect (see Table 5.6 and 5.7). In accor-
dance with other studies (see Barge-gil, 2010 for an overview), this means that large firms
and firms that devote extra financial means to R&D have a higher likelihood of innovat-
ing. In contrast, the sector has no significant effect in the region of Lower Bavaria. The
marginal effects of the sectoral variables are not statistically significant. This indicates
that whether a firm belongs to the manufacturing sector or to the construction sector,
rather than to the service sector that serves as the reference group in the estimation
model, does not significantly change the firm’s probability of innovating when all other
firm characteristics, i.e. cooperation patterns, size, R&D expenditures, are similar.
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To evaluate the performance of the various model specifications, the McFadden R2 is
used as our goodness-of-fit measurement (see Tables 5.6 to 5.13). The McFadden R2 has
been proven as a valid measurement for the model fit in Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE), even though the McFadden R2 is smaller than the R2 in Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression models (Allison, 2012). It is evident that the McFadden R2 ranges
between 0.19 and 0.23, pointing towards a satisfying goodness-of-fit of the first set of
model specifications.
While in the first set of models specifications the aggregated innovation variable consti-
tutes the dependent variable, in the following section, the various model specifications
are estimated separately for product innovation, process innovation and non-technological
innovations. With respect to product innovations, the corresponding average marginal
effects for cooperation, calculated from the estimated coefficients of the logistic regression
model are depicted in Figure 5.4. Results show that cooperation on most geographical
scales has a positive effect on the likelihood of firms introducing product innovations. As
the results show, the cooperation variable is only statistically significant in the case of
cooperation with distant partners, i.e. partners in regions other than Germany, Austria
and the Czech Republic. Firms cooperating with distant partners have a 16.6 percentage
points higher probability of introducing a product innovation than otherwise similar firms
that do not maintain cooperation-linkages with distant partners. This result is in line with
the presumption that cooperation with partners in distant regions has a positive impact
on firms’ likelihood of introducing product innovation. This indicates that firms exploit
analytical knowledge when innovating with geographically distant cooperation partners.
However, in contrast to the expectations from the literature, it is not R&D-oriented co-
operation that channels the relation, but rather application-oriented cooperation that
matters.
When it comes to process innovation (see Figure 5.5), the average marginal effects are
by and large negative, except for cooperation with local, i.e. Lower Bavarian partners
although they are not statistically significant. The results may be driven by the compar-
atively limited number of firms that have introduced process innovations in the past three
years. Hence, the validity of the results for process innovation as the dependent variable
is rather weak, which is also indicated by the comparatively low McFadden R2 (see Table
5.10 and 5.11). For non-technological innovations, the goodness-of-fit is also quite low
125
Chapter 5: Cooperation Patterns and Innovation Outcomes
Figure 5.4: Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Product Innovation
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Figure 5.5: Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Process Innovation
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
(see Table 5.12 and 5.13). In this set of model specifications, however, a positive, statis-
tically significant average marginal effect is still observable for cooperation with regional,
i.e. Lower Bavarian and Bavarian, partners (Figure 5.6). Hence, firms that maintain
cooperation linkages with Bavarian partners have a 12.2 percentage points higher prob-
ability of introducing non-technological innovations than otherwise similar firms that do
not cooperate with partners from Bavaria. This finding is in line with the hypothesis
that cooperation with local or regional partners has a positive effect on firms’ likelihood
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of introducing low-threshold innovations. As evident from the reported average marginal
effects in Figure 5.6, it is again application-oriented cooperation that drives the relation,
a finding that is in line with expecations from the literature.
Figure 5.6: Average Marginal Effects of Cooperation on Non-Technological Innovation
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Results also show that on all other spatial scales the cooperation variables are not sta-
tistically significant, irrespective of the form of cooperation and the type of innovation.
This is, of course, not to say that firms cooperating with partners in these regions do
not innovate. However, cooperation with partners in these regions does not affect the
innovation behaviour of the firm when keeping the control variables constant.
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In summary, the empirical results show that in Lower Bavaria, one example of an eco-
nomically successful LMT region, firms cooperate predominantly with local and regional
cooperation partners. Hence, in line with the literature on the embeddedness of knowl-
edge in the regional and institutional context (see, for example, Gertler, 2004), geographic
proximity seems to be important for knowledge spillovers. Regarding the form of coopera-
tion, application-oriented cooperations prevail, suggesting that in this region, cooperation
supports development rather than research.
When looking at the innovation implications of cooperation, in line with the first hy-
pothesis, cooperation on various spatial scales is indeed important for innovation. This
suggests that firms exploit knowledge from outside the region in order to innovate and
that a broad scope of learning opportunities is particularly beneficial. When differenti-
ating between the impact that cooperation on different geographical scales has for the
likelihood of firms innovating, it becomes evident that the impact of cooperation dif-
fers between the various geographic levels. While cooperation with regional, i.e. Lower
Bavarian or Bavarian, partners significantly increases the likelihood of firms introducing
non-technological innovations, firms that cooperate with distant partners are more likely
to introduce product innovations. This result suggests that firms only engage in cooper-
ation with distant partners when the acquired knowledge is not available at the regional
level. When differentiating between the distinct forms of cooperation, it becomes evident
that it is application-oriented cooperation that drives the relation. This finding suggests
that in the region of Lower Bavaria, an example of a LMT region, R&D-intensive coopera-
tion is less relevant for innovation, with application-oriented cooperation, i.e. production,
procurement and sales cooperation with suppliers, customers, or – in some cases– com-
petitors, instead being more important. This suggests that firms primarily apply a DUI
mode of innovation, irrespective of whether they introduce product or lower-threshold
innovations.
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The essay studied the interplay between spatial cooperation patterns and innovation out-
comes of firms in the German rural, LMT region of Lower Bavaria. Drawing from the
existing literature on the spatial scale of cooperation (for example Bathelt et al., 2004;
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Cooke, 2001) and on different types of knowledge and modes of innovation (Asheim et al.,
2011; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Jensen et al., 2007), two research hypotheses regarding
the impact of cooperation on innovation in this type of region were formulated and em-
pirically tested. These hypotheses can be derived directly from the existing literature, yet
they have not been tested systematically in the German context. Thanks to the database
of original micro-data of Lower Bavarian firms that explicitly reports cooperation pat-
terns of these firms with the surrounding regions on different spatial scales the empirical
analysis provided an in-depth analysis of the interplay between the spatial scale of co-
operation and the form of cooperation. On the output side, the empirical analysis has
differentiated between product innovation, process innovation and non-technological in-
novation in order to provide a fine-grained picture of the innovation implications that the
various cooperation patterns in this region entail. Overall, the following major findings
can be summarised:
(1) In the region of Lower Bavaria, local and regional cooperation dominates. This result
is in line with the literature on the embeddedness of knowledge in the regional and
institutional context (see, for example, Gertler, 2004) and suggests that firms generate
and exploit regional agglomeration effects.
(2) In the region of Lower Bavaria, application-oriented cooperation dominates. Regional
firms cooperate predominantly with other firms, such as suppliers, customers, or even
competitors, while cooperation with universities and research institutes is less frequent.
Correspondingly, application-oriented cooperation such as production, procurement and
sales cooperation is more frequent than explicit R&D cooperation. This result suggests
that regional firms use cooperation particularly to acquire synthetic, engineering-based
knowledge that is particularly relevant when pursuing a DUI mode of innovation (Asheim
and Gertler, 2005; Jensen et al., 2007).
(3) With respect to the relation between cooperation and innovation, results show that
firms that cooperate with partners from a more diverse set of regions have a higher likeli-
hood of innovating, even when controlling for the size and sector of the firm as well as for
firms’ R&D expenditures. This result shows that the interplay between local and global
sourcing activities is important. This might stem from the creation of cluster effects
in combination with the simultaneous enlargement of the knowledge base by non-local
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or non-regional sources. The finding corresponds well with the literature on knowledge
bases and different modes of innovation (see, for example, Asheim et al., 2011; Asheim
and Gertler, 2005; Jensen et al., 2007), as well as with other empirical works on cooper-
ation in non-core regions (Fitjar and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2011; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015;
Lagendijk and Lorentzen, 2007).
(4) The findings also show that firms’ cooperation on different spatial scales entails dif-
ferent innovation outcomes. Hence, results show that cooperation with regional partners
positively and statistically significantly correlates with a higher likelihood of introducing
low-threshold, i.e. non-technological, innovations. In contrast, cooperation with partners
in distant regions is positively and statistically significantly correlated with product inno-
vations that presumably require more analytical knowledge. Overall, the finding suggests
that firms indeed exploit different spatial knowledge sources, depending on the required
knowledge base, and that these translate into different innovation outcomes.
(5) In Lower Bavaria, it is not R&D cooperation that affects the likelihood of a firm
of innovating. Instead, application-oriented forms of cooperation, such as procurement,
production, or sales cooperation with suppliers, customers or competitors seem to im-
pact firms’ innovativeness. This suggests that the increasing absorptive capacity (see,
for example, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is an important prerequisite for learning and
innovating in a LMT context.
Translated into the political context, the findings suggest that locally bounded network
policies may not be sufficient for stimulating regional innovativeness. Instead, policies
should also consider the benefits arising from spatially diverse, inter-regional coopera-
tion when designing regional policies suited for LMT regions. With respect to the form
of cooperation, the findings imply that an exclusive focus on R&D-based cooperation
might neither be appropriate nor sufficient for stimulating the innovativeness of firms in
LMT regions. In low-technology regions with a strong economic performance, less R&D-
intensive forms of knowledge might thus be of greater importance, an implication that
has also been put forward in other recent studies (for example Hansen and Winther, 2011
and 2014).
Even though the essay adds multiple new aspects to the academic debate on how coop-
eration impacts innovation of firms located in a German LMT border region, there are
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some limitations to be noted. The essay uses micro-data of firms in Lower Bavaria, which
limits the overall external validity of the results. Therefore, there may be certain unob-
served, idiosyncratic regional factors that potentially drive the results in this particular
region and would consequentially impede a transfer of results to other regions. In the
case of Lower Bavaria, the comparatively strong regional automobile industry may be
such a factor. This industry has frequently been identified as the main driver of regional
growth. Given that the automobile plant located in the region constitutes a large produc-
tion subsidiary to the BMW headquarters in Munich, innovation may, if at all, be driven
rather by incremental process improvements facilitated by cooperation with suppliers.
This suggests that in Lower Bavaria, regional growth is primarily demand-driven. As the
demand for regional products is, however, largely determined by the competitiveness of
regional products, the quality and innovativeness of regional products is likewise impor-
tant, especially in a high-wage country such as Germany. Hence, it is plausible to identify
the innovativeness of regional firms as an important prerequisite for regional growth in
Lower Bavaria.
Table 5.14: Other European Second Tier LMT Regionsa
Core City Second Tier Region GDP HRST Largest City (Inhabitants)
Munich Lower Bavaria 117 37.0 Landshut (65.322)
Vienna Upper Austria 126 36.1 Linz (191.501)
Copenhagen Southern Denmark 114 40.2 Vejle (52.449)
Amsterdam Friesland 104 40.5 Leeuwarden (96.568)
Frankfurt Giessen 107 41.2 Giessen (76.680)
Stockholm Smaland 108 39.6 Joenkoeping (89.369)
Brussels West Flanders 112 43.6 Bruegge (117.170)
a Own depiction based on data from Eurostat Regional Database (2016); GDP=Regional GDP (PPS per
inhabitant in % of the EU27 average); HRST=Share of Human Ressources in Science and Technology
(in % of total workforce) for the year 2012.
Despite these idiosyncratic factors, Lower Bavaria may not be that atypical compared
to other regions. Located at the second tier of a major city and characterised by a
relatively strong economic performance, despite low levels of internal R&D, Lower Bavaria
shares similar regional characteristics with several regions within the EU-15, for example
Upper Austria, Southern Denmark, Sma˚land, or West Flanders. All these regions display
regional characteristics similar to those of Lower Bavaria in terms of location, internal
R&D and economic performance (see Table 5.14). Due to this high degree of similarity,
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it may be reasonable to assume that the region of Lower Bavaria constitutes a valid and
typical example of a specific type of European region. The key findings of the essay may
thus also be found in other economically successful LMT regions.
However, owing to the lack of comparable survey data, this presumption cannot be tested
empirically. Moreover, a comparison of Lower Bavaria with regions that share similar
structural characteristics but are less successful in economic and innovative terms may
be an interesting endeavour. It would allow for an investigation of whether firms in
these less successful regions lack cooperation linkages or whether cooperation linkages
are also present, but do not affect firms’ innovativeness. Finally, the essay only analyses
correlations between cooperation and innovation. Hence, the results do not claim a causal
interpretation of the relevant associations. Nonetheless, these correlation patterns already
provide important insights for a better understanding of the interplay between the spatial
scale of cooperation, the form of cooperation and the corresponding innovation outcomes
of firms located in an economically successful LMT region with low internal R&D.
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Appendix Part One
I.1 Synthetic Controls for Individual Border Regions
Burgenland - AT11
Table I.1: Balance Test: Burgenland
Variable Burgenland Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .782 .786
Population Density 69.76 94.88
Patent Intensity .112 .097
Primary Secor .046 .047
Secondary Sector .279 .280
Tertiary Sector .664 .665
Hourly Wage 10.97 10.61
GDP per capita 1991 14806.35 14858.10
GDP per capita 1995 16794.62 16803.38
GDP per capita 2000 19238.92 19263.02
Table I.2: Synthetic Con-
trol: Burgenland
Region NUTS Code Weight
Namur BE35 .210
Lu¨neburg DE93 .096
Calabria ITF6 .038
Norte PT11 .076
Alentejo PT18 .210
Cheshire UKD2 .088
Highlands UKM6 .282
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Lower Austria - AT12
Table I.3: Balance Test: Lower Austria
Variable Lower Austria Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .860 .857
Population Density 79.42 73.42
Patent Intensity .232 .231
Primary Secor .032 .032
Secondary Sector .340 .339
Tertiary Sector .616 .613
Hourly Wage 12.61 12.56
GDP per capita 1991 20069.59 20001.22
GDP per capita 1995 21112.13 21044.47
GDP per capita 2000 23899.33 23814.34
Table I.4: Synthetic Control:
Lower Austria
Region NUTS Code Weight
Vorarlberg AT34 .145
Lower Franconia DE26 .036
Western Finland FI19 .052
Northern Finland FI1A .100
Franche-Comte´ FR43 .217
Emilia-Romagna ITD5 .071
Basilicata ITF5 .016
Alentejo PT18 .035
Cumbria UKD1 .192
Highlands UKM6 .136
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Vienna - AT13
Table I.5: Balance Test: Vienna
Variable Vienna Synthetic Control
Employment Rate 1.04 1.04
Population Density 3736.46 3651.24
Patent Intensity .216 .204
Primary Secor .001 .003
Secondary Sector .195 .196
Tertiary Sector .818 .818
Hourly Wage 18.02 18.08
GDP per capita 1991 33117.54 33083.95
GDP per capita 1995 34721.93 34689.96
GDP per capita 2000 40047.96 40013.12
Table I.6: Synthetic Control: Vienna
Region NUTS Code Weight
Brussels BE10 .227
Walloon Brabant BE31 .040
Hamburg DE60 .124
Cologne DEA2 .024
Rhinehessen Palatinate DEB3 .039
Leipzig DED3 .057
Campania ITF3 .035
Inner London UKI1 .083
Outer London UKI2 .371
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Carinthia - AT21
Table I.7: Balance Test: Carinthia
Variable Carinthia Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .957 .956
Population Density 58.61 91.80
Patent Intensity .200 .200
Primary Secor .021 .022
Secondary Sector .307 .307
Tertiary Sector .667 .667
Hourly Wage 12.89 12.87
GDP per capita 1991 19969.78 19944.34
GDP per capita 1995 20988.81 20961.57
GDP per capita 2000 24126.13 24095.01
Table I.8: Synthetic Control:
Carinthia
Region NUTS Code Weight
Tyrol AT33 .127
Vorarlberg AT34 .113
Western Finland FI19 .069
Basse-Normandie FR25 .143
Franche-Comte´ FR43 .039
Auvergne FR72 .177
Luxembourg LU00 .031
Norte PT11 .042
Cumbria UKD1 .030
West Wales UKL1 .229
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Styria - AT22
Table I.9: Balance Test: Styria
Variable Styria Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .953 .953
Population Density 72.21 138.96
Patent Intensity .257 .256
Primary Secor .025 .026
Secondary Sector .353 .354
Tertiary Sector .611 .612
Hourly Wage 12.43 12.42
GDP per capita 1991 19357.77 19381.92
GDP per capita 1995 20909.14 20934.47
GDP per capita 2000 24674.13 24703.6
Table I.10: Synthetic Control:
Styria
Region NUTS Code Weight
Vorarlberg AT34 .030
Lower Franconia DE26 .109
Brunswick DE91 .254
Western Finland FI19 .075
Franche-Comte´ FR43 .076
Luxembourg LU00 .075
Norte PT11 .035
Centro PT16 .240
Cumbria UKD1 .061
Cheshire UKD2 .045
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Upper Austria - AT31
Table I.11: Balance Test: Upper Austria
Variable Upper Austria Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .978 .973
Population Density 113.65 164.87
Patent Intensity .305 .295
Primary Secor .023 .028
Secondary Sector .405 .406
Tertiary Sector .556 .559
Hourly Wage 13.46 13.58
GDP per capita 1991 23448.47 23427.14
GDP per capita 1995 24233.82 24214.33
GDP per capita 2000 28070.97 28039.48
Table I.12: Synthetic Control:
Upper Austria
Region NUTS Code Weight
Vorarlberg AT34 .055
Stuttgart DE11 .211
Navarra ES22 .500
Western Finland FI19 .006
Luxembourg LU00 .001
Groningen NL11 .094
Centro PT16 .048
Cheshire UKD2 .085
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Lower Bavaria - DE22
Table I.13: Balance Test: Lower Bavaria
Variable Lower Bavaria Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .906 .924
Population Density 111.18 238.78
Patent Intensity .258 .130
Primary Secor .021 .018
Secondary Sector .396 .394
Tertiary Sector .578 .579
Hourly Wage 12.64 11.72
GDP per capita 1991 19192.16 19321.93
GDP per capita 1995 23013.55 22981.5
GDP per capita 2000 24827.45 24855.93
Table I.14: Synthetic Control: Lower
Bavaria
Region NUTS Code Weight
Note PT11 .228
Centro PT16 .075
Tees Valley and Durham UKC1 .157
Cheshire UKD2 .328
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .147
Highlands UKM6 .065
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Upper Palatinate - DE23
Table I.15: Balance Test: Upper Palatinate
Variable Upper Palatinate Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .968 .950
Population Density 109.27 298.50
Patent Intensity .489 .367
Primary Secor .017 .019
Secondary Sector .374 .369
Tertiary Sector .607 .606
Hourly Wage 12.91 12.99
GDP per capita 1991 19717.17 19756.03
GDP per capita 1995 23177.77 23150.99
GDP per capita 2000 26409.15 26393.96
Table I.16: Synthetic Control: Upper
Palatinate
Region NUTS Code Weight
Lower Franconia DE26 .201
Rhinehessen-Palatinate DEB3 .017
North Brabant NL41 .125
Centro PT16 .141
Cheshire UKD2 .237
Lancashire UKD4 .234
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .045
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Upper Franconia - DE24
Table I.17: Balance Test: Upper Franconia
Variable Upper Franconia Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .966 .961
Population Density 152.95 231.37
Patent Intensity .335 .326
Primary Secor .011 .012
Secondary Sector .355 .355
Tertiary Sector .634 .634
Hourly Wage 13.32 13.17
GDP per capita 1991 21157.39 21163.07
GDP per capita 1995 22858.43 22862.73
GDP per capita 2000 24276.68 24280.41
Table I.18: Synthetic Control: Upper Franco-
nia
Region NUTS Code Weight
Freiburg DE13 .283
Lower Franconia DE26 .013
Swabia DE27 .053
Muenster DEA3 .211
Eastern Finland FI13 .013
Norte PT11 .092
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear UKC2 .087
West Wales UKL1 .154
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .094
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Berlin - DE30
Table I.19: Balance Test: Berlin
Variable Berlin Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .872 .914
Population Density 3862.18 579.34
Patent Intensity .261 .111
Primary Secor .001 .012
Secondary Sector .209 .275
Tertiary Sector .801 .721
Hourly Wage 16.49 14.39
GDP per capita 1991 29618.62 29379.4
GDP per capita 1995 26498.33 25966.31
GDP per capita 2000 26281 26725.57
Table I.20: Synthetic Control: Berlin
Region NUTS Code Weight
Brussels BE10 .067
Leipzig DED3 .573
Alps-French Riviera FR82 .218
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .143
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Brandenburg - DE40
Table I.21: Balance Test: Brandenburg
Variable Brandenburg Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .756 .757
Population Density 87.12 159.53
Patent Intensity .103 .100
Primary Secor .017 .017
Secondary Sector .316 .315
Tertiary Sector .666 .665
Hourly Wage 12.42 12.41
GDP per capita 1991 19090.62 19072.25
GDP per capita 1995 16222.98 16206.97
GDP per capita 2000 18394.71 18377.21
Table I.22: Synthetic Control:
Brandenburg
Region NUTS Code Weight
Walloon Brabant BE31 .017
Hainaut BE32 .057
Lu¨neburg DE93 .016
Leipzig DED3 .153
Schleswig-Holstein DEE0 .468
Thuringia DEG0 .220
Highlands UKM6 .069
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Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania - DE80
Table I.23: Balance Test: Mecklenburg Western-
Pomerania
Variable Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .770 .770
Population Density 78.10 150.79
Patent Intensity .048 .056
Primary Secor .030 .030
Secondary Sector .243 .243
Tertiary Sector .724 .724
Hourly Wage 11.87 11.81
GDP per capita 1991 18109.22 18114.33
GDP per capita 1995 16090.26 16090.56
GDP per capita 2000 17869.91 17868.14
Table I.24: Synthetic Control: Meck-
lenburg Western-Pomerania
Region NUTS Code Weight
Namur BE35 .127
Rhinehessen-Palatinate DEB3 .239
Schleswig-Holstein DEE0 .177
Andalusia ES61 .113
Nord-Pas-de-Calais FR30 .017
Calabria ITF6 .258
Highlands UKM6 .034
Northern Ireland UKN0 .035
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Chemnitz - DED1
Table I.25: Balance Test: Chemnitz
Variable Chemnitz Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .837 .869
Population Density 275.58 200.37
Patent Intensity .086 .046
Primary Secor .010 .018
Secondary Sector .360 .355
Tertiary Sector .629 .625
Hourly Wage 11.02 10.33
GDP per capita 1991 15845.83 15813.52
GDP per capita 1995 15327.51 15257.19
GDP per capita 2000 16927.57 16935.69
Table I.26: Synthetic Control: Chem-
nitz
Region NUTS Code Weight
Leipzig DED3 .176
Asturias ES12 .359
Borte PT11 .253
West Wales UKL1 .207
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .005
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Dresden - DED2
Table I.27: Balance Test: Dresden
Variable Dresden Synthetic Control
Employment Rate .801 .814
Population Density 222.13 212.87
Patent Intensity .204 .138
Primary Secor .010 .014
Secondary Sector .336 .332
Tertiary Sector .655 .651
Hourly Wage 12.55 11.95
GDP per capita 1991 18836.22 18832.62
GDP per capita 1995 16487.57 16473.12
GDP per capita 2000 18368.44 18389.74
Table I.28: Synthetic Control: Dres-
den
Region NUTS Code Weight
Lu¨neburg DE93 .051
Rhinehessen-Palatinate DEB3 .041
Leipzig DED3 .192
Schleswig-Holstein DEE0 .057
Thuringia DEG0 .375
Norte PT11 .113
Tees Valley and Durham UKC1 .171
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Friuli-Venezia Giulia - ITD4
Table I.29: Balance Test: Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Variable Friuli-Venezia Giulia Synthetic Control
Employment Rate 1.01 .998
Population Density 150.80 292.88
Patent Intensity .183 .190
Primary Secor .019 .027
Secondary Sector .263 .266
Tertiary Sector .688 .691
Hourly Wage 11.82 11.58
GDP per capita 1991 23742.06 23724.81
GDP per capita 1995 26558.35 26510.25
GDP per capita 2000 28959.06 28912.61
Table I.30: Synthetic Control: Friuli-Venezia-Giulia
Region NUTS Code Weight
Brussels BE10 .016
Cologne DEA2 .225
Limousin FR63 .097
Bolzano ITD1 .334
Veneto ITD3 .069
Luxembourg LU00 .021
Norte PT11 .053
Centro PT16 .143
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire UKJ1 .003
North Eastern Scotland UKM5 .039
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I.2 Logistic Regression for Propensity Scores
Table I.31: Logistic Regression
Modela
Border Location
Share < 6 Years -10.917
(10.503)
Share 6 < 18 Years -10.271
(10.315)
Share 18 < 25 Years -11.001
(10.479)
Share 25 < 30 Years -11.045
(10.283)
Share 30 < 50 Years -10.775
(10.330)
Share 50 < 65 Years -10.270
(10.368)
Share 65 < 75 Years -10.674
(10.331)
Share > 75 Years -10.548
(10.354)
Population Density -.001
(.002)
Share Foreigners -.220
(.203)
Umemployment Rate .143
(.115)
Youth Unemployyment .143
(.160)
Income per capita .001
(.001)
Share Unskilled Labor .211
(.174)
Share University Degree .357**
(.163)
Clearance Rate .184**
(.049)
Constant 1051.072
(1034.203)
Observations 428
McFadden’s R2 .385
a Table entries denote regression coeffi-
cients of a logistic regression model. De-
pendent variable: border region. Stars
denote significance of the estimates as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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I.3 Border Regions and Matched Controls
Table I.32: Border Regions and Matched Control Regions
Border Regions Matched Control Regions
Regen (DE229) Altenburger Land (DEg0m)
Weiden i. d. Opf. kreisfreie Stadt (DE233) Dingolfing-Landau (DE22c)
Cham (DE235) Dessau-Roßlau, kreisfreie Stadt (DEe01)
Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab (DE237) Suhl, kreisfreie Stadt (DE04)
Schwandorf (DE239) Ostprignitz-Ruppin (DE416)
Tirschenreuth (DE23a) Ru¨gen (DE80h)
Hof, kreisfreie Stadt (DE244) Eichsfeld (DEg06)
Hof, Landkreis (DE249) Bernkastel-Wittlich (DEb22)
Frankfurt (Oder), kreisfreie Stadt (DE411) Demmin (DE808)
Barnim (DE412) Darmstadt, kreisfreie Stadt (DE711)
Ma¨rkisch-Oderland (DE413) Jena, kreisfreie Stadt (DEg03)
Oder-Spree (DE415) Haßberge (DE267)
Uckermark (DE418) So¨mmerda (DEg0d)
Cottbus, kreisfreie Stadt (DE422) Rottal-Inn (DE22a)
Spree-Neiße (DE429) Gu¨strow (DE809)
Ostvorpommern (DE80f) Do¨beln (DEd33)
Uecker-Randow (DE80i) Kyffha¨userkreis (DEg0a)
Plauen, kreisfreie Stadt (DEd12) Bitburg-Pru¨m (DEb23)
Annaberg (DEd14) Hoyerswerda, kreisfreie Stadt (DEd23)
Freiberg (DEd16) Weimar, kreisfreie Stadt (DEg05)
Vogtlandkreis (DEd17) Leipziger Land (DEd34)
Mittlerer Erzgebirgskreis (DEd18) Zwickauer Land (DEd1c)
Aue-Schwarzenberg (DEd1b) Muldentalkreis (DEd35)
Bautzen (DEd24) Torgau-Oschatz (DEd36)
Lo¨bau-Zittau (DEd28) Nordhausen (DEg07)
Sa¨chsische Schweiz (DEd29) Riesa-Großenhain (DEd27)
Weißeritzkreis (DEd2a) Saalfeld-Rudolstadt (DEg0i)
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I.4 Effect Size of the Schengen Acquis on the Rate
of Burglaries
Table I.33: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Matched Samples:
Effect Size Burglariesa
Log Burglary Log Burglary Log Burglary Log Burglary
DID .527** .517* .555** .559**
(.188) (.199) (.197) (.196)
Year=2008 -.552** -.549** -.605** -.549**
(.179) (.179) (.188) (.187)
Border=1 -.622** -.617** -.615** -.619**
(.202) (.209) (.201) (.184)
Clearance Rate -.001 .002 .003
(.004) (.003) (.003)
GDP per capita .001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
GDP Growth Rate -1.251 -.207
(.887) (.915)
Pop. Density .001**
(.001)
Yearly Dummies
√ √ √ √
Constant -0.091 -.054 -.659 -.473
(.152) (.192) (.358) (.382)
Onservations 270 270 270 270
McFadden R2 .118 .115 .158 .266
a Table entries denote estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses) and the
level of significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Log rate of
burglary
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Standortverflechtungsanalyse für den Wirtschaftsstandort Niederbayern 
 
«IHKNR»     «IHKNR» 
 
Rückadresse: 
 
 
      «Firma» 
      «Firma1» 
      «Firma2» 
      «Strasse» 
      «Plz» «Ort» 
 
 
 
Für die Onlinebeantwortung:  
 
Wir bieten Ihnen unseren Fragebogen auch online an. 
Die Anmeldemaske finden Sie unter:  
 
https://www.umfragen.ihk.de 
 
Kennung: «Kennung»  
Kennwort: «Kennwort» 
 
oder per Fax: 02 31 / 97 46 - 46 317 
 
Bitte antworten Sie bis XX.XX.XXXX 
 
Erläuterungen zum Ausfüllen des Fragebogens 
 
Bitte füllen Sie den Fragebogen gut leserlich aus, indem Sie… 
- in die weißen Kästchen ein Kreuz machen  
 
Beispiel:          F&E Abteilung                      Ja                                               Nein  
 
Falls Sie eine Antwort korrigieren möchten, füllen Sie bitte das fälschlich angekreuzte Kästchen vollständig aus und 
kreuzen Sie anschließend das richtige Kästchen an. 
 
Beispiel:          F&E Abteilung                      Ja                                                 Nein       
 
- in die unterstrichenen Felder Zahlen oder Text in Druckbuchstaben schreiben 
 
Beispiel:         Anzahl der Mitarbeiter/innen: _____________ 
 
- in die weißen Textfelder Ihre Antworten und Anmerkungen schreiben  
 
Beispiel:        In welchem Netzwerk oder Cluster ist Ihr Betrieb Mitglied?  z.B. M.A.I.,  Carbon, M
4
 
 
Anmerkungen zu den Regionen: 
 
Im Fragebogen stellen wir Ihnen einige Fragen, in denen Sie die Regionen innerhalb und außerhalb des IHK Bezirks Niederbayern 
nennen sollen, in denen Ihr Betrieb Kooperationen und Geschäftsbeziehungen hat.  
 
Die Liste der Regionen umfasst dabei die folgenden, in der Karte eingezeichneten Gebiete: 
 
- Städte und Landkreise in 
Niederbayern 
- Stadt und Landkreis 
Regensburg 
- Stadt und Landkreis München 
- Städte Nürnberg/Fürth/Erlangen 
- Oberpfalz 
- Oberbayern 
- übriges Bayern 
- übriges Deutschland 
- Oberösterreich 
- Region Salzburg 
- übriges Österreich 
- Region Budweis (Südböhmen) 
- Region Pilsen (Westböhmen) 
- Region Prag (Mittelböhmen) 
- übriges Tschechien 
- übriges Osteuropa 
(ohne Tschechien) 
- übriges Westeuropa  
(ohne Deutschland und 
Österreich) 
- übrige Welt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSCHNITT A: FRAGEN ZUM BETRIEB 
 Im ersten Abschnitt des Fragebogens haben wir einige allgemeine Fragen zu den strukturellen Merkmalen Ihres Betriebes. 
 Betrieb bezeichnet im Nachfolgenden den im Anschreiben genannten Standort einschließlich zugehöriger rechtlich 
    unselbständiger Niederlassungen/Betriebsstätten in Niederbayern. 
 
1. In welchem der folgenden Wirtschaftszweige ist Ihr Betrieb überwiegend tätig?  
 
Falls Ihr Betrieb keinem der genannten Wirtschaftszweige zugeordnet werden kann, kreuzen Sie bitte den Wirtschaftszweig an, 
    mit dem die größte Übereinstimmung besteht.  
Bitte nur eine Antwort ankreuzen! 
 
Fahrzeugbau  Erzeugung und Bearbeitung von Metall  
Elektronik  Chemie, Kunststoffverarbeitung, Gummiwaren, Pharmazie  
Baugewerbe  Nahrungs- und Genussmittel  
Maschinenbau  Holzgewerbe (ohne Möbel)  
Bergbau, Stein und Erde  Möbel, Schmuck, Musikinstrumente, Sportgeräte, Spielwaren  
Glas, Porzellan, Keramik  Druckerei und Vervielfältigung  
Textil, Bekleidung, Leder  Papier und Pappe  
Feinmechanik, Optik  Logistik und Transportgewerbe  
Energieerzeugung  Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstleistungen  
Recycling  Freiberufliche, wissenschaftliche und technische Dienste  
Sonstiges    
 
2. Seit wann ist Ihr Betrieb an diesem Standort 
 ansässig? 
Vor 1990  
Zwischen 1990 und 2000  
Nach 2000  
3. Welche Art von Aktivitäten führen Sie am 
 Standort aus? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
Beschaffung 
Produktion von Waren/Dienstleistungen 
Absatz 
Forschung und Entwicklung 
Personalverwaltung 
Finanzverwaltung 
Aus- und Weiterbildung 
Geschäftsführung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Wie lässt sich Ihr Betrieb charakterisieren? 
Dieser Betrieb ist der einzige 
Standort  
 weiter mit 
Frage 7 
Dieser Betrieb ist der Hauptsitz   weiter mit Frage 6 
Dieser Betrieb ist eine 
Niederlassung  
 weiter mit 
Frage 5 
5. Wo befindet sich der Hauptsitz? 
  
Hauptsitz in:___________________________________ 
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6. Wo befinden sich die (übrigen) 
 Niederlassungen/Betriebsstätten Ihres Betriebes/ 
 Unternehmens? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich!  
 
Stadt und LK Passau  
LK Regen  
LK Deggendorf  
LK Freyung-Grafenau  
LK Kelheim  
Stadt Straubing/ LK Straubing-Bogen  
LK Rottal-Inn  
LK Dingolfing-Landau  
Stadt und LK Landshut  
Stadt und LK Regensburg  
Stadt und LK München  
Städte Nürnberg/ Fürth/ Erlangen  
Oberpfalz  
Oberbayern  
übriges Bayern  
übriges Deutschland (ohne Bayern)  
Oberösterreich  
Region Salzburg  
übriges Österreich  
Region Budweis (Südböhmen)  
Region Pilsen (Westböhmen)  
Region Prag (Mittelböhmen)  
übriges Tschechien  
übriges Osteuropa (ohne Tschechien)  
übriges Westeuropa  
(ohne Deutschland und Österreich)  
übrige Welt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Wie hoch war der Jahresumsatz Ihres Betriebes 
 im Jahr 2011 in etwa?  
 
  Zur Erinnerung: Mit Betrieb ist der im Anschreiben 
 genannte Standort einschließlich zugehöriger  
 rechtlich unselbständiger Niederlassungen/Betriebsstätten 
 in Niederbayern gemeint. 
bis zu 1 Mio. Euro  
mehr als 1 Mio. Euro, aber max. 5 Mio. Euro  
mehr als 5 Mio. Euro, aber max. 50 Mio. Euro  
mehr als 50 Mio. Euro  
8. Wie viele Mitarbeiter (sozialversicherungs-
 pflichtige Beschäftigte, inkl. Auszubildende, 
 Teilzeit- und Saisonkräfte) sind gegenwärtig in 
 Ihrem Betrieb beschäftigt? 
 
ca. ____________
_ 
Mitarbeiter/innen 
   
 
9. Aus welchen der folgenden Regionen kommen 
 die Mitarbeiter (sozialversicherungspflichtige 
 Beschäftigte, inkl. Auszubildende, Teilzeit- und 
 Saisonkräfte), die Ihr Betrieb in den letzten 3 
 Jahren eingestellt hat?  
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
gleicher Landkreis 
Niederbayern 
übriges Bayern 
übriges Deutschland 
Österreich 
Tschechien 
übriges Ausland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSCHNITT B: VERFLECHTUNGEN INNERHALB UND AUSSERHALB NIEDERBAYERNS 
 Im nächsten Abschnitt interessieren uns die regionalen und überregionalen Verflechtungen und Kooperationen Ihres 
    Betriebes. 
 
10. Aus welchen der folgenden Regionen bezieht Ihr 
 Betrieb Vorleistungen? 
 Bitte kreuzen Sie alle Regionen an, aus denen Ihr 
 Betrieb Vorleistungen bezieht. 
 
  Vorleistungen sind alle von anderen Betrieben oder 
 Einrichtungen bezogenen Roh-, Hilfs- und Betriebsstoffe, 
 Handelswaren und fremden Dienstleistungen, die für die 
 Weiterverarbeitung in Ihrem Betrieb relevant sind.  
1 Stadt und LK Passau  
2 LK Regen  
3 LK Deggendorf  
4 LK Freyung-Grafenau  
5 LK Kelheim  
6 Stadt Straubing/ LK Straubing-Bogen  
7 LK Rottal-Inn  
8 LK Dingolfing-Landau  
9 Stadt und LK Landshut  
10 Stadt und LK Regensburg  
11 Stadt und LK München  
12 Städte Nürnberg/ Fürth/ Erlangen  
13 Oberpfalz  
14 Oberbayern  
15 übriges Bayern  
16 übriges Deutschland (ohne Bayern)  
17 Oberösterreich  
18 Region Salzburg  
19 übriges Österreich  
20 Region Budweis (Südböhmen)  
21 Region Pilsen (Westböhmen)  
22 Region Prag (Mittelböhmen)  
23 übriges Tschechien  
24 übriges Osteuropa (ohne Tschechien)  
25 übriges Westeuropa  
(ohne Deutschland und Österreich) 
 
26 übrige Welt  
11. Welche der genannten Regionen ist der 
 wichtigste Beschaffungsmarkt für Ihren Betrieb? 
 
 Nummer der Region (vgl. Frage 10):  ___________ 
 
12. In welcher der folgenden Regionen setzt Ihr 
 Betrieb Waren/Dienstleistungen ab? 
 Bitte kreuzen Sie alle Regionen an, in denen 
 Ihr Betrieb Waren und Dienstleistungen absetzt. 
1 Stadt und LK Passau  
2 LK Regen  
3 LK Deggendorf  
4 LK Freyung-Grafenau  
5 LK Kelheim  
6 Stadt Straubing/ LK Straubing-Bogen  
7 LK Rottal-Inn  
8 LK Dingolfing-Landau  
9 Stadt und LK Landshut  
10 Stadt und LK Regensburg  
11 Stadt und LK München  
12 Städte Nürnberg/ Fürth/ Erlangen  
13 Oberpfalz  
14 Oberbayern  
15 übriges Bayern  
16 übriges Deutschland (ohne Bayern)  
17 Oberösterreich  
18 Region Salzburg  
19 übriges Österreich  
20 Region Budweis (Südböhmen)  
21 Region Pilsen (Westböhmen)  
22 Region Prag (Mittelböhmen)  
23 übriges Tschechien  
24 übriges Osteuropa (ohne Tschechien)  
25 übriges Westeuropa  
(ohne Deutschland und Österreich) 
 
26 übrige Welt  
13. Welche der genannten Regionen ist der 
 wichtigste Absatzmarkt für Ihren Betrieb? 
 
 Nummer der Region (vgl. Frage 12):  ___________ 
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Anmerkungen und Beispiele zu Frage 14 
 
In Frage 14 bitten wir Sie eine Tabelle zu den Kooperationen Ihres Betriebes in verschiedenen 
Unternehmensbereichen und mit verschiedenen Kooperationspartnern auszufüllen.  
 
 Mit Kooperationen sind dabei alle Formen der partnerschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit (z.B. Einkaufs- und 
Produktionsverbünde, gemeinsame Produktentwicklung) mit externen Partnern (z.B. anderen Unternehmen, 
Bildungseinrichtungen) gemeint.  
Nicht gemeint sind mit Kooperationen reine Marktbeziehungen, die nicht über ein einfaches Auftraggeber-
Auftragnehmer-Verhältnis hinausgehen.   
 
Dazu bitten wir Sie in Frage 14:  
- Kreuzen Sie für jeden Bereich und Partner die Regionen an, in denen Ihr Betrieb Kooperationen hat. 
- Markieren Sie die wichtigste Region für jeden Bereich und Partner mit einem Kringel. 
- Falls Ihr Betrieb in einem Bereich oder mit einem Partner keine Kooperationen hat, machen Sie dies bitte mit 
einem Kreuz in der ersten Zeile kenntlich. 
Ausfüllbeispiel: Stellen Sie sich vor, Ihr Betrieb ist an einer Einkaufskooperation mit einem Wettbewerber aus 
München beteiligt und setzt seine Waren zusammen mit tschechischen Vertriebspartnern in Tschechien ab, wobei der 
wichtigste Vertriebspartner in Pilsen sitzt. Ihr Betrieb ist zudem an einer Weiterbildungskooperation mit einer 
Hochschule in Passau beteiligt. In diesem Fall müssten Sie die Tabelle wie folgt ausfüllen:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kooperationen in folgenden 
Unternehmensbereichen: 
 
Kooperationen mit 
folgenden Partnern: 
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keine Kooperationen vorhanden  x   x  x x   
Landkreis Passau/Stadt Passau     x    x 
Oberpfalz          
Stadt München x       x  
Region Pilsen (Westböhmen)   x       
übriges Tschechien 
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 14. Im Folgenden interessieren uns Ihre Kooperationen (siehe Definition auf Seite 6) zu Partnern in 
 Regionen innerhalb und außerhalb Niederbayerns.  
 Dazu bitten wir Sie die Tabelle wie folgt auszufüllen: 
 –  Kreuzen Sie für jeden Bereich und für jeden Partner die Regionen an, in denen Ihr 
      Betrieb Kooperationen hat. 
 - Markieren Sie die wichtigste Region für jeden Bereich und Partner mit einem Kringel. 
 - Falls Ihr Betrieb in einem Bereich oder mit einem Partner keine Kooperationen hat,  
  machen Sie dies durch ein Kreuz in der ersten Zeile kenntlich.   
 
  
Kooperationen in folgenden 
Unternehmensbereichen: 
 
 
Kooperationen 
mit folgenden Partnern: 
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     keine Kooperationen vorhanden          
Niederbayern 
     LK Straubing-Bogen/ Stadt Straubing          
     LK Regen          
     LK Deggendorf          
     LK Freyung-Grafenau          
     LK Passau/ Stadt Passau          
     LK Rottal-Inn          
     LK Dingolfing-Landau          
     LK Landshut/ Stadt Landshut          
     LK Kelheim          
Bayern / Deutschland 
     Stadt und LK Regensburg          
     Stadt und LK München          
     Städte Nürnberg, Fürth, Erlangen          
     Oberpfalz          
     Oberbayern          
     übriges Bayern          
     übriges Deutschland (ohne Bayern)          
Österreich 
     Oberösterreich          
     Region Salzburg          
     übriges Österreich          
Tschechien 
     Region Budweis (Südböhmen)          
     Region Pilsen (Westböhmen)          
     Region Prag (Mittelböhmen)          
     übriges Tschechien          
Europa / Welt 
     übriges Westeuropa 
    (ohne Deutschland und Österreich) 
         
     übriges Osteuropa (ohne Tschechien)          
     übrige Welt          
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 15. Wenn Sie in einem Bereich keine Kooperationen 
 haben, was ist der Hauptgrund für die 
 Nichtkooperation?   
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
 
schlechte 
Erfahrungen 
mit Koopera-
tionspartnern 
keine ge-
eigneten 
Koopera-
tionspartner 
gefunden 
keine 
Koopera-
tions-
partner 
benötigt 
Beschaffung    
Produktion    
Absatz    
Aus- und 
Weiterbildung    
Forschung & 
Entwicklung    
 
C: ART UND INTENSITÄT DER KOOPERATION 
 
 Im nachfolgenden Abschnitt haben wir einige Fragen zu Art 
und Intensität der Kooperationsbeziehungen Ihres Betriebes. 
C1: KOOPERATIONEN IN DEN BEREICHEN 
BESCHAFFUNG, PRODUKTION UND ABSATZ 
 
 Im ersten Abschnitt geht es um Ihre Kooperationen in den  
Bereichen Beschaffung, Produktion und Absatz. (Wenn Sie in 
diesen Bereichen keine Kooperationen haben, gehen Sie zu 
Frage 21!) 
 
16. Nennen Sie für die Kooperation mit Zulieferern 
 (Vordienstleistern) und Produktionspartnern die 
 jeweilige Bedeutung der folgenden Motive. 
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
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Kosteneinsparung     
Qualtitätsverbesserung     
Erhöhung der 
Flexibilität     
bessere 
Kapazitätsauslastung     
Risikominderung     
Wissens- und 
Technologietransfer     
17. Nennen Sie für die Kooperation mit Vertriebs-
 partnern die Bedeutung der folgenden Motive 
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
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Kosteneinsparung     
Erhöhung der 
Flexibilität     
Zugang zum 
Absatzmarkt     
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18. Nennen Sie für jeden der Bereiche Beschaffung, 
 Produktion und Absatz die wichtigste Art und 
 Weise, in der Kooperationen zustande 
 gekommen sind.  
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
 
aktive 
Suche 
(z.B. 
Messen, 
Internet) 
persön-
liche 
Kontakte 
Empfeh-
lungen 
Kontakt 
über 
Kam-
mern 
Beschaffung     
Produktion     
Absatz     
19. Nennen Sie für jeden der Bereiche Beschaffung, 
 Produktion und Absatz das wichtigste Kriterium 
 für die Auswahl der Kooperationspartner. 
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
 Preis Qualität Ver-
trauen 
räum-
liche 
Nähe 
Beschaffung     
Produktion     
Absatz     
20. Nennen Sie für jeden der Bereiche Beschaffung, 
 Produktion und Absatz auf der nachfolgenden 
 Skala die Art und Intensität der 
 Kooperationsbeziehungen. 
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
 einzelfallweise 
Kooperation 
dauerhafte 
Kooperation 
 1 2 3 4 
Beschaffung     
Produktion     
Absatz     
 
C2: KOOPERATIONEN IN DEN BEREICHEN 
FORSCHUNG- UND ENTWICKLUNG SOWIE 
AUS- UND WEITERBILDUNG  
 
 Im nächsten Abschnitt haben wir einige Fragen zu Ihren 
Kooperationen im Bereich Aus- und Weiterbildung sowie im 
Bereich Forschung- und Entwicklung. (Wenn Sie in beiden 
Bereichen keine Kooperationen haben, gehen Sie zu Frage 27!) 
 
21. Mit welchen der folgenden Einrichtungen 
 unterhält Ihr Betrieb Aus- und 
 Weiterbildungskooperationen? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
keine Kooperationen  
allgemeinbildende Schulen  
berufsbildende Schulen  
Hochschulen  
Aus- und Weiterbildungsverbünde mit anderen 
Unternehmen  
Industrie- und Handelskammern, 
Handwerkskammern  
andere Aus- und Weiterbildungseinrichtungen 
(z.B. private, gemeinnützige)   
   
 22. Mit welchen der folgenden Einrichtungen 
 unterhält Ihr Betrieb Kooperationen im Bereich 
 Personal/Personalgewinnung? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
keine Kooperationen  
allgemeinbildende Schulen  
berufsbildende Schulen  
Hochschulen  
Personaldienstleister/private Arbeitsvermittler  
23. Mit welchen der folgenden Akteure hat Ihr Betrieb 
 Forschungs- und Entwicklungskooperationen/-
 kontakte? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
keine Kooperationen  
Unternehmen innerhalb der Unternehmensgruppe  
Zulieferer  
Wettbewerber/ andere Unternehmen  
der gleichen Branche  
außeruniversitäre Forschungseinrichtungen  
Hochschulen und/oder Technologiezentren  
Industrie- und Berufsverbände  
24. Wenn Ihr Betrieb Kooperationen mit Hochschulen 
 und/oder Technologiezentren hat, in welchen 
 Bereichen wird kooperiert? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
keine Kooperationen  
Entwicklung neuer Produkten und Dienstleistungen   
Entwicklung neuer Produktionsmethoden  
für Güter und Dienstleistungen  
Entwicklungen neuer  
Absatz- und Vermarktungsformen  
Kooperation im Bereich Personal  
25. Welche Formen der Forschungs- und 
 Entwicklungskooperationen nutzt Ihr Betrieb? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
informelle Treffen/ Gespräche  
Austausch von Personal  
gemeinsame Entwicklung neuer 
Produkte und/oder Prozesse 
 
Anpassung von extern entwickelten 
Produkten und/oder Prozessen 
 
Kauf von Lizenzen und Technologien  
von Kooperationspartnern 
 
26. Wie wichtig sind die folgenden Motive für die 
 Nutzung von Forschungs- und 
 Entwicklungskooperationen für Ihren Betrieb?  
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
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Kosteneinsparung     
Risikominderung     
Eintritt in neue Technologiefelder     
Zugang zu spezifischem Wissen     
schnellere Entwicklung neuer 
Produkte/Prozesse     
Erhöhung der finanziellen 
Möglichkeiten     
Aufbau langfristiger  
strategischer Partnerschaften     
 
C3: NETZWERKE, CLUSTER UND 
BRANCHENVERBÄNDE 
 
 Im nächsten Abschnitt interessieren uns Ihre Verflechtungen 
innerhalb von Netzwerken, Clustern oder Branchenverbänden. 
Dazu bitten wir Sie, die nachfolgenden Fragen zu beantworten. 
 
27. Ist Ihr Betrieb Mitglied eines Netzwerkes, Clusters 
 oder Branchenverbands? 
Ja   weiter mit Frage 28 
Nein   weiter mit Frage 31 
28. Bitte nennen Sie die Netzwerke, Cluster und/oder 
 Branchenverbände in denen Ihr Betrieb 
 Mitglied ist. 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
 wichtigstes/r Netzwerk/Cluster/Verband: 
  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
 weitere Netzwerke/Cluster/Verbände: 
 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
 ____________________________________________ 
29. Wie beschreiben Sie auf der folgenden Skala die 
 Kooperation in dem für Ihren Betrieb wichtigsten 
 Netzwerk, Cluster oder Branchenverband?  
einzelfallweise 
Kooperation 
dauerhafte  
Kooperation 
1 2 3 4 
    
30. Nennen Sie die Bedeutung der folgenden Motive 
 für die Mitgliedschaft in Netzwerken, Clustern 
 oder Branchenverbänden für Ihren Betrieb. 
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
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Erfahrungsaustausch und  
informelle Vernetzung     
Wissens- und 
Technologietransfer     
Gewinnung von 
Handelspartnern     
Erweiterung des 
Absatzmarktes     
Aufbau von 
Produktionskooperationen     
Marketing/Öffentlichkeitsarbeit     
bedarfsgerechte 
Personalgewinnung     
finanzielle Anreize durch 
Förderung     
 
«IHKNR»     «IHKNR»      «Kennung»
«Blatt4»  
 ABSCHNITT D: WEITERFÜHRENDE FRAGEN 
 
 Im letzten Abschnitt des Fragebogens haben wir noch einige 
weiterführende Fragen zum Kooperations- und 
Innovationspotential Ihres Betriebes. 
 
31. Planen Sie in den nächsten 1-2 Jahren 
 Veränderungen in Ihren Kooperationen? 
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
Ja, und zwar Aufbau neuer Kooperationen  
Ja, und zwar Vertiefung bestehender 
Kooperationen  
Ja, und zwar Einschränkung/ Beendigung 
bestehender Kooperationen  
Nein, es sind keine Veränderungen in den 
Kooperationen geplant  
32. Wie relevant sind die folgenden 
 Kooperationshemmnisse für Ihren Betrieb?  
 
   Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile nur ein Kreuz! 
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räumliche Distanz     
fehlendes Vertrauen     
fehlendes Know-how der 
potentiellen Partner     
fehlende Cluster- oder 
Netzwerkinitiativen     
administrative-rechtliche  
Hemmnisse     
sprachlich-kulturelle 
Hemmnisse     
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33. Werden in Ihrem Betrieb Forschungs- und 
 Entwicklungsaktivitäten durchgeführt? 
 Wenn ja, wie hoch waren die Ausgaben Ihres 
 Betriebes für Forschungs- und Entwicklungs-
 aktivitäten (FuE) in Prozent des Umsatzes 
 im Jahr 2011? 
Nein  
Ja, und zwar bis zu 2,5% des Umsatzes      
Ja, und zwar bis zu 7% des Umsatzes      
Ja, mehr als 7% des Umsatzes      
34. Welche der folgenden Innovationen hat Ihr 
 Betrieb in den letzten drei Jahren eingeführt? 
  Innovationen sind Neuerungen, die in Ihrem Betrieb 
 eingeführt worden sind. Es muss sich dabei nicht um 
 Marktneuheiten handeln.    
 
  Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich! 
Neue oder signifikant verbesserte Produkte und 
Dienstleistungen  
Neue oder signifikant verbesserte 
Produktionsmethoden für Güter und 
Dienstleistungen 
 
Neue Formen der Organisation interner Prozesse 
(Wissensmanagement,supply chain 
management, Qualitätsmanagement, etc.) 
 
Neue Formen der Arbeitsorganisation (neue Aus- 
und Weiterbildungssysteme, Teamwork, etc. )  
Neue Formen der externen Beziehungen (neue 
Kooperationen und Partnerschaften, 
Outsourcing, etc.) 
 
Neue Formen des Absatzes und der 
Vermarktung (neue Designs/Verpackungen, 
Werbemaßnahmen, Vertriebskanäle) 
 
keine Innovationen  
 
 
 
 Vielen Dank für Ihre Mitarbeit am Fragebogen. Falls Sie Anmerkungen, Hinweise oder Anregungen zu 
einzelnen Fragen oder zum Fragebogen insgesamt haben, teilen Sie uns diese bitte mit. 
 
 Anmerkungen zum Fragebogen: 
 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Kontaktdaten des Ansprechpartners für Rückfragen in Ihrem Betrieb: 
 
 Name:   __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Email:  ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Telefon:   _________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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II.2 Representativity Tests
Table II.1: Representativity by Size: IHK Firmsa
IHK Strukturdaten Firm Survey by NIW
< 1 employee 86.2% 4.1%
1 - 9 employees 9.3% 41.4%
10 to 49 employees 3.5% 33.1%
50 to 99 employees 0.5% 8.9%
100 to 249 employees 0.3% 6.3%
250 to 999 employees 0.2% 4.7%
> 1000 employees 0.01% 1.5%
a Values are based on the IHK/HWK Strukturdaten (2012). Table entries
show that micro-firms with no employees are largely underrepresented in
the sample. This results from the fact that firms with an annual turnover
< 17, 500 Euro are excluded from the analysis. When excluding this
category, the sample is, however, representative for the entire population
of Lower Bavarian firms.
Table II.2: Representativity by County: IHK Firmsa
IHK Strukturdaten Firm Survey by NIW
Passau 24.5% 22.3%
Regen 6.1% 9.3%
Deggendorf 10.8% 13.4%
Freyung-Grafenau 5.8% 8.4%
Landshut 20.0% 15.7%
Straubing and Straubing-Bogen 13.0% 13.9%
Rottal-Inn 12.4% 10.5%
Dingolfing-Landau 7.5% 6.4%
a Values are based on the IHK/HWK Strukturdaten (2012). Table entries show that
firms from Regen and Deggendorf are slightly overrepresented, whereas firms from
Straubing are slightly underrepresented in the firm sample. The χ2-test, however,
indicates that no significant correlation between firms’ location and their consider-
ation in the sample exists (χ2 = 5.12 with 7 DF).
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Table II.3: Representativity by County: HWK Firmsa
HWK Strukturdaten Firm Survey by NIW
Passau 21.7% 20.2%
Regen 7.8% 9.5%
Deggendorf 10.9% 9.9%
Freyung-Grafenau 7.6% 7.2%
Landshut 19.6% 16.0%
Straubing and Straubing-Bogen 12.8% 15.2%
Rottal-Inn 12.1% 13.7%
Dingolfing-Landau 7.6% 8.4%
a Values are based on the IHK/ HWK Strukturdaten (2012). Table entries show that
firms from Regen and Straubing are slightly overrepresented, whereas firms from
Landshut are slightly underrepresented in the firm sample. The χ2-test, however, in-
dicates that no significant correlation between firms’ location and their consideration
in the sample exists (χ2 = 1.99 with 7 DF).
Item Response Test
Table II.4: Item-Response Analysis: Cooperation and Innovation Variablesa
Missing Innovation Variable Missing Cooperation Variable
Firm Size .001 .001
(.300) (1.10)
Firm sector .177 -.068
(1.15) (-.580)
Innovation -.462
(-1.36)
Scope Cooperation -.079
(-1.12)
Constant -2.53*** -1.41***
(-5.55) (-4.29)
Observations 453 488
McFadden’s R2 .011 .012
a Table entries denote regression coefficients of a logistic regression model with a binary
variable for missing values on the cooperation variable and missing values on the in-
novation variable as the dependent variable. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote
significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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II.3 Results for an Extended Choice Set
Table II.5: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Cooperation Decisions:
Extended Choice Seta
County/ Lower Bavaria/ Bavaria Austria Czech Rep. World/
Germany/ Germany/ Germany/ Germany/ Germany/ Germany/
Specification I
Constant 2.87*** 1.50* 1.40 .067*** .100*** .433**
(.609) (.354) (.335) (.048) (.061) (.144)
Observations 1547
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size .998*** .999** .999*** 1.00** .999 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .263*** .359** .259*** 3.71e+09 3.41e+07 4.51e+07
(.075) (.107) (.077) (1.07e+13) (1.04e+11) (6.98e+10)
Service Sector .128*** .097*** .188*** 34.89 .207 .287
(.041) (.037) (.064) (202452.80) (1075.83) (770.61)
Constant 11.922*** 4.580*** 5.486*** 2.08e-11 5.60e-09 1.46e-08
(3.14) (1.28) (1.51) (5.99e-08) (.001) (.001)
Observations 1337
McFadden’s R2 .060
Specification III
Firm Size .999 .999 .999 1.00 1.00 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .547 .631 .572 4.95e+09*** 3.36e+07*** 1.75e+08***
(.424) (.518) (.514) (2.88e+10) (3.73e+07) (7.33e+08)
Service Sector .486 .175 .621 116.01 .425 2.54
(.440) (.199) (.658) (694.69) (.455) (11.21)
R&D Activites .183** .330 .461 .198 .553 .725
(.117) (.227) (.344) (.282) (.734) (.742)
Constant 14.89*** 5.64** 3.76* 4.85e-11*** 1.00e-08*** 3.57e-09***
(9.74) (3.96) (2.76) (3.26e-10) (1.42e-08) (1.59e-08)
Observations 1155
McFadden’s R2 .081
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Reference category: Germany. Reference
category sector variable: construction sector. Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significance
of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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II.4 Results for Various Reference Categories
Reference: Same County
Table II.6: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spa-
tial Cooperation Decisions: Reference Same Countya
Lower Bavaria/ Bavaria/ Germany Abroad
County/ County/ County/ County/
Specification I
Constant .523*** .488*** .349*** .209***
(.096) (.092) (.074) (.054)
Observations 1105
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size 1.0** 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector 1.36 .987 3.80*** 4.77e+07
(.283) (.200) (1.28) (3.09e+10)
Service Sector .756 1.47 7.81*** 3.28
(.256) (.399) (2.97) (3779.74)
Constant .384*** .460*** .084*** 6.13e-09
(.064) (.073) (.026) (3.96e-06)
Observations 955
McFadden’s R2 .061
Specification III
Firm Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector 1.15 1.05 1.83 1.41e+08***
(.553) (.602) (1.42) (4.67e+08)
Service Sector .361 1.28 2.06 8.12
(.335) (1.05) (1.86) (27.92)
R&D Activites 1.80 2.52 5.46 2.95
(.855) (1.42) (3.46) (2.11)
Constant .379** .253** .067*** 1.06e-09***
(.149) (.107) (.044) (3.68e-09)
Observations 825
McFadden’s R2 .083
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Reference
category: same county. Reference category sector variable: construction sector.
Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the
estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Reference: Lower Bavaria
Table II.7: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Coop-
eration Decisions: Reference Lower Bavariaa
County/ Bavaria/ Germany Abroad
Lower Bavaria/ Lower Bavaria/ Lower Bavaria/ Lower Bavaria/
Specification I
Constant 1.91*** .033 .667* .400**
(.352) (.200) (.157) (.112)
Observations 1105
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size .999** 1.00 1.00*** 1.00**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .733 .724 2.78*** 3.50e+07
(.152) (.171) (.988) (2.26e+10)
Service Sector 1.32 1.95* 10.33*** 4.33
(.448) (.707) (4.66) (5000.62)
Constant 2.60*** 1.20 .218*** 1.60e-08
(.439) (.231) (.072) (.001)
Observations 955
McFadden’s R2 .061
Specification III
Firm Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .867 .907 1.59 1.23e+08***
(.416) (.589) (1.30) (4.04e+08)
Service Sector 2.77 3.54 5.71 22.53
(2.57) (3.80) (6.48) (78.30)
R&D Activites .556 1.40 3.03 1.64
(.264) (.852) (2.09) (1.19)
Constant 2.64** .667 .177*** 2.80e-09***
(1.04) (.333) (.125) (9.75e-09)
Observations 825
McFadden’s R2 .083
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Reference category:
Lower Bavaria. Reference category sector variable: construction sector. Firm clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Reference: Bavaria
Table II.8: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spa-
tial Cooperation Decisions: Reference Bavariaa
County/ Lower Bavaria/ Germany Abroad
Bavaria/ Bavaria/ Bavaria/ Bavaria/
Specification I
Constant 2.05*** 1.07 .714 .429***
(.386) (.230) (.171) (.121)
Observations 1105
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size .999** 1.00 1.00*** 1.00***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector 1.01 1.38 3.85*** 4.84e+07
(.205) (.326) (1.35) (3.13e+10)
Service Sector .680 .514* 5.31*** 2.23
(.184) (.187) (2.13) (2569.25)
Constant 2.17*** .835 .182*** 1.33e-08
(.344) (.161) (.059) (8.61e-06)
Observations 955
McFadden’s R2 .061
Specification III
Firm Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector .957 1.10 1.75 1.35e+08***
(.551) (.717) (1.57) (4.49e+08)
Service Sector .783 .282 1.61 6.36
(.642) (.303) (1.71) (21.97)
R&D Activites .398 .716 2.17 1.18
(.224) (.438) (1.62) (.927)
Constant 3.96*** 1.50 .265* 4.19e-09***
(1.68) (.749) (.195) (1.46e-08)
Observations 825
McFadden’s R2 .083
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Reference
Category: Bavaria. Reference category sector variable: construction sector.
Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the
estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Reference: Europe/World
Table II.9: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors on Firms’ Spatial Co-
operation Decisions: Reference Europe/Worlda
County/ Lower Bavaria/ Bavaria Germany
Abroad/ Abroad/ Abroad/ Abroad/
Specification I
Constant 4.78*** 2.50*** 2.33*** 1.67*
(1.24) (.699) (.659) (.498)
Observations 1105
McFadden’s R2 .001
Specification II
Firm Size .997*** .998*** 1.00*** 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector 2.09e-08 2.86e-08 2.07e-08*** 7.96e-08
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Service Sector .305 .231 .449 2.38
(352.31) (266.29) (518.30) (2750.68)
Constant 1.63e+08*** 6.26e+07 7.50e+07*** 1.37e+07
(1.05e+11) (4.05e+10) (4.85e+10) (8.84e+09)
Observations 955
McFadden’s R2 .061
Specification III
Firm Size .998* .998* .998* 1.00
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Sector
Manufac. Sector 7.08e-09*** 8.16e-09*** 7.40e-09*** 1.29e-08***
(2.34e-08) (2.69e-08) (2.46e-08) (4.23e-08)
Service Sector .123 .044 .157 .253
(.424) (.154) (.543) (.871)
R&D Activites .339 .609 .850 1.85
(.242) (.443) (.671) (1.58)
Constant 9.45e+08*** 3.58e+08*** 2.39e+08*** 6.33e+07***
(3.29e+09) (1.25e+09) (8.34e+08) (2.21e+08)
Observations 825
McFadden’s R2 .083
a Table entries denote relative risk ratios of a multinomial logit model. Reference category:
Europe/World. Reference category sector variable: construction sector. Firm clustered
standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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II.5 Subsample Analyses for Manufacturing Firms
Any Innovation
Table II.10: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation of Manufacturing
Firms: National Partnersa
Lower Bavaria Bavaria Munich Germany
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .037 .131 .029 .052 .087 064 .034 0 .018 .041 0 .026
(.670) (1.22) (.530) (.910) (.650) (1.13) (.620) (.) (.240) (.600) (.) (.380)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22 .21 .21 .21
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation. Dependent vari-
ables: Innovation (any type of innovation). Reference category for sectoral variables: construction sector. T statistics in
parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table II.11: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Innovation of Man-
ufacturing Firms: International Partnersa
Austria Czech Republic Distant Regions
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .216** 0 .216** -.028 0 -.028 .189 -.461* .188
(2.92) (.) (2.92) (-.240) (.) (-.240) (1.50) (-1.98) (1.49)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation.
Dependent variables: Innovation (any type of innovation). Reference category for sectoral variables:
construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Product Innovation
Table II.12: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Innovation of Manufacturing
Firms: National Partnersa
Lower Bavaria Bavaria Munich Germany
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation -.061 .011 -.074 .048 .088 .076 -.041 0 -.024 .133* .014 .123*
(-1.06) (.140) (-1.31) (.820) (.860) (1.27) (-.710) (.) (-.710) (2.17) (.130) (1.96)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22 .21 .21 .21
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation. Dependent variables:
product innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables: construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote
significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table II.13: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Product Inno-
vation of Manufacturing Firms: International Partnersa
Austria Czech Republic Distant Regions
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .114 0 .114 .063 0 .063 .168* .029 .163*
(1.62) (.) (1.62) (.610) (.) (.610) (2.07) (.140) (1.99)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on in-
novation. Dependent variables: product innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables:
construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Process Innovation
Table II.14: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation of Manufacturing
Firms: National Partnersa
Lower Bavaria Bavaria Munich Germany
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .015 .059 -.021 -.052 .034 -.072 -.001 0 -.103 -.058 -.084 -.041
(.280) (.970) (-.400) (-.940) (.450) (-1.25) (-.020) (.) (-1.35) (-.990) (-1.03) (-.700)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22 .21 .21 .21
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation. Dependent variables:
process innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables: construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote
significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table II.15: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Process Innovation of
Manufacturing Firms: International Partnersa
Austria Czech Republic Distant Regions
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation -.050 .164 -.050 -.105 0 -.105 -.236*** -.107 -.222***
(-.730) (.920) (-.730) (-1.18) (.) (-1.18) (-3.61) (-.760) (-3.35)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation. Depen-
dent variables: process innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables: construction sector. T statistics
in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Non-Technology Innovation
Table II.16: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technology Innovation of
Manufacturing Firms: National Partnersa
Lower Bavaria Bavaria Munich Germany
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .025 -.045 .059 .099 .046 .138* .012 0 .032 .039 .033 .088
(.370) (-.490) (.900) (1.48) (.400) (2.05) (.180) (.) (.360) (.510) (.270) (1.18)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22 .21 .21 .21
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innovation. Dependent variables:
non-technology innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables: construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars
denote significance of the estimates as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table II.17: Impact of Various Cooperation Patterns on Non-Technology
Innovation of Manufacturing Firms: International Partnersa
Austria Czech Republic Distant Regions
all RD Appl all RD Appl all RD Appl
Cooperation .090 -.221 .090 .021 0 .021 .107 -.370 .135
(1.08) (-.920) (1.08) (.170) (.) (.170) (1.15) (-1.81) (1.45)
Firm Size
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R&D Contribution
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
McFadden’s R2 .21 .21 .21 .22 .21 .23 .22 .21 .22
a Table entries denote average marginal effects of various cooperation patterns (columns) on innova-
tion. Dependent variables: non-technology innovation. Reference category for sectoral variables:
construction sector. T statistics in parentheses. Stars denote significance of the estimates as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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